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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS
Abstract: This dissertation examines who should be held liable under international 
criminal law for international crimes committed by child soldiers. In order to do so, 
analysis of primary sources of international criminal law such as the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone as well 
as analysis of their jurisprudence is conducted. This thesis also looks at the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and at transitional justice mechanisms. It concludes that adults 
who unlawfully recruit and use child soldiers must be the ones held criminally 
responsible for the crimes committed by these children. It also concludes that in theory, 
child soldiers who were over 15 years at the time of the crimes could be prosecuted for 
these. However, this solution is not recommended because other solutions maybe better 
adapted to deal with child soldiers.
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Chapter 1: Introduction - Child Soldiers and International Criminal Law
I lifted my gun to start firing. Ahead I could see a group of jallabas 
standing between two huts, and I pointed my gun at them. I started 
firing (...) Suddenly, I felt powerful, strong. My gun was speaking for 
me as it spat bullets. My gun was taking my revenge.1
Child soldiers commit unspeakable crimes including murder, torture and rape.2 *These 
crimes are directed against other combatants or civilians, whether they are enemies or 
members from their own communities. Nevertheless, child soldiers are complex 
individuals who cannot be categorized as mere perpetrators deserving punishment. 
Oftentimes, their early victimization creates the conditions under which they commit 
crimes, and they are victims of the crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers.4 This 
dual perpetrator-victim framework therefore gives rise to difficult legal questions. When 
a society tries to reconstruct itself after an armed conflict, criminal justice is often part of 
the process, thereby providing retribution against those responsible for committing 
crimes.5 But what about the crimes committed by child soldiers? Who should be held 
criminally liable for these? Should it be the individuals; who recruit and use the child 
soldiers? Should it be child soldiers themselves? These questions are analyzed throughout
1 Emmanuel Jal, War Child: A Child Soldier’s Story (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2009) at 140.
2 Office o f  the Special Representative o f  the Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflicts
"Recruiting or Using Child Soldiers", online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/childsoldiers.html>; David M. Crane, "Prosecuting Children 
in Times o f  Conflict: the West African Experience" (2008) 15 Hum Rts Brief 11 at 12 [Crane]; Matthew 
Happold, “Child Soldiers, Victims or Perpetrators?” (2008) 29 U La Veme L Rev 56 at 78.
* Ibid.
4 Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 
July 2002) [Rome Statute], art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) ; Agreement Between the United Nations and 
the Government o f  Sierra Leone on the Establishment o f a Special Court fo r  Sierra Leone, 16 January 
2002, 2178 U.N.T.SS 138 (entered into force 12 April 2002) [Statute o f the SCSL], art. 4(c).
5 Joanna R. Quinn, Transitional Justice, by M. Goodhart (London: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Transitional Justice is concerned with how to rebuild societies after human rights’ violations. Retributive 
justice constitutes one way to do so, alongside with restorative and reparative justice.
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this thesis from an international criminal legal perspective. First, this thesis examines the 
war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers in order to determine the exact nature 
of the crime and whether it includes liability for crimes committed by child soldiers. 
Second, it explores whether child soldiers could be held liable for their crimes and, if so, 
whether this solution is to be recommended. Mechanisms other than criminal proceedings 
might be better adapted in order to achieve the aim of punishing child soldiers for their 
crimes but also reintegrating them within society. Before getting to the core of the topic, 
however, it is necessary to provide some background on the themes studied throughout 
this thesis - namely international criminal law and child soldiers - as well as giving some 
methodological explanations.
I- International Criminal Law
International criminal law deals with criminal liability of individuals for international 
crimes. Even though this area of the law is a branch of public international law, 
international criminal law is very unique in the sense that responsibility is not imposed 
upon states.6 Instead, liability is imposed upon individuals who can be prosecuted and
n  \
convicted when accused of international crimes. The aim of the present section is to 
situate where the international crimes committed by child soldiers fit within the area of 
international criminal law. In order to do so, this section gives an overview of the 
historical development of international criminal law. Then, it distinguishes international 
criminal law with other areas of the law. Lastly, a definition of international crimes is 
provided. *1
2
6 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (New York: Cambridge 




International criminal law is a relatively new area of the law with most of its 
developments stemming from jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals over the 
last fifteen years. Originally, it developed under the umbrella of international 
humanitarian law, but has since become an autonomous area of the law.
1- Link With International Humanitarian Law
International criminal law has its roots in international humanitarian law. The latter 
emerged in the late 19th century as a body of law applicable to states when engaged in 
armed conflicts.8 It deals with the jus in bello, which is the law applicable to conduct 
within armed conflicts, as opposed to the jus ad bellum, which is the law on the 
prevention of war.9 International humanitarian law finds its sources in the first Geneva 
Convention of 186410 “which dealt with ameliorating the conditions of wounded soldiers 
on battlefields”,11 and in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and , 190712 13“which imposed 
limitations on methods of warfare that could be employed by states.” After World War 
I, individuals started to be prosecuted on the basis* of breaches of international 
humanitarian standards.14 This can be considered as a first step towards the founding of
8 Robert J. Currie, International and Transnational Criminal Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) [Currie] at 4.
9 International Committee o f  the Red Cross “What are jus ad bellum and jus in bello” (2004), online: ICRC
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5kzjjd.htm>. ■ : : •. ;
10 Convention for the Amelioration o f the Condition o f Wounded in Armies in the Field, 22 August 1864,
CanT.S. 1942 No 6. ,
11 Currie, supra note 8 at 4.
12 First Peace Conference o f  the Hague (29 July 1899); Second Peace Conference o f the Hague (18 
October 1907), online: ICRC <www.icrc.org>. .
13 Currie, supra note 8 at 4.
14 Ibid  at 5. The Leipzig trials which started in 1921, found their legal basis in the 1919 Treaty o f  Versailles 
(Treaty o f  Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (1919) T.S.). However, they 
were largely unsuccessful because in the end only 12 trials took place. The Kaiser who was supposed to be 
prosecuted in accordance with art. 227 o f  the Treaty o f  Versailles fled to the Netherlands which refused to 
extradite him. Therefore, he was never prosecuted.
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an independent area of international law called international criminal law. Indeed, for the 
first time in history, individuals were being held responsible for breaches of international 
law as opposed to state responsibility.15 Modem international humanitarian law is based 
upon the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.16 
These treaties provide for criminalization of grave breaches of humanitarian standards 
during war time.17 18Thus, international criminal law evolved to deal with breaches of 
international humanitarian law which are so grave that they are criminalized. However, 
international criminal law is also broader than criminalization of certain aspects of 
international humanitarian law. It has developed as an autonomous area of the law to also 
include behaviour occurring outside a situation of armed conflict.
2- From WWII to the creation o f the ICC
International prosecutions have developed in the aftermath of the Second World
1 O
War. After the atrocities committed during this period of history, the international 
community realized that states should work together in order to end impunity for those 
who violated the most fundamental norms of international humanitarian law. This led to 
the creation of two international military tribunals: the Nuremberg military tribunal and
15 Ludwig Dithmar and John Boldt were each sentenced to four years imprisonment, the harshest sentence 
imposed upon accused who faced the Leipzig Trials. This case is also known as the Llandovery Castle 
Case. The other individuals found guilty were Karl Heynen, Emil Muller, Robert Neumann, Karl Stenger 
and Benno Crusius.
16 Convention fo r  the Amelioration o f  the Condition o f the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [GCI\; Convention for the Amelioration 
o f  the Condition o f  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [GC1I\; Convention relative to the Treatment o f Prisoners 
o f War, 12 August 1949, , 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) [GCIIJ]; Convention 
Relative to the Protection o f  Civilian Persons in Time o f  War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) [GC1V]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection o f  Victims o f  International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 7 December 1979) [API]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection o f  Victims o f  Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 
(entered into force 7 December 1978) [APII],
11 Ibid
18 Cryer, supra note 6 at 111.
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the Tokyo military tribunal.19 201The indictments before these tribunals contained counts of 
war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. Crimes against 
humanity represented a new type of crime under international law, thereby expanding the
91realm of international criminal law.
The next step in the development of international criminal law was the adoption of the 
1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.22 23This convention provides a definition of the international crime of genocide. 
It is also the pillar for the definition of the crime of genocide provided by the Statutes of 
various international criminal tribunals. Individuals charged with genocide “shall be 
tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, 
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”24 256The same year, in 1948, 
the General Assembly invited the International Law Commission "to study the 
desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of 
persons charged with genocide . . . "  Despite the negotiation of several draft Statutes,
<y/r
states could not agree for many decades on the establishment of such a tribunal. It was 
not until 1989, under the impulse of Trinidad and Tobago, that the International Law 
Commission resumed its work, with a larger focus on the creation of a permanent
19 Charter o f the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279; Charter o f the 
International Military Tribunal fo r  the Far East, 19 January 1946, TIAS 1589 (amended 26 April 1946).
20 Cryer, supra note 6 at 112 and 116.
21 Currie, supra note 8 at 118.
22 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 
277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) [Genocide Convention].
23 Currie, supra note 8 at 108.
24 Genocide Convention, supra note 22, art. VI.
25 Study by the International Law Commission o f  thé Question o f  an International Criminal Jurisdiction, 
GA Res 260 B (III), UNGAOR, T948, UN Doc A/760 and Corr.1-2.
26 Finalization was put o ff because o f  a lack o f  consensus over the definition o f  the crime o f  aggression: 
International Criminal Jurisdiction, GA Res 898 (IX), UNGAOR, 512 Plenary Meeting, UN Doc A/2827, 
(1954); See also Currie, supra note 8 at 177.
international criminal court to prosecute genocide and other international crimes.27 28The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was subsequently adopted in 
1998, with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for the so-called core crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. These crimes are 
considered so grave that they “shock the conscience of humanity.”29 301All of them are 
defined by the Rome Statute. An important feature of the ICC is its complementary 
character. Investigations and prosecutions may be initiated only where states that would 
have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes covered by the Rome Statute are unwilling or
<5 I
unable to do so. Apart from the ICC, some time-limited tribunals have been created to 
address crimes committed in specific conflicts. For instance, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) were created pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council of the 
United Nations.32 3Others, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) or the 
Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, are hybrid jurisdictions containing international 
and domestic elements.
Because of its history, international criminal law is strongly linked to international 
humanitarian law. It is also linked to other areas such as international human rights law 
and transnational criminal law. :
6
27Cryer, supra note 6 at 120.
28 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5. .
Ibid, preamble.
30 Ibid, arts. 6; 7; and 8. Definition o f  the crime o f  aggression was decided during the first review 
conference held in Kampala in June 2010. It is included in art. 8 bis o f  the Rome Statute.
31 Ibid, art. 17(1 )(a).
32 Tribunal (Former Yugoslavia), SC Res 827,UNSCOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/827 (1993); 
Establishment o f an International Tribunal fo r  Rwanda and adoption o f  the Statute o f  the Tribunal, SC Res 
955, UNSCOR, 49th Sess, UN Doc S/Res/955 (1994).
33 Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 4; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government o f  
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law o f  Crimes Committed During the Period o f  
Democratic Kampuchea, 6 June 2003, 2329 UNTS 117 (entered into force 29 April 2005).
B- International Criminal Law, Transnational Law and International Human Rights 
. Law
One characteristic of international criminal law is its universality: it deals with crimes 
that are so grave that they shock the conscience of humanity and their perpetrators are 
enemies of humankind.34 This universality is exercised both through direct and indirect 
enforcement. Direct enforcement is illustrated by the fact that the ICC has potential 
universal jurisdiction to try any individual.35 Indirect enforcement is illustrated by the 
fact that any state can prosecute an individual who committed an international crime, 
without regard for a link between the state and the criminal.36 This universal character of 
international criminal law creates linkages with, but also differentiates it from, other areas 
of international law.
International criminal law is to be distinguished from international human rights law 
in the sense that these areas of the law are distinct from, but inform, each other. Indeed, 
the former deals with prosecution of individuals for massive human rights violations. 
However, some violations existing under international human rights law are not 
considered as international crimes per se and cannot be prosecuted before international 
criminal tribunals. For instance, the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute torture 
(when it does not amount to a crime against humanity or war crime) or terrorism. 
International criminal law is also to be distinguished from transnational criminal law. The 
latter deals with cooperation between states in order to prevent and punish trans-border
34 Ibid at 18; This universality character is considered as the most controversial principle o f  jurisdiction in 
international criminal law, Cryer, supra note 6 at 44.
35 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 13.
36 Currie, supra note 8 at 76. It is important to note the distinction between “custodial universal jurisdiction 
where “states enforce universal jurisdiction over a perpetrator where that person is apprehended in their 
territory” and “absolute universal jurisdiction whereby a state will initiate proceedings without waiting until 
the offender is present on its territory”.
7
• i ncrimes. In this situation, crimes prosecuted are not international crimes. Instead, they 
are crimes under national jurisdictions but they have an international element or effect.37 8 39
For instance, drug trafficking is a transnational crime where planning of the crime may 
occur in one state, while narcotics are grown and processed in a second state in order to
’iQbe sold in several other states. In this situation, cooperation between the states involved 
is necessary. Therefore, states enter into international agreements in order to help each 
other to enforce domestic laws and with the aim of preventing transnational crimes to 
occur. International criminal law, on the other hand, deals with international crimes. It 
can be directly enforced by international criminal tribunals, meaning that perpetrators are 
prosecuted by international courts.40 But international criminal law can also.be indirectly 
enforced through domestic prosecutions.41
C- International Crimes
International crimes are crimes that are deemed by the international community to 
transcend the domestic criminal law of any state.42 They are so egregious that they can be 
prosecuted by international tribunals or by any state under the universal jurisdiction 
principle.43 International crimes can be divided into two categories: core crimes and other 
international crimes.44 The core crimes, namely genocide, crime against humanity, war 
crimes and crimes of aggression are part of customary international law.45 Their 
customary character implies that every single state must comply with the obligations
8
37 Currie, supra note 8 at 23.
38 Cryer, supra note 6 at 3.
39 Currie, supra note 8 at 23.
40 Ibid, chapter 4.
41 Ibid, chapter 5.





Ibid  at 18.
Ibid.
related to them, even when they are not party to a treaty imposing them. Also, states are 
under the legal duty to criminalize them. This category constitutes international crimes in 
the strict sense because their perpetrators can be prosecuted by international criminal 
tribunals. Other international crimes such as torture (not rising to the level of crimes 
against humanity or war crimes), piracy or slavery (not rising to the level of crimes 
against humanity or war crimes), do not give rise to direct criminal responsibility before 
international tribunals.46 Instead, their prosecution is left to domestic jurisdictions which 
can prosecute them, including under the universality principle.
To this point, it is necessary to give a brief definition of each of the international 
crimes. Genocide finds its definitional basis in the Genocide Convention.47 48It is any one 
of a number of acts committed with intent to destroy at least a substantial part of a 
national, racial, ethnic or religious group. The notion of crimes against humanity 
leading to individual criminal responsibility emerged in the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal.49 The definition was aimed at addressing crimes committed by 
governments against their own populations.50 While a nexus to armed conflict was 
originally required, this requirement disappeared in the ICTR and ICC Statutes.51 52It is any 
one of a number of prohibited acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. The crime of aggression is the “planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid at 108.
48 Genocide convention, supra note 22, arl 2.
49 Agreement fo r  the Prosecution and Punishment o f the Major War Criminals o f the European Axis, 8 
August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
50 Currie, supra note 8 at 118.
51 Ibid  at 119.
52 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(1); Statute o f  the SCSL, supra note 4 art. 2; Statute o f the International 
Criminal Tribunal fo r  Rwanda, 8 November 1994, 33 ILM 1598 [ICTR Statute], art. 3.
9
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direct the political or military action of a state, of an act of aggression.”53 This definition 
was agreed upon during the first review conference of the Rome Statute that occurred in 
Kampala, Uganda, in 2010.54 However, the ICC will not be able to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until 2017.55 Turning to war crimes, they are 
acts occurring in violation of international humanitarian law standards during an armed 
conflict.56 There must be a nexus between the armed conflict and the crime. At first, only 
crimes occurring in the framework of an international armed conflict were covered.57 *
However, the Statute of the ICTR and the Rome Statute include crimes occurring during
co
internal armed conflicts. According to the Rome Statute, war crimes are “grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949” and “other serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.”59 It also includes acts 
listed by the Rome Statute, when, “in the case of an armed conflict not of an international 
character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949” occur, and, also “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.”60 The present thesis 
focuses on the war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers, whether occurring in 
international or internal armed conflict. To a lesser extent, it also covers genocide and 
crimes against humanity because, in addition to war crimes, these are crimes that may be 










Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8 bis.
Cryer, supra note 6. -
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 15 bis entitled Exercise o f  Jurisdiction Over the Crime o f  Aggression.
Ibid at 221.
Ibid  at 230. /: i
Ibid.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(a) and (b). ; ; V
Ibid, arts. 8(2)(c) and (d).
Ibid, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
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international criminal law deals with the crimes committed by child soldiers, it also 
acknowledges that criminal prosecutions by international tribunals may not always be 
recommended.
D- Relevance of International Criminal Law
Both international criminal law, and international criminal tribunals, have been subject 
to criticism. It is therefore important to acknowledge and address these concerns.
The main criticism of international criminal law is that it purports to be universal in 
character but is not so in reality. Critics identify the lack of universality both in the 
objects and the subjects of international criminal tribunals. Concerning the objects, 
international criminal tribunals themselves are seen as political actors seeking to 
implement a western view of justice.62 63As such, their principal aims are retribution and 
deterrence as opposed to reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction: “this has often 
been portrayed as a debate between peace versus justice, which seems to pit the 
International Criminal Court against, [for example, a domestic] Amnesty Act.” Some 
critics interested in post-conflict reconstruction are concerned that international criminal 
tribunals operating in conflict-ridden societies may prove to be an impediment to the 
resolution of conflict and cessation of hostilities.64 Moreover, international criminal 
tribunals are often criticized for being located too far from those most affected by the 
conflict and the crimes the tribunals are meant to address - the victims. This lack of 
proximity is both geographical and legal. It is geographical insofar as most international
62 Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts” (2003) Chinese JIL 78 at 93.
63 Joanna Quinn, “Getting to Peace? Negotiating with the LRA in Northern Uganda” (2009) 10 Human 
Rights Review 55 at 63.
64 Joanna Quinn, “Introduction” (2009) 10 Human Rights Review 1 at 1; Kasaija Phillipp Apuuli, “The ICC 
Arrest Warrants for the Lords Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda” (2006) 
4 Journal o f  International Criminal Justice 179 at 180.
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criminal tribunals are located outside of the country of conflict, and those that are located 
within the country of conflict are viewed as largely inaccessible to victims of the 
atrocities being prosecuted.65 This lack of proximity is also legal, where victims view 
justice as something different than the application of criminal law. For instance, “whereas 
in Uganda the ICC Prosecutor seeks justice through criminal prosecutions, victim 
communities seek justice through peace and traditional reintegration ceremonies.”66 And 
yet the ICC’s own character of complementarity appears to try -  to some extent -  bridge 
that gap because its jurisdiction will be triggered only when genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes would otherwise go unpunished and there is some prosecutorial 
leeway in making this decision: “the ICC, given its mandate, must generally insist on 
prosecution, but there may be exceptional circumstances where it would not be in the 
interests of justice to interfere with a reconciliation mechanism, even though that
mechanism falls short of prosecution of all offenders.”67
 ̂ *
These concerns about the objects of international criminal law and tribunals raise
important considerations for this thesis. This thesis does not advocate for a blind use of
international criminal law, without regard to the consequences. It argues for a deeper
understanding of what is done to child soldiers by adults, and their international criminal
liability as a result, as well as an understanding of what is done child soldiers and
international options for addressing these acts. In exploring this dual focus, this thesis
takes a nuanced approach. It accepts that the objects of international criminal tribunals
65 Tim Kelsall, Culture under Cross- Examination- International Justice and the Special Court fo r Sierra 
Leone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 1-2.
66 Drumbl, Mark. Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 136.
67 Darryl Robinson, “Serving the Interests o f  Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International 
Criminal Court” (2003) 14 European Journal o f  International ¿aw  481 at 483.
(which may or may not be overtly focused on the child soldier issue) are identified in the 
context of political decision-making, but it also recognizes that retribution and deterrence 
of crimes against children are recognizable goals of accountability in countries around the 
world.68 This thesis also observes that application of international criminal law 
addressing the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and the crimes of child soldiers, is
not easy or straightforward, either in the midst of a conflict or after a conflict, and thus
✓
seeks to bring a less binary point of view to the peace versus justice debate. In addition, 
this thesis acknowledges that lack of geographical and legal proximity to victims is 
problematic, and therefore, in examining the complex nature of victim-perpetrator child 
soldiers, makes suggestions to bring this proximity closer to the child soldiers and their 
communities.
Critics have also expressed concern about the subjects of international criminal law. 
For example, it has been argued that the ICC is not fair in its choices of situations 
because, so far, only nationals from African countries have been subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the court.69 This thesis directly tackles the issue of the child as subject of 
international criminal law. It argues both that there are legitimate sociological and 
practical reasons for international criminal law’s interest in protecting children from 
being recruited and used in armed conflict by adults, and that those who recruit and use 
child soldiers do have a place in international criminal tribunals because these tribunals 
are often the only means to hold these individuals accountable for their crimes. While this 
approaches indeed universalist, it also is more multifaceted than a blind insistence that
68 No Peace Without Justice and UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, “International Criminal Justice and 
Children” (2002), online: UNICEF < http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ICJC.pdf>.
69 Mail & Guardian Online , “ICC accused o f ‘exclusively* targeting Africans,” (20 April 2011), online: 
Mail & Guardian <http://mg.co.za/article/2011 -04-20-icc-accused-of-exclusively-targeting-africans>.
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international criminal law is the only answer. This thesis also argues that, unlike those 
responsible for their recruitment and use, child soldiers should not be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals. This is so because international law insists on the fact 
that child soldiers should be treated primarily as victims and efforts should be. made on 
their reintegration into society, and this stance is supported by sociological research. 
Thus, while this conclusion is again based on universalist international criminal law 
principles, it also suggests ways in which regional and local values and practices can 
assist in child reintegration or be included within Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration programs and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.
II- Child Soldiers
Child soldiering is a very sensitive topic to study. It involves many tensions and 
dilemmas resulting from diverging conceptions of childhood within the international 
community. The most significant tension is probably found with respect to the definition 
of child soldier. But before explaining this difficulty, it is important to understand some 
facts related to child soldiers.
A- Facts • - ? : .. *. ■
The present thesis analyzes liability for crimes committed by child soldiers so it is 
important to give some background on child soldiering. It is estimated that, today, there 
are around 300,000 child soldiers under 18 years around the world. Child soldiers have
' H1
always been involved in armed conflicts. Originally, the term “infantry” comes from the 
Italian “infant” which literally means “child”. It was used to refer to boys who followed 701
70 UNICEF “Factsheet-Child Soldiers”, online: UNICEF
<http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/childsoldiers.pdfi>. .
71 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 
[Happold] at 4.
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knights into battle on foot.72 As early as the 15th century, Joan of Arc was known as a girl 
soldier.73 The Napoleonic army was also notorious for using children.74 756*8012More recently in 
history, the Hitler Youth was composed of children. Nowadays, what is new about the 
phenomenon of child soldiers is the extent to which they are being recruited and used. 
This can be explained in part by scientific advances. Weapons are becoming lighter and 
easier to use. For instance, it is estimated that a ten-year-old can learn effectively how to 
use an AK-47 in half an hour. While thousands of children have come out of fighting 
forces in the last five years as wars ended in countries such as Angola, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Sri Lanka, thousands more have been drawn into new conflicts. Africa has 
the largest number of child soldiers who are being used in armed conflict in Central
7Q
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Sudan. Child
80soldiers are also being used in Asia, the Middle East and in Latin America.
Various reasons are behind recruitment and use of child soldiers. Children are 
recruited by armed groups because they can be easily manipulated and they obey orders 
without questioning them. Even though child soldiers can be forcibly recruited, they
87 _  , 'usually join voluntarily. This voluntariness has been questioned on the basis that
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72 Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2006) at 26.
73 Allen Williamson “Joan o f  Arc, A  Brief Biography”, online:, < http://archive.joan-of- 
arc.org/joanofarc_short_biography.html>.
74 Ibid.
75 Eben Kaplan, “Child Soldiers Around the World”, online: Council, on Foreign Relations 
<http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/child-soldiers-around-world/p9331>.
76 Happold, supra note 71 at 4.
11 Ibid.
78 Coalition to Stop the Use o f  Child Soldiers “Questions and Answers”, online: Coalition to Stop the Use 
o f Child Soldiers <http://www.child-soldiers.org/home> [Coalition to Stop the Use o f  Child Soldiers].
19 Ibid
80 Ibid.
81 Happold, supra note 71 at 10. Recruitment by government forces is motivated by other reasons such as 
manpower shortages.
82 Coalition to Stop the Use o f  Child Soldiers, supra note 78.
children are often compelled to join armed groups due to socio-economic factors. 
Joining an armed group can be a way to obtain food and shelter, thereby offering “better” 
living conditions to children who come from very poor backgrounds. Oftentimes, a gun 
is a ticket for food. Children can also decide to join an armed group in order to avenge 
relatives who were killed, tortured, raped or injured during an attack by other armed 
forces.83 45 Other ways for children to join are indoctrination and peer pressure from the 
family or community.86 Once enrolled into an armed group, child soldiers play different 
roles. These may go from fighting on the front lines to serving as porters, messengers or 
spies.87 It is worth mentioning that girls represent up to 40% of child soldiers.88 89In 
addition to being sent on activities directly linked to combat, they are often used as “bush
wives” for the soldiers: these soldier “wives” are required to cook, clean and provide
80sexual services for their soldier “husbands”.
The international community’s focus on child soldiers has developed quite recently. 
The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were the first legal instruments 
to regulate the use of children in armed conflict.90 In 1989, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) prohibited the use of children under 15 years to participate in
83 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Situation in the Democratic Republic o f Congo in the Case o f the Prosecutor 
vs Thomas Lubanga Dyilo- Written Submission o f the United Nations Special Representative o f the 
Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict, ICC-01/04-01/06-1229 (18 March 2008) [Amicus 
curiae].
84 Happold, supra note 71 at 11-12. ;
85 Ilene Cohn & Guy s. Goodwin, Child Soldiers, The Role o f Children in Armed Conflict (Oxford, New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 33.
86 IbiddX 37-40.
87 Gra?a Machel, Impact o f Armed Conflicts on Children, UNGAOR, 51st Sess, UN Doc A/51/306 (1996) 
[Gra$a Machel Report], paras 44, 47 and 34.
88 Coalition to Stop the Use o f  Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report, (London: Coalition, 2001).
89 Gra9a Machel Report, supra note 87, para 45.
90 API, supra note 16, art. 77; APII, supra note 16, art. 4(3)(c). While art. 77 o f  API regulates the 
recruitment and use o f  children in international armed conflicts, art. 4(3)(c) o f  APII deals with non­
international armed conflicts.
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hostilities.91 92The turning point in understanding the gravity of the situation occurred with
Q/)
the publication of the Gra?a Machel report on the impact of armed conflicts on children.
It led to implementation of a stronger legal framework aiming at regulating the use of 
children in armed conflicts. Measures taken to achieve this aim include the appointment, 
in 1997, by the UN Secretary-General of a Special Representative for Children in Armed 
Conflicts, whose office is in charge of “promoting and protecting the rights of children 
affected by armed conflict.”93 The same year, the Cape Town Principles and Best 
Practices were adopted with the objective of recommending action to be taken by 
governments and communities in countries affected by the use of child soldiers.94 The 
1999 International Labour Organization Convention on the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour prohibits the forced or compulsory recruitment of children under 
18 for use in armed conflict.95 In 2000, the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol) strengthened the CRC 
by, among other things, raising the minimum age for compulsory recruitment to 18 
years.96 Regional instruments such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child or the European Union Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict are also
91 Convention on the Rights o f the Child, GA Res 44/25, UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49, (1989) 
[CRC], art. 38.
92 Graça Machel Report, supra note 87.
93 “In September 1997, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Olara A. Otunnu as his Special Representative 
for Children and Armed Conflict. Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy has assumed this position since April 
2006.” Office o f  the Special Representative for the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflicts, 
online: UN <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/theoffice.html>.
94 Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (1997) [Cape Town Principles], online: 
<http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles%281%29.pdf>. It is important to note that the 
Cape Town Principles are not binding.
95 Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action fo r  the Elimination of the Worst Forms of  
Child Labour, 17 June 1999, 38 ILM 1207, 2133 U.N.T.S.161 (entered into force 19 November 2000) 
[Convention on thé Worst Forms o f Child Labour],
6 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child on the involvement o f  children in armed 
conflict, GA Res 54/263, UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/54/49, (2000) [OPT],
aimed at prohibiting the use of child soldiers.97 In 2007, adoption of the Principles and 
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Conflicts (Paris Principles) illustrated the 
strong commitment expressed by the international community to end child soldiering by 
providing guidelines on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all 
categories of children associated with armed groups.98 The International Day against the 
Use of Child Soldiers, on February 12 of each year, is a special commemoration 
highlighting the fate of children who were forced to join armed forces and groups.99
The main concrete achievement of the international community, however, is the 
criminalization of the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The Rome Statute of the ICC 
and the Statute of the SCSL both provide that “conscripting or enlisting children under 
the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities” is a war crime.100 These provisions are not merely symbolic and are being 
enforced by international criminal tribunals. The ICC, in its first case, has almost 
completed the prosecution of Thomas Lubanga from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.101 He was charged solely with recruiting and using child soldiers.102 Since then,
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97 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o f the Child, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered 
into force 29 November 1999); European Union Guidelines on Children in Armed Conflicts
98 Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces o f  Armed Groups (February 2007), 
online: UN <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf>.
99 Yuma Malaika Gracia “International Day against the Use o f  Child Soldiers: Impact o f  the Lubanga trial
in the DRC” (2010), online: Coalition for the ICC
<http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/blog/?p=526&langswitch_lang=en>.
100 Rome Statute, supra note 4: art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) refers to recruitment and use by governmental armed 
forces whereas art. 8(2)(e)(vii) refers to recruitment and use by any armed forces; Statute o f  the SCSL, 
supra note 4, art. 4(c).
101 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation o f  the Charges
(29 January 2007) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I). ; ‘
102 Ibid. :
several other individuals have been charged by the ICC with this crime.103 The SCSL has 
convicted six individuals on this ground.104
B- Definition
A fundamental question to answer before going further in this thesis is how to define 
“child soldier”. The CRC, which reflects customary international law,105 provides in 
article 1 that a child is any individual under 18 years of age. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the term “child soldier” simply refers to any soldier under the age 
of 18 years. Rather, there is controversy about the linkage of the terms “child” and 
“soldier”. This is because there is lack of agreement as to whether the term “child 
soldier” covers all children under 18 years who are involved in hostilities, or whether it 
only refers to children younger than 15. Another closely connected controversy relates to 
the mode of participation in hostilities: is a child soldier someone who participates 
directly or indirectly in hostilities? While direct participation in hostilities refers to acts 
carried out by individuals to support one party to the conflict by directly causing harm to 
another party, indirect participation in hostilities does not directly cause harm to the other
19
103 See e.g. Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
Confirmation o f  the Charges (30 September 2008) (Pre-Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Bosco Nkatanga, 
ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant o f  Arrest (22 August 2006) (Pre-Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Dominic 
Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant o f  Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (8 July 2005) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II) [Ongwen, Warrant o f  Arrest],
104 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (AFRC Trial Judgment), SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (20 June 2007) 
(SCSL, Trial Chamber II); Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (AFRC Appeals Judgment), SCSL-04-16-A, 
Judgment (22 February 2008) (SCSL, Appeals Chamber); Prosecutor v Moinina Fofona (CDF Trial 
Judgment), SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment (2 August 2007) (SCSL, Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Moinina 
Fofona (CDF Appeals Judgment), SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment (28 May 2008) (SCSL, Appeals Chamber); 
Prosecutor v Sesay (RUF Trial Judgment), SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (2 March 2009) (SCSL, Trial 
Chamber I); Prosecutor v Sesay (RUF Appeals Judgment), SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (26 October 2009) 
(SCSL, Appeals Chamber).
105 The CRC.is the most widely ratified international treaty. It has been ratified by every country except the 
United States and Somalia, United Nations Treaty Collections, “Status o f  States’ Ratifications”, online: UN 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11 &chapter=4&lang=en>.
party.106 1078Some international legal instruments argue that children under 18 years shall not 
be compulsory or forcibly recruited into armed forces. The International Labour 
Convention classifies “forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed 
conflict” as one of the worst forms of child labour. It also mentions that, for the 
purpose of the convention, a child is an individual under 18 years.109 Therefore, one can 
deduce that state parties to this convention are under the legal obligation not to recruit 
children under 18 years in a forcible or compulsory manner. However, states can recruit 
children who decide to join voluntarily. Another indicator in favour of the 18 years 
approach for the purpose of recruiting and using child soldiers is the Optional Protocol. It 
provides that “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of 
their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in 
hostilities.”110 However, the obligation does not encompass indirect participation. The 
Optional Protocol also demands that “persons who have not attained the age of 18 years 
are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces”111 12*, thereby allowing voluntary 
enlistment below the age of eighteen. The obligation directed towards armed groups, as 
opposed to governments, is broader, since armed groups cannot recruit child soldiers 
either forcibly or voluntarily, or use them to participate in hostilities. In 2010, the 
Office of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflicts launched the “Zero
20
106 International Committee o f  the Red Cross, “Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers, 
online: ICRC< http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-
020609.htm#al>.
107 OPI, supra note 96, arts 1 and 2.
108 Convention on the Worst Forms o f  Child Labour, supra note 95, art. 3.
109 Ibid, art. 2.
110 OPI, supra note 96, art. 1.
111 Ibid, art. 2.
112 APII and OP purport to bind armed groups, whether in opposition or allied to the government o f  a state
party to the treaty. Happold, supra note 71 at 95. 
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under Eighteen” campaign, with the purpose of achieving universal ratification of the 
Optional Protocol by 2012.114 The broadest definition of child soldiers was adopted 
during a symposium organized by UNICEF and the working group on the CRC.115 It is 
“any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed 
force or armed group in any capacity.”116 178
Other international legal instruments authorize recruitment and use of children by 
armed forces when they attain the age of 15 years. For instance, Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions provides: “The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible 
measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take 
a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into 
their armed forces.” The CRC provides similar obligations. Both of these treaties 
also mention that “[i]n recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 
fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall 
endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.”119 Read together, these provisions 
indicate that the obligation is not absolute: states parties shall only “take all feasible 
measures”. A contrario, it means that when it is not feasible, children under 15 years 
could be recruited and take direct part in hostilities. Second, the obligation imposed on 
states aims at preventing use of children by non-states and states armed groups. Third, the
114 Office o f  the Special Representative for the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflicts, online: 
<http://wwwun.org/children/conflict/english/theoffice.html>. So far, states have ratified and have signed it 
but not ratified yet.
115 “Children and Armed Conflicts”, online: UNICEF <
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/index_childsoldiers.html>.
116 Cape Town Principles, supra note 94.
117 API, supra note 16, art. 77(2).
118 CRC, supra note 91, art. 38(2) and (3). It is to be noted that provisions o f  the CRC are weaker than the
ones found in APII. This was criticized and led to adoption o f  the optional Protocol; Happold, supra note 
71 at 72. ,
119 API, supra note 16, art. 77(2); CRC, supra note 91, art. 38(3).
prohibition does not concern the indirect taking part in hostilities. Last, even though 
children may be used in armed conflicts from 15 years, states should try to recruit them as 
old as possible. Additional Protocol II is stricter in its obligation because it does not use 
the formulation “take all feasible measures.” Instead, it provides that “children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or 
groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.”120 12In other words, the obligation is 
absolute: children under 15 years shall not be recruited by national or non-national armed 
groups, neither can they take direct part in hostilities. In conclusion, it is generally agreed 
by States that the recruitment and direct participation of children under the age of fifteen 
in armed conflict is prohibited as a matter of customary international law. However, 
universal ratification of the Optional Protocol in the future might reflect a new customary 
norm prohibiting states from forcibly recruiting and using children under 18 years to 
participate directly in hostilities and prohibiting non-state actors from recruiting and 
using children under 18 years to participate in hostilities.122 123
Concerning international criminal law, the behaviour criminalized is to recruit 
“children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.55 Emphasis should be put on two things. First, it is 
important to note the broad wording of “actively5Y as opposed to “directly55. Prohibiting 
active participation in hostilities includes indirect roles such as scouting, spying, sabotage
22
120 APII, supra note 16, art. 4(3)(c).
121 R. Coomaraswamy, “The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child on the 
Involvement o f Children in Armed Conflict- Towards Universal Ratification” (2010) 18 International 
Journal o f  Children’s Rights 535 at 539.
122 Ibid.
123 Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii). Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 4 art. 
4(c).
and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints.124 125Second, the age 
limit was set at 15 years, as opposed to 18 years, on the basis that the latter did not find 
any support under customary international law. This crime of recruitment and use of 
child soldiers is detailed in chapter 3, in accordance with the following methodology.
Ill- Methodology
Under international criminal law, recruiting and using children under 15 years to 
participate actively in hostilities is a war crime. International criminal law being a 
relatively new area of the law, contains many undeveloped aspects: the war crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers is one of these undeveloped aspects. The first aim of 
the present thesis is to clarify what this war crime encompasses. Emphasis is put on the 
definition of the crime and its constitutive elements. It also includes a discussion on 
whether perpetrators of this crime could be held liable for the crimes committed by child 
soldiers. Another, and related, issue is the liability of child soldiers themselves for the 
crimes they commit. International criminal law is not clear on this point. The second aim 
of the present thesis is therefore to critically analyze whether child soldiers should be 
prosecuted by international criminal tribunals. *
The two above-mentioned aims will be achieved by conducting research and detailed 
analysis of primary and secondary sources of international criminal law. These sources 
provide the legal underpinnings of the issue, as well as expose the views of academic 
commentators, especially their views on any gaps or positive developments in the case 
law. So far, only two international criminal tribunals have focused on the prosecution of
124 Report o f the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court, 
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 (14 April 1998) at 21, footnote 12.
125 Otto Trififterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court (München, 
Germany: C.H. Beck, 2008) at 468.
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child soldier-related issues: the SCSL and the ICC. Analysis of the travaux préparatoires, 
Statutes and decisions of these two tribunals is particularly useful for the purpose of the 
present thesis. To a lesser extent, analysis of international human rights law is conducted. 
This area of the law is likely to help in understanding issues that have not yet been 
resolved by international criminal law. Also, looking at empirical studies is useful to 
guide and fill the gaps in the reasoning in international criminal and/or human rights law.
Even though it would be tempting to look to other legal instruments such as those 
found in international humanitarian law and domestic laws, they are excluded from the 
analysis -  with some exceptions as set out below - for the following reasons. International 
humanitarian law does deal with issues concerning child soldiers. Indeed, the Geneva 
Conventions, read along with their Additional Protocols, provide, on the one hand, 
special protection for children - as civilians - under 15 years during armed conflicts and, 
on the other hand, prevent children from being recruited into armed conflicts. The present 
thesis does not include these considerations because the focus is on children who have 
actually acted as soldiers (and therefore are not civilians). In addition, these aspects of 
international humanitarian law deal with the responsibility of states, whereas international 
criminal law focuses on the responsibility of individuals. Therefore, liability does not 
occur at the same level under international humanitarian law and does not have the same 
implications for individuals as does international criminal law. Another area which is not 
used in the analysis is domestic law. Many countries have in their legal systems 
provisions to protect children from forced labour (child soldiering is considered as one of 
the worst forms of child labour).126 While it would be interesting to study the domestic 
law on this issue in every country having such provisions, such an approach is not
126 Convention on the Worst Forms o f Child Labour, supra note 95, art. 3(a).
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realistic. It is also not clear that a large-scale study of domestic laws will benefit the 
project, as domestic laws may or may not be in compliance with international treaty law, 
making it difficult to determine the relevance of any findings to a question about 
international law. Nevertheless domestic laws will be used to the extent that they reflect 
implementation of international criminal law. Indeed, some domestic Statutes are 
supposed to reflect international criminal law within their domestic system in order to
1 onprosecute nationals for war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The thesis is divided into four parts. First, this thesis analyses the general principles of 
liability found under international criminal law. These principles aim at establishing the 
conditions under which an individual can be found liable under international criminal 
law. It is crucial to understand these principles because subsequent analysis of adult and 
child liability flows from them. Indeed, understanding them allows for an understanding 
of how adults have been held liable for the war crime of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers and how child soldiers could be held liable, or not, for their own crimes. Second, 
the war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers is examined with a focus on the
198application of the general principles of liability in the context of this specific crime. 
Also, details are given on the definition of this war crime and, specifically, analysis of 
how the words “conscripting”, “enlisting”, “using” and “participate actively” have been 
interpreted in the context of adult liability is conducted. Third, focus is put on child 
soldiers themselves in order to examine whether they could be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals for their crimes. General principles of liability governing 12789
127 For e.g., see Canada's Crime Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 29 June 2000, which is meant to 
implement the Rome Statute o f  the ICC.
128 AFRC Trial Judgment; AFRC Appeals Judgment; CDF Trial Judgment; CDF Appeals Judgment; RUF 
Trial Judgment; RUF Appeals Judgment, supra note 104.
129 Ibid.
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international criminal law establish that, in order to be found liable, an individual who 
commits a crime must do so with intent. This intentional element, also known as mens 
rea, is particularly controversial when dealing with crimes committed by child soldiers 
because it is not sure whether children have the capacity to intentionally commit crimes. 
In addition to this, child soldiers are victims of the war crime of recruitment and use of 
child soldiers and many children’s rights advocate argue that they should be treated 
primarily as victims as opposed to perpetrators. On the other hand, child soldiers commit 
unspeakable crimes and therefore should be prosecuted as perpetrators. Careful analysis 
of this dual situation is provided and leads to the conclusion that, in theory, child soldiers 
over 15 years of age could be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals. Lastly, 
prosecution of child soldiers over 15 years is critically discussed and other solutions in 
order to deal with former child soldiers are provided as a better alternative.
IV- Conclusion
This thesis is important in order to develop and further the understanding of 
international criminal law with respect to international crimes committed by child 
soldiers. Its main purpose is to fill the actual gap existing in international criminal law 
itself as well as in scholarly work on international criminal law related to child soldiers. 
Child soldiers commit international crimes that shock the conscience of humanity. As 
such, these crimes are not only the concern of victims affected by them, but also of the 
entire international community. The phenomenon of child soldiers is not new, but it is 
growing, and it is therefore fundamental to know how the international community 
should and could deal with it. More precisely, it is important for adults to know that 
recruiting and using child soldiers is an international crime for which they may be
27.
prosecuted, because awareness may prevent such practices. For example, it has been 
noted by the UN Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children in 
Armed Conflicts that “not so long ago, governments and rebel forces were proudly 
displaying young fighters[,] but now they are at pains to deny the presence of child 
soldiers in their ranks and sometimes agree to demobilise them.”130 It is equally important 
for adults to know precisely what conduct is criminal and, for instance, to know whether 
they could be held criminally liable for the international crimes committed by child 
soldiers. Also, having a precise understanding of what an international prosecution of 
child soldiers would entail is fundamental. International criminal law is confronted by a 
dilemma under which it is supposed to punish criminals but, in doing so,, it is supposed to 
respect human rights standards. Child soldiers are perpetrators of international crimes but 
their status of children must be taken into account when making any decision as to how to 
deal with their criminal behaviour.
130 Integrated Regional Information Networks, “Special Report: Child Soldiers” (2003), online: 
<http://www.irinnews.org/pdi7in-depth/Child-Soldiers-IRIN-In-Depth.pdf> at 4.
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Chapter 2: General Principles of International Criminal Law
i
International criminal law is governed by general principles of liability. These 
principles include, on the one hand, forms of liability also found in domestic systems, 
such as directly committing a crime or aiding and abetting the commission of a crime.1 2
On the other hand, international criminal law has developed general principles of liability 
that are specific to that area of the law, with one notable example being the principle of 
command responsibility. This chapter, while defining and explaining the general 
principles of liability under international criminal law, is a necessary step to an 
understanding of the basic requirements developed by international criminal law in order 
to find an individual liable. Therefore, this chapter provides a useful background which 
will allow for a better understanding of the decisions made by the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) with respect to individuals charged with the crime of recruitment and use 
of child soldiers. Analysis of the decisions made by the SCSL will take place in chapter 3 
of this thesis. Additionally, in chapter 4, this thesis will examine whether the general 
principles of liability apply to children. If they do apply, then child soldiers could be held 
accountable for the commission of war crimes.
The first part of the present chapter describes the tests developed by the international 
criminal tribunals in order to find an individual liable. These tests include proof that a 
criminal act was committed and that this commission occurred with intent. The second 
part focuses on the various modes of liability that can be found under international
1 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010) [Cryer] at 361. \
2 Ibid.
criminal law. These modes of liability are individual criminal liability and command 
responsibility. The last part deals with the grounds for excluding criminal liability under
international criminal law, such as justifications and excuses.
/
I- Tests for Liability
Under international criminal law, three elements must be proven in order for an 
international criminal tribunal to hold an individual liable for genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes. First, a prosecutor must prove that a criminal act was committed. 
This is referred to as the actus reus. Second, a prosecutor must prove that the accused had 
the intention to commit such a criminal act. This is called the mens rea. Lastly, the 
prosecutor must address any claims by the accused relating to grounds under which 
criminal liability could be excused.
A- Actus Reus
The first step in determining whether an accused may be held responsible is to
•i
examine whether the individual fulfilled the material elements of a crime. Even though 
no general provision on the material elements can be found in any of the Statutes of 
international criminal tribunals, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) refers to them in article 30, which deals with the mental element. This article 
provides as follows: “Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”3 4 The material elements are 
objective elements implying a conduct that can consist of a positive act, or act of
3 Gerhard Werle, Principles o f International Criminal Law (The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2009) [Werle] at 142.
4 Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 
July 2002) [Rome Statute], art. 30(1).
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commission, or a negative act, or act of omission. This second category of acts is more 
controversial and is conditioned: liability for an act of omission can arise only when the 
law imposes a clear obligation to act and the individual fails to do so.5 As we shall see 
later in this chapter, liability for an act of omission mainly applies in the context of 
command responsibility.6 78Criminal conduct leads to liability only to the extent that there 
is a consequence to this conduct and that this consequence derives from the criminal 
conduct. The consequence can consist of harm that has actually occurred, or of a danger
o
to a protected right such as endangering the health of the victim.
In addition to establishing criminal conduct and that consequence derived from this 
conduct, additional circumstances must be examined to find an individual liable. These 
can be factual. For instance, with respect to the crime of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers, the victim must be younger than 15 years old.9 Circumstances can also have a 
normative aspect such as the fact that the victim was protected under the Geneva 
Conventions.10 The actus reus alone is not enough to find an individual criminally liable: 
the act committed must also be intended by its author.
B- Mens Rea
Besides the actus reus requirement, international criminal tribunals must examine 
whether the prosecutor has proven that the accused fulfilled the mental element 
requirement, also known as the mens rea. The mental element is divided into various 
degrees and it is necessary to understand the distinction between them. The first degree is
30
5 Werle, supra note 3 at 233.
6 See section III(B) o f  this chapter.
7 Werle, supra note 3 at 144.
8 Ibid at 143.
9 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
10 Ibid, art. 8(2)(a).
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known as dolus eventualis and its requirements are met when a person is “aware that a 
material element included in the definition of a crime (such as the death of a person) may 
result from his/her conduct and “reconciles himself’ or “makes peace” with this fact.”11 12
The next degree - which is sometimes assimilated with dolus eventualis - is the one of 
recklessness. It can be defined as “located somewhere between (direct) intention and 
negligence. Under this concept, an offender is held liable for consciously creating a risk 
that is realized through the commission of the crime.”13 It has been argued that the main 
difference between dolus eventualis and recklessness is that the former is about the 
perpetrator’s attitude and the latter is about the risk the perpetrator is willing to take.14 
The highest degree found for the mental element is the one of dolus directus. It is itself 
divided between dolus directus of the first degree, meaning that the perpetrator has the 
concrete intent to commit a crime, and dolus directus of the second degree, under which 
the perpetrator is aware of the inevitable outcome.15 As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, international criminal law is not clear as to which degree must be proven is order 
to conclude that an individual has acted with the required mens rea.
The international criminal tribunals have each considered the mens rea requirement, 
but have done so differently, with the ad hoc Tribunals and the SCSL taking one 
approach, and the ICC taking another. The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the Statute of the SCSL do not include a general provision on requirements
11 Werle, supra note 3 at 153.
12 The requirements for recklessness are not always defined consistently: Werle, supra note 3, footnote 90
at 153.
Ibid.
G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, 
(2005) 3 JICJ 539 at 554.
15 Werle, supra note 3 at 154.
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for the mental element.16 178Instead, these requirements have been developed on a case-by- 
case basis by the tribunals. The element usually required is intent and this reflects 
, customary international law. There is a distinction between specific intent, general 
intent, direct intent and indirect intent. General intent refers to the common 
requirements for all crimes under international criminal law whereas specific intent refers 
to an additional requirement. A good illustration of a situation where specific intent is 
required to establish the liability of an individual is for the crime of genocide, under 
which the “intent to destroy” must be established.19 201Direct intent involves situations 
where the perpetrator knows with certainty that all the material elements of the crime will 
be fulfilled. It can be contrasted with indirect intent, where the perpetrator does not 
know for certain that the prohibited result will occur. This latter form of intent is not yet
77clear in its application.
As opposed to the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and of the Special Court, the Rome 
Statute contains a provision on requirements for the mental element in article 30:
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
16 Statute o f the International Tribunalfor the Prosecution o f  Persons Responsible for Serious Violations o f  
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory o f  the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 25 May 
1993, 32 ILM 1159, (as amended by the Updated Statute o f the International Criminal Tribunalfor Former 
Yugoslavia) [ICTY Statute]; Statute o f the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, 
33 ILM 1598 [ICTR Statute]; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government o f Sierra Leone 
on the Establishment o f a Special Court fo r  Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.SS 138 (entered 
into force 12 April 2002) [Statute o f the SCSL].
17 Werle, supra note 3 at 158.
18 Ibid  at 149.
19 ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 4(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 16, art. 2(2); Rome Statute, supra note 4, 
art. 6.




(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course 
of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.23
This article imposes a stricter standard than the one required under customary
international law. Requirements of “intent” and “knowledge”, as defined by sub- 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 30, leave no room for dolus eventualis and recklessness. 
However, the idea that the Rome Statute excludes the concept of dolus eventualis has 
been challenged in the Lubanga case.24 25Pre-Trial Chamber I found that “the cumulative 
reference to “intent” and “knowledge” requires the existence of a volitional element” that 
encompasses not only dolus directus but also dolus eventualis 25 Plain language of the 
Rome Statute excludes dolus eventualis, for instance by using “will occur” as opposed to 
“may occur” when defining “knowledge”. In this sense, Pre-Trial Chamber I departed 
from literal wording of article 30 in finding that it includes dolus eventualis. In the 
meantime, the fact that article 30 starts by mentioning “unless otherwise provided” could 
be interpreted as an indicator that a lower standard than dolus directus could be applied.26 
Indeed, “unless otherwise provided” can be interpreted as meaning “unless otherwise 
provided by the Statute” or “unless otherwise provided by customary international law.”27 
As mentioned above, customary international law recognizes that the concept of dolus 
eventualis can be applied by international criminal law. Therefore, this is an indicator that
23 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 30.
24 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation o f  the Charges (29 
January 2007) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I) [Lubanga- Confirmation of Charges].
25 Ibid; see also War Crime Research Office, Modes o f  Liability and the Mental Element: Analyzing the 
Early Jurisprudence o f  the International Criminal Court {American University- Washington College o f  
Law, 2010) [Modes o f  Liability].
26 Modes o f  Liability, supra note 25 at 65.
27 Werle, supra note 3 at 156-157.
the Rome Statute itself allows in some circumstances the application of this lower degree 
of the mental element.
A prosecutor must prove the elements of actus reus and mens rea in order to find an 
individual criminally liable. However, even when these two elements are present, an 
accused might be acquitted on the basis of justifications or excuses provided by 
international criminal law.
C- Grounds for Excluding Liability
In addition to determining whether an accused fulfills the required two elements for 
criminal liability (actus reus and mens red), international criminal tribunals must 
establish whether an accused could benefit from defences that would rule out his/her 
liability.28 29Defences can be divided into two categories: justifications and excuses. A 
justified conduct is a “conduct that would per se be considered contrary to law because it 
causes harm or damage to individuals or society but is regarded as lawful and thus does 
not amount to a crime.” In contrast, an excuse is “an unlawful action that causes harm 
and that is contrary to a criminal norm but the wrongdoer goes unpunished.”30 Once an 
intentional criminal conduct has been proven and the accused does not have any 
justification or excuse, he or she can be held criminally liable under one or several modes 
of liability provided by international criminal law.
II- Modes of Liability
The tests for liability described above are being applied to modes of liability. These 
reflect the way an individual will be held liable for a crime. There are two grounds for
34
28 Ibid  at 139.
29 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) [Cassese] at 
255.
30 Ibid at 256.
holding an individual liable under international criminal law: individual criminal liability 
and command responsibility. In the former mode of liability, an individual is liable for a 
crime he or she is individually connected with. In other words, the individual was to some 
point involved with the crime by committing it, encouraging it, or assisting in its 
commission. In the latter mode of liability, an individual is liable for a crime committed 
by other individuals, without being individually involved with the crimes. Instead, 
liability arises from a passive attitude towards the crime by failing to prevent or punish it. 
Individual criminal liability often reflects liability for commission whereas command, 
responsibility is based on omission.
A- Individual Criminal Liability
Perpetration of international crimes constitutes most of the time manifestations of 
collective criminality. As opposed to domestic systems where the criminal is often the 
primary perpetrator such as the one who pulls the trigger, international criminal justice 
has to deal with a plurality of offenders. International criminal law reflects this 
complexity by providing various grounds in order to hold an individual accountable. A 
person can be held liable for committing a crime, for encouraging the commission of a 
crime or for aiding or abetting to the commission of a crime.
1- Commission o f a Crime
Commission of an international crime can occur when an individual physically 
perpetrates the crime. However, direct physical perpetration is not a requirement and an 
individual can also be held liable through his/her connection to a group of individuals. A 312
35
31 Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1A, Judgment (15 July 1999) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) [Tadic, Appeals 
Judgment], para 191.
32 Cryer, supra note 1 at 301.
more controversial mode of perpetration is the concept of co-perpetration through another 
person. ■ • • : '
a- Physical Perpetration .
An individual who intentionally commits all of the elements of a crime, or fails to 
comply with an obligation expressly stated (situation of liability for . omission), will be 
held liable for this crime. This situation refers to cases where the offender himself 
physically perpetrates the crime. However, in some situation, an offender can be said as 
having perpetrating a crime even though he or she did not physically carry out the act. 
This mode of liability can be found in article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute, which refers 
to the commission of a crime “through another person.”33 It means that the perpetrator 
uses another person as a tool in order to physically perform the criminal act.34 Therefore, 
the person who does not physically carry out the act is criminally liable because he or she 
exercises control over the will of the physical perpetrator.35 This mode of liability finds 
its roots in the German doctrine of “Organisationsherrschaft. ”36 37Under this doctrine, the 
indirect perpetrator is the one who has a full control over the crime because he or she 
exercises effective control over the organizational apparatus. This organizational 
apparatus is characterized by the fact that its members are interchangeable.38 In other 
words, as long as the order to commit a certain crime is given by the indirect perpetrator, 
the crime will be automatically carried out by a member of the organizational apparatus. 
Also, the indirect perpetrator must have the will to control the perpetration of the crime
33 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(a).
34 Werle, supra note 3 at 178.
35 Ibid. '
36 Florian Jessberger & Julia Geneuss, “On the Application o f  a Theory o f  Indirect Perpetration in A1 





and must have the mens rea with regard to the precise crime committed. Distinction 
between this mode of liability and liability for ordering might not be clear since in both 
situations, the person who physically commits the crime is used by the individual who 
will be held liable for committing the crime or for ordering it. It is necessary to 
understand the distinction since the Rome Statute clearly distinguishes the two 
concepts.39 40 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in the Katanga case explained that indirect 
perpetration is a narrow concept that applies to just three types of cases:41 (i) the physical 
perpetrator lacks the capacity for blameworthiness, meaning that the criminal act was 
committed under duress;42 (ii) The physical perpetrator has been misled by the indirect- 
perpetrator about the seriousness of the crime;43 and (iii) The indirect perpetrator 
committed the crime by means of control over an organization.44 This concept of indirect 
perpetration can also be referred to as ‘innocent agency’. It applies, for instance, to the 
crimes committed by child soldiers. Indeed, it was argued that when someone persuades 
children under the age of criminal liability to commit crimes, children cannot be 
considered as having any culpable part in the crime and the principal perpetrator is the 
individual who persuaded.45 -
b- Joint Criminal Enterprise
An individual can be held liable on the basis that he or she shares with other 
individuals the intent to commit a criminal act. This type of individual criminal liability
39 Ibid. -  i ;
40 Art. 25(3)(a) refers to liability for the commission through another person whereas art. 25(3)(b) refers to 
liability for ordering the commission o f  a crime.
41 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
Confirmation o f  the Charges (30 September 2008) (Pre-Trial Chamber I) [Katanga & Chui- Confirmation 
o f  the Charges}.
41 Ibid  para 495.
43 Ibid para 658.
44 Ibid para 498.
45 Cryer, supra note 1 at 364.
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refers to liability for participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE). This doctrine, also 
known as the “common purpose doctrine”,46 was originally developed in the case law of 
the ICTY.47 48In that Tribunal’s first case, that of the Tadic, the Appeals Chamber:had to 
consider whether the accused could be held liable “for the killing of five men even 
though there was no evidence that he killed any of them.” The two central issues 
identified by the Court were as follow: “whether the acts of one person can give rise to 
the criminal culpability of another where both participate in the execution of a common 
criminal plan” and “what degree of mens rea is required in such a case.”49 The Appeals 
Chamber explained in its reasoning that article 1 of the Statute of the ICTY gives 
jurisdiction to the tribunal to “prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.”50 The Court interpreted this provision as offering an 
expansive reading of article 7,51 523saying that the individuals who are responsible for such 
violations are not limited to the categories mentioned in article 7(1) - namely planning, 
instigating, ordering or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or 
execution of the crime. Instead, article 7(1) also includes liability of individuals who
C-3 ■ ■ ^
shared the common purpose of embarking in a criminal activity. In addition to this 
statutory justification, the Court held that the common purpose doctrine is also justified 
by the very nature of international crimes which often constitute collective manifestations
46Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 at 80; See also Hector Olasolo, "Joint Criminal Enterprise and its 
Extended Form: A Theory o f  Co-Perpetration Giving Rise to Principle Liability, a Notion o f  Accessorial 
Liability, or a Form o f  Partnership in a Crime?" (2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 263 [JCE and its Extended 
Form] at 264.
47 The Tadic case first articulated the doctrine: Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31:
48 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 para 185.
49 Ibid.
50 ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 1.
51 Jens David Ohlin, "Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine o f  Joint Criminal Enterprise" (2007) 5 
JICJ 69 [Ohlin] at 71.
52 ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 7(1). —
53 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 para 190.
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of criminality.54 In other words, the Court explained that excluding this form of liability 
would miss the point of the collective nature of these crimes.55 In its conclusion on the 
notion of common purpose, the Appeals Chamber stated that it “holds the view that the 
notion of common design as a form of accomplice liability is firmly established in 
customary international law and in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly, in the Statute of 
the International Tribunal.”56
After a justification of the doctrine of joint commission, the Tadic Appeals Chamber 
went on to establish, on the basis of customary international law, the test for liability 
under this doctrine.57 58The Court concluded that three categories of JCE could be found.
f Q
First, JCE I or the basic form, exists when there is a common intentional purpose. 
Under this form of JCE, the mens rea requirement has a low threshold because, in 
addition to shared intent, dolus eventualis may suffice to find all the participants liable.59 
Moreover, members of the JCE will be found liable for committing a crime if they use a 
physical perpetrator who is not member of the JCE to carry out the crime.60 Secondly, 
JCE II, also known as systemic form, embraces the “concentration-camp” situations.61 It 
consists of participation in a common plan within an institutional framework, meaning 
that the criminal design is implemented through an institution such as a concentration
54 Ibid para 191.
55 Ohlin, supra note 51 at 71.
56 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 para 220.
57 /¿/¿/para 194.
58 Ibid para 196. See also, Prosecutor v Blagoje Simic, IT-95-9-T, Judgment (17 October 2003) (ICTY, 
Trial Chamber) [Simic, Trial Judgment]', In Krstic the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial’s Chamber 
decision and held that the accused did not share the genocidal intent but instead simply aided and abetted: 
Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, IT-98-33, Judgment (19 April 2004) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber).
59 Cassese, supra note 29 at 191.
60 Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdanin, IT-99-36-A, Judgment (3 April 2007) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) 
[Brdanin, Appeals Judgment] at 367.
1 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 para 202; see also Prosecutor v Kvocka et al, IT-98-30/1-T, 
Judgment (2 November 2001) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) [Kvocka Trial Judgment].
camp.62 63The Appeals Chamber in Tadic established three criteria of liability under JCEII, 
based on the decision of a World War II British Military Court in the Belsen case: “(i) 
the existence of an organised system to ill-treat the detainees and commit the various 
crimes alleged; (ii) the accused’s awareness of the nature of the system; and (iii) the fact 
that the accused in some way actively participated in enforcing the system, i.e., 
encouraged, aided and abetted or in any case participated in the realisation of the 
common criminal design.”64 Therefore, the mens rea requirement is based on the 
knowledge of the nature of the system and the intent to take part in this system.65 The last 
category of JCE, or JCE III, is also known as the extended form. It involves situations 
where participants agree to a common plan but one of them commits, an act which is 
outside of this common plan even though such an act was a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of carrying out the common plan.66 The requirement is the one of objective 
foreseeability where the other participants should have foreseen that the crime was likely 
to be perpetrated.67 In sum, the ICTY has held that JCE must involve several individuals. 
Second, there must be a common plan that does not have to be previously arranged or 
formulated.68 Last, the accused must have participated in the common plan even though 
an essential contribution is not required.69
40
62 Cassese, supra note 29 at 195.
63 Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, Case No 10, Judgment (17th September-17th November,
1945) (British Military Court, Luneberg). ; !
64 Tadic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 31 para202.
65 Ibid  para 203. : :
66 Ibid  para 204. .
67 Ibid  para 220; see also JCE and its Extended Form, supra note 46 at 280.
68 Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-A, Judgment (25 February 2004)(ICTY, Appeals Chamber) para 100.
69 Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al, IT-98-30/1-A, Judgment (28 February 2005) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) paras 
97, 104 and 187. However, in the Brdanin case, the requirement o f  a “significant contribution” was 
required: Brdanin, Appeals Judgment, supra note 60 para 430.
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The Rome Statute adopts a different approach to JCE than that established by the 
ICTY. Under the Rome Statute, the doctrine of JCE is found under article 25(3)(a), which 
provides:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible ' 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible.70 7123
The wording “jointly with another” seems to infer, for the first time in the Statute of an 
international criminal tribunal, the existence of the doctrine of JCE. However, as 
opposed to the interpretation given by the ad hoc Tribunals, there is a requirement of an 
essential contribution to the JCE meaning that, without this contribution, the common 
plan could not be carried out. This is so because acts of lesser weight will qualify under 
another standard such as “assistance” or “contribution to the commission of a crime by 
a group.”74 75Moreover, it seems that JCE III is not recognized by the Rome Statute, in that 
intent is always required. Indeed, if one refers to the general provision on the mental
n c
element, requirements of “intent” and “knowledge” are specified. Nevertheless, these 
requirements are preceded by the wording “unless otherwise provided.” This could be 
interpreted as meaning that Customary International Law could apply and since it allows
70 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(a).
71 Note that some authors had implicitly or expressly contented that art. 25(3)(d) could also be understood 
as regulating JCE. Antonio Cassese, "The Proper Limits o f  Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine o f  
Joint Criminal Enterprise" (2007) 5 JICJT09 [The Proper Limits o f  Individual Responsibility Under the 
Doctrine o f  JCE ]at 132; Kai Ambos , "Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility" (2007) 5 
JICJT59 [Ambos] at 172. But, as would Cassese later review, art. 25(3)(d) is a regulation o f  a different 
mode o f  responsibility, see Cassese, supra note 29 at 213.
72 Werle, supra note 3 at 176.
73 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(c).
74 Ibid, art. 25(3)(d).
75 Ibid, art. 30.
for a lower standard relating to JCE III, it means that the Rome Statute itself does not 
exclude “dolus eventual is'' for the third form of JCE.
Liability under JCE is important when considering the war crime of recruitment and 
use of child soldiers. This is so because it is one of the most likely forms of liability to be 
applied to thè war crime of the recruitment and use of child soldiers, in that it is a broad 
category which allows every member of the JCE to be held individually liable on the 
ground that they share a common plan. The war crime of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers involves several acts such as abduction, training or ordering attacks. In this 
sense, it illustrates very well the concept of collective criminality. JCE is an “ideal” mode 
of liability in order to capture collective criminality since every member can be equally 
held liable. However, so far, no individuals have been convicted for recruiting and using 
child soldiers under this mode of liability, 
c- Indirect Co-Perpetration
When an individual commits a crime jointly with another person but through another 
person, for instance if two individuals decide to loot a village and use child soldiers to do 
so, adoption of a new concept is necessary. This concept would be the one of indirect co­
perpetration and the debate as to whether liability under this mode could be used first 
took place in the ICTY’s Stakic case. In that case, the Trial Chamber refused to apply 
the concept of JCE and instead decided that the alternative term “commission” could 
embrace the concept of “co-perpetratorship.”76 8 The idea of co-perpetratorship is that there 
is a combination of two forms of commission: namely perpetration through another
76 Cassese, supra note 29 at 212.
77 The Prosecutor v Stakic, IT-97-24, Judgment (31 July 2003) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) [Stakic, Trial
Judgment]; The Prosecutor v Stakic, IT-97-24-A, Judgment (22 March 2006) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) 
[Stakic, Appeals Judgment]. :
78 Stakic, Trial Judgment, supra note 77 paras 438-440.
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person and joint control over the crime. However, this mode of liability was not 
supported by the Appeals Chamber, which concluded that “this mode of liabiliy, as 
defined and applied by : the Trial Chamber, does not have support in customary 
international law or in the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal.” The concept of “co- 
perpetratorship” was also rejected the same day by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the 
Odjanic case on a similar basis- this notion does not have support under customary 
international law since no state practice and opinio juris can be demonstrated. On the 
other hand, this mode of liability has received support within ICC jurisprudence. It has
O I
been invoked in relation to the case against the President of Sudan, Omar A1 Bashir. 
Germain Katanga was charged under the mode of indirect co-perpetration by the 
Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber accepted this mode of liability during : the 
Confirmation of Charges. However, this mode of liability has been challenged by the 
defence which filed a brief on the interpretation of article 25(3)(a).
2- Encouragement
Apart from committing a crime, an individual can be found individually criminally
. V
liable by encouraging the commission of a crime. The mode of liability of 
“encouragement” can be found under article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute, which 
provides as follows: “In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if 
that person: (b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact 7980*23
79 Stakic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 77 para 62.
80 Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction — Indirect Co-perpetration, supra 
note para 26.R1 AJessberger & Geneuss, supra note 36 at 853.
82 Katanga & Chui-Confirmation of the Charges, supra note 41.
83 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Brief on 
the Interpretation o f  Art. 25(3)(a) o f  the Rome Statute (30 October 2009) para 26.
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occurs or is attempted.”84 Similar provisions that refer to the concept of ordering and 
instigating can be found in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and in the Statute of the 
SCSL.85 Liability under this form of participation is accessory.86 87Encouragement can take 
place in two different ways. First, an individual may be held liable as an instigator when 
he or she prompts another to commit a crime. Second, an individual may be held liable 
for ordering when he or she orders the commission of a crime. The main difference 
between ordering and instigating is that ordering implies a relationship of subordination- 
fife jure or de facto88- between the one giving and the one receiving the order.89 
Encouragement, and more specifically ordering, is relevant when examining who should 
be held liable for the crimes committed by child soldiers. Indeed, in most cases, child 
soldiers commit crimes because they are ordered to do so by their commanders. 
Therefore, commanders should be held liable for these crimes under the concept of 
ordering.
3- Assistance
In addition to committing a crime or encouraging to the commission of a crime, an 
individual can assist the commission of a crime. This mode of liability, also known as 
aiding and abetting, is recognized under article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute as well as in
84 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(b).
85 ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 7; 1CTR Statute, supra note 16, art. 6; Statute o f the SCSL' supra note 
16, art. 6.
86 Werle, supra note 3 at 169.
87 Prosecutor v Kordic & Cerkez,IT-95- 14/2-A, Judgment (17 December 2004) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) 
[Kordic & Cerkez, Appeals Judgment] para 27; See also, Prosecutor vAkayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment 
(1 June 2001) (ICTR, Appeals Chamber) para 478; Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi JCTR-01-71 -A, Judgment 
(16 January 2007) (ICTR, Appeals Chamber) para 117; Prosecutor v Nahimana et al, ICTR-96-11-A, 
Judgment (28 November 2007) (ICTR Appeals Chamber) para 480.
88 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Appeals Judgment, supra note 87 para 28; Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR 
98-44-A-A, Judgment (20 May 2005) (ICTR, Appeals Chamber) para 85; Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, 
ICTR- 99-54-A-A, Judgment (19 September 2005)(ICTR, Appeals Chamber) para 75; Prosecutor v. 
Seromba, ICTR-2001-66-A, Judgment (12 March 2008) (ICTR, Appeals Chamber) para 201.
89 Werle, supra note 3 at 181.
the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Statute of the SCSL.90 According to the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, the assistance does not need to be necessary for the 
commission of the crime but has to have a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime.91 For instance, granting moral support to the perpetrator can suffice.92 The Rome 
Statute expressly mentions that “providing the means” for the commission of a crime is a 
form of assistance.93 It is not sure whether this mode of liability could apply in order to 
find commanders liable for the crimes committed by child soldiers. Even though it is 
obvious that commanders encourage children to commit crimes and provide them with 
the means to do so - such as training and firearms - this mode of liability can be used only 
where the principal perpetrator has the intent to commit a crime. Under this mode of 
liability, child soldiers would be the principal perpetrators. However, in most cases they 
commit crimes not because they intend to do so but because they are forced to do so. In 
residual cases where it could be proved that child soldiers intended to commit crimes and 
commanders only assisted these crimes, liability for assistance could be used.
B- Command Responsibility
Apart from individual criminal responsibility, international criminal law provides for a 
form of liability specific to this area of the law which is known as command or superior 
responsibility.94 This mode of liability is largely based on liability for omission,95 and 
will be specifically relevant when analysing liability for the crimes committed by child 
soldiers.
90 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(c); ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 1;ICTR Statute, supra notel6, 
art. 6; Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 16, art. 6.
91 Werle, supra note 3 at 183.
92 Ibid.
93 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 25(3)(c).
94 Werle, supra note 3 at 187.
95 Cassese, supra note 29 at 236.
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1- History: from WWII to the Jurisprudence o f the ICTY and the ICTR 
Historically, the first legal instrument dealing with the doctrine of command 
responsibility was a French ordinance of 1944 that declared that a superior was liable as 
an accomplice as long as he or she tolerated the criminal acts of his/her subordinates.96 
The first case recognizing this mode of liability is that of General Yamashita, who was 
prosecuted by a US military commission for crimes committed by his subordinates during 
World War II in the Pacific region. The US Supreme Court heard the appeal of the case 
and held that commanders have a duty to take the appropriate measures that are within 
their power to control their troops and prevent violations of the laws of warfare. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court said that it based its decision on the rules imposed by 
international humanitarian law.97 After that, the post-World War II High Command and 
Hostages cases further developed this area of the law.98 When read together, the two 
cases show that commanders could not “be held to a strict liability standard with respect 
to offenses committed by their subordinates, although the law did impose on them a duty 
to stay informed with respect to the acts of such subordinates.”99 The first international
96 Ordonnance du 28 Août 1944 relative à la répression des crimes de guerre, (1948) Journal officiel de la 
République française o f  30 August 1944, 4 Law Reports o f  Trials o f  War Criminals at 87.
97 Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (4 February 1946), online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org/ihl- 
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/ld4c8a391cc93c38cl256dl700575bb2!C)penDocument>. It 
is important here to note that this Judgment has been harshly criticized on the part dealing with the mens 
rea requirement. No direct evidence o f  his knowledge o f  the crimes was available and the decision to 
convict him has been interpreted as imposing a strict liability requirement: See e.g. Jenny Martinez, 
“Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility” (2007) 5 JICJ 638; W.H. Parks, “Command 
Responsibility for War Crimes” (1973) 62 Military Law Review 130; A.F. Reel, The Case Against General 
Yamashita (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949) at 169.
98 United States v Wilhelm List et.al. (Hostages Case), Case VII (1948) (Nuremberg Trials Held by The
United States Under Control Council Law No 10); United States v Wilhelm von Leeb et al. (High Command 
Case), Case XII (1948) (Nuremberg Trials Held by The United States Under Control Council Law No 10). 
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instrument to codify this doctrine is 1977 Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.100
2- Jurisprudence o f the ICTY and the ICTR 
Both Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals contain provisions on command responsibility 
stating that the fact that the crime “was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his 
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reasons to know that the subordinate 
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof.”101 1023The jurisprudence developed by the ad hoc Tribunals allows for a better 
understanding and interpretation of such a provision. First, it is clear that an international 
crime must be committed. Second, there is a need for a superior-subordinate relationship, 
under which the superior has the “material ability to prevent and punish the commission 
of the offenses.” However, as long as the superior exercises the prerequisite element of 
effective control, there is no requirement that the commander be in a fixed or permanent 
relationship with the subordinate. Also, the superior must possess specific information 
that would give him or her, , an indication that crimes are being committed by the 
subordinate.104 The doctrine of command responsibility extends to both civilian and
47
100 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims o f  International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 
1979), art. 86(2) provides ‘The fact that a breach o f  the Conventions or o f this Protocol was committed by 
a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if  
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the 
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if  they did not take all feasible 
measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.”
101 ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 7(3); ICTR Statute, supra note 16, art. 6(3). •
102 Prosecutor v Music, IT-96-21-A, Judgment (20 February 2001) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) para 196.
103 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac et a l ,  IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, Judgment (22 February 2001) (ICTY, 
Trial Chamber) para 399.
104 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic et ah, IT-96-21, Judgment (20 February 2001) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) 
[Delalic, Appeals Judgment] para 196.
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military superiors, as well as to individuals exercising both types of functions.105 Third,
the superior must know or have reasons to know that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed.106 Lastly, the superior must fail to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the offense of being committed or punish the offenders.
The wording “prevent or punish” does not provide the superior with an alternative choice:
if he or she knows that the subordinate is about to commit a crime and fails to prevent it,
he or she cannot make up afterwards for that failure to act by punishing the subordinate
once the crime has been committed.107 However, this third criterion in determining the
superior’s responsibility is conditioned on the material ability of the superior to take the
necessary measures.108 In other words, the superior is under the obligation to take
measures that are in the extent of his/her power.
3- The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute provides as follow:
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may 
be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances: at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
105 Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, Judgment (24 March 2000) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) para 
76.
106 Delalic, Appeals Judgment, supra note 104 para 241.
107 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14, Judgment (3 March 2000) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) para 336.
108 Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic et al., IT-96-21, Judgment (16 November 1998) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) para
395. :
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commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described 
in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under 
his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure 
to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about 
to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.109
Under this provision, liability arises from failure to act in spite of a legal duty to do so. 
This article helps to clarify the Statutes and jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals.110 It is 
clear that the superior/subordinate relationship applies to military commanders (article 
28(a)) and/or to civilian superiors (article 28(b)). The threshold in finding the superior 
liable seems to differ depending on whether the superior is a military commander or a 
civilian, but, in both situations, the threshold imposed by the Rome Statute is higher than 
the one imposed by the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals. The military commander is 
liable when he or she “knew” or “should have known”, as opposed to the Statutes of the 
ad hoc Tribunals where the superior only needs to “have reasons to know.” In the ICC’s 
Bemba case, the Pre-Trial Chamber explained that the language under article 28(a) of the 
Rome Statute sets a different standard than that applied by the ad hoc Tribunals.111 
According to the Pre- Trial Chamber, this “should have known” standard “requires more
109 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 28.
110 Werle, supra note 3 at 189. >
1,1 Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, IT-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Art. 61(7)(a) and 
(b) o f  the Rome Statute on the Charges o f  the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (15 June 
2009) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II) para 434.
of an active duty on the part of the superior to take the necessary measures to secure 
knowledge...’ Concerning the liability of civilian superiors, the Rome Statute provides 
a higher standard because culpable lack of knowledge is insufficient. Instead, it is 
required that the superior “consciously disregarded information.”
4- Nature o f the Doctrine o f Command Responsibility
The nature of command responsibility is opened to ongoing debates in international 
criminal law.12 314 Is command responsibility a mode of liability for crimes committed by 
the subordinate under which the superior participated in the crime as an accomplice or is 
held liable under a vicarious/imputed liability?115 Or is it a mode of liability that 
constitutes a separate offense and where the superior is liable for his/her own failure to 
prevent or punish a crime?116 It seems from the earliest developments of the doctrine that 
there was not a uniform interpretation of the nature of the liability arising from the 
doctrine of command responsibility.117 18The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR do 
not provide clarity to these questions. It appears from the Tribunals’ interpretation of the 
Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR that command responsibility is understood as arising 
from responsibility of the superior for failure to act as opposed to liability for the crimes 
committed by the subordinates. Therefore, the responsibility of the superior is a sui
50
112 Ibid para 433.
113 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 28(b)(i).
114 Werle, supra note 3 at 188; see also Chantal Meloni, “Command Responsibility: Mode o f  Liability for 
the Crimes o f  Subordinates or Separate Offense o f  the Superior?” (2007) 5 JICJ 619 [Meloni] at 620.
115 Ibid at 623.
116 Ibid. This is the approach embodied in Canada’s legislation implementing the Rome Statute at the 
domestic level: Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, sections 5 and 7.
117 Ibid at 624.
118 Prosecutor v Haliiovic, IT-01-48-T, Judgment (16 November 2005) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) paras 42 
and 54; Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, IT-01-47-T, Judgment (15 March 2006)(ICTY, Trial 
Chamber) para 75; Prosecutor v Delic, IT-04-83-T, Judgment (15 September 2006) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) 
para 55.
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generis responsibility where failure to act leads to liability.119 120A literal interpretation of 
the nature of the liability of the superior according to the Rome Statute implies that the 
superior is liable for the crimes committed by the subordinate. Some authors suggest 
that liability arises from “failure to act despite a legal duty to do so” and therefore “the 
superior is liable for the crime committed by his/her subordinates but to a lesser degree 
than those committing the crime as direct or indirect perpetrators.” However, some 
authors explain that it is necessary to distinguish cases in which the superior who “knew” 
about the crime and failed to prevent it, where liability as an accomplice may be more 
relevant, from cases where the superior “should have known” or “consciously 
disregarded information”, where negligence of the superior should be treated as a 
separate offense. In the latter scenario, the superior may be held liable for the crimes of 
his/her subordinate only where he or she actually had material control over the 
subordinate and, had the superior exercised this control, he or she would have known the 
risk.123 Concerning the failure to punish, this is clearly a liability for failure to act.124 1256
The doctrine of command responsibility has been criticized mainly because it is seen
1 c V
as a weak basis for retributive justice. Under the retributive theory of criminal law,
126lawmakers should criminalize and punish only wrongful and blameworthy conduct. 
Because liability under the command responsibility ground is based on a minimum mens 
rea of negligence with an actus reus of omission, it is problematic in terms of
119 Werle, supra note 3 at 188; Meloni, supra note 114 at 632.
120 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 28(a) and (b). !
121 Werle, supra note 3 at 189.
122 Meloni, supra note 114 at 636.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Arthur Thomas O'Reilly, “Command Responsibility: A  Call to Realign Doctrine with Principles” (2004) 
20 American University International Law Review 71 at 93.
126 Ibid at 89.
justification for punishment. Command responsibility is fundamental for the purpose 
of the present thesis dealing with liability for international crimes committed by child 
soldiers. Indeed, child soldiers are in a situation of superior/subordinate relation with the 
armed group they operate in. Under the doctrine of command responsibility, military 
commanders who fail to prevent or punish crimes committed by child soldiers should be 
held liable for these crimes.
Ill- Grounds for Excluding Liability
When an individual commits a criminal act intentionally, he or she is charged under 
one of the mode of liabilities described above and is sentenced accordingly. However, 
sometimes a criminal attitude can be justified or excused thereby leading to exclude 
criminal responsibility.
A- Justification
This chapter has discussed above the two modes of liability found under international 
criminal law, namely individual criminal responsibility and command responsibility.
Accused may seek to justify their involvement in a crime in order to escape criminal
\
liability by proving that their behaviour was in fact lawful. Indeed, while in normal 
circumstances the criminal act would be unlawful, in a situation of self-defence, the 
criminal conduct is considered as justified thereby rendering the conduct lawful. Self- 
defence applies when use of force is unlawfully used against the perpetrator. The use 
of force can be physical or psychological and has to be directed directly against the life, 







Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 31(l)(c). 
Ibid.
measures taken in response to the use of force are reasonable and appropriate and
1 ™committed with the intent to defend oneself.
B- Excuses
If an individual cannot justify a criminal act, he or she may invoke excuse for it. As 
opposed to a justified conduct, an excused conduct is still considered as unlawful. 
However, the perpetrator goes unpunished. Excuses are based on lack of mens rea 
deriving from absence of individual autonomy or from external circumstances.
1- Based on Lack o f Individual Autonomy
When an individual is not autonomous, he or she cannot be considered as being 
capable of committing a crime intentionally. Three excuses based on lack of individual 
autonomy can be found in international criminal law. First, there is insanity or mental 
disorder. Secondly, there is intoxication. Intoxication is a valid excuse when it is so 
serious that it negates the mens rea. In the event of a voluntary intoxication, the excuse is 
valid only if the person did not do so for the purpose of engaging in a criminal action. 
This defence is particularly relevant and will be mentioned later in this thesis when 
dealing with the liability of child soldiers for the crimes they commit because child 
soldiers are often compelled to take alcohol or drugs. Third, there is the excuse that the 
accused was a child under the age of 18 years at the time of the crime -  a minority.130 234 
This excuse is not uniformly accepted among the international criminal tribunals: it is 
provided for within the Rome Statute, but the Statute of the SCSL allows for prosecution
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133 Michelle Steel, “Child Soldiers” (2008), online: 
<http://www. vision.org/visionmedia/art.aspx?id=6684>.
134 Cassese, supra note 29 at 267.
of minors over 15 years. As a result, it is not clear whether child soldiers accused of 
crimes could benefit from this excuse at the international level.
2- Based on External Circumstances
Lack of mens rea entitling an accused to claim defences can derive from 
circumstances that are not linked with the individual itself. As such, when an individual 
commits a criminal act in response to an order, to a situation of duress or to a mistake, he 
or she may be excused.
a- Superior Orders
“Superior orders” refers to the claim that a person is not liable because he or she was 
simply following the orders of a superior. Under international criminal law, superior 
orders are not a valid excuse. Indeed, it is clear from the Statutes of international 
criminal tribunals that superior orders shall not relieve the criminal responsibility of the
f  -5 n
accused. However, the Rome Statute distinguishes situations in which this excuse may
be accepted. The reason for this is that it is necessary to keep a certain discipline within
armed forces and therefore compliance by subordinates with the orders of their superiors
is necessary. As a result, the Rome Statute provides that a subordinate can use the
defence of superior order in the event that there was a legal obligation to obey orders, the
subordinate did not know that the order was unlawful and the order was not manifestly
unlawful. Even though this provision does not apply to genocide and crimes against
1 ̂0humanity because they, always are manifestly unlawful, it can apply to war crimes. 1356789
135 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 26; Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 16, art. 14.
136 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 33; ICTY Statute, supra note 16, art. 7(4); ICTR Statute, supra note 16, 
art. 6(4); Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 16, art. 6(4).
137 Ibid.
138 Cassese, supra note 29 at 269.
139 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 33(2).
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Therefore, child soldiers who commit war crimes could use this defence when they are 
ordered to commit war crimes. ;
b- Necessity/Duress
Necessity and duress are both excuses based on a threat to life and limb. The 
distinction lays in the fact that, in a necessity case, the threat emanates from objective 
circumstances such as force of nature whereas, in a duress case, the threat emanates from 
another person.140 Several conditions apply to this kind of defence: (i) threat against life 
or bodily integrity; (ii) the measures taken are necessary and reasonable i.e. they are the 
only possibility of immediately eliminating the threat; (iii)the measures have to be taken 
with the intention of averting the threat and other intentions are irrelevant; (iv) interests 
must be balanced in order to avoid to cause a greater harm than the one that is sought to 
be avoided; (v) in the event of self-induced necessity, the defence is not available. If child 
soldiers are to be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals, they could use the 
defence of duress as an excuse. 
c- Mistake
According to the Rome Statute, mistake of fact or mistake of law - to a lesser extent - 
may exclude the criminal responsibility of an individual.141 Exclusion of liability is based 
on article 30 of the Rome Statute dealing with the mental element. The idea behind this 
exclusion is that because of the mistake, the individual lacked the required mens rea 
element.142 A mistake of fact occurs when the mistaken perception of the perpetrator 
affects the material elements and therefore negates the subjective element for liability.143
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143 Ibid  at 211.
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A mistake of law occurs when the perpetrator’s mistaken perception concerns the legal 
requirements of liability and this negates the subjective conditions of liability.144 
Ignorance of the law is not a ground for excluding criminal liability.145 However, where 
ignorance of the law. meets duress - meaning the perpetrator does not know about the 
unlawfulness of a superior order to commit a crime that is not manifestly illegal - mistake 
of law is a relevant excuse.146
C- Immunities
Under international law, there are two kinds of immunity. The first is known as 
immunity ratione materiae or organic immunity. It concerns state agents acting in their 
official capacity and is based on the fact that states must respect other states’ internal 
organization.147 148The second type of immunity is known as ratione personae and is 
granted to avoid obstacles to the discharge of diplomatic functions. However, state 
immunity under international law does not prevent the prosecution of crimes under 
international criminal law.149 For example, the ICC has issued an arrest warrant against 
the current President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir150 and the SCSL is prosecuting former 
President of Liberia Charles Taylor (who was indicted when he was the sitting 
President).151 Charles Taylor is charged, among other things, with the war crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. However, despite his status of President at the time 
of the indictment, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the motion presented by Charles
144/¿W at 212.
145 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 32(2).
146Ibid. V •"
147 Cassese, supra note 29 at 303.
148 Ibid.
149 Werle, supra note 3 at 241.
150 “Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir”, online: ICC <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/08B26814-F2Bl- 
4195-8076-B4D4026099EC/282348/bashirEngl.pd£>.
151 “Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor”, online: SCSL <http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx>.
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Taylor to quash his indictment and set aside the arrest warrant on the ground of 
immunity.152
IV- Conclusion
International criminal law is governed by general principles of liability that have been 
developed by the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals. Some principles 
share common features with domestic laws, whereas some other principles or doctrines 
are characteristic of international criminal law. International criminal tribunals use a 
three-step test when determining the liability of an individual. First, they examine 
whether a criminal act was committed. If so, then they must determine whether this 
criminal act was committed with the requisite mens rea. Last, they.must determine 
whether any ground exists that would rule out the liability of an individual. Once the 
actus reus and the mens rea of an individual have been established, this individual may 
be held liable under a mode of individual criminal liability or under the doctrine of 
command responsibility. The former mode of liability may trigger liability as a principal 
for the commission of a crime, participation in a JCE, indirect perpetration or indirect co­
perpetration. However, the individual may also be held liable as an accessory under the 
modes of encouragement, assistance, or assistance to the commission of a crime by a 
group. The latter mode of liability is based on the principle of responsibility for omission. 
Lastly, the individual may have his/her conduct excused or justified and this will rule out 
his/her liability. Understanding these general principles of liability in international 
criminal law is necessary to the extent that the next chapters will draw upon these
152 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (31 May 2004) 
(SCSL, Appeals Chamber) paras 42, 52-53, 58-59. Charles Taylor was not found to benefit from immunity 
because the SCSL was deemed to be an international criminal tribunal and immunities do not apply at the 
international level.
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principles to develop an analysis as to who should be held liable for the crimes committed 
by child soldiers.
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Chapter 3: Liability of Adults for the War Crime of Recruitment and Use of Child
Soldiers- -
If child soldiers commit international crimes, it is usually because they are being 
purposefully recruited and used by adults for these acts. Impunity for those adults 
responsible for these heinous practices has ended in a large part of the world. The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL) criminalize the recruitment and use of child soldiers.1 23 The SCSL 
has condemned individuals for this crime, and the ICC has almost completed the 
prosecution of Thomas Lubanga, a former commander in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo who was charged solely on this ground. This chapter has four main objectives. 
First, it introduces cases heard by international criminal tribunals dealing with the crime 
of recruitment and use of child soldiers. Second, it analyses the constitutive elements of 
this crime in light of the jurisprudence from the SCSL. Third, it describes the modes of 
liability used by the SCSL in order to convict individuals for this war crime. Lastly, it 
provides an analysis as to whether adults found guilty-of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers are also liable for the specific crimes committed by these children.
1 Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 1 
July 2002) [Rome Statute]; Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government o f Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment o f  a Special Court fo r  Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.SS 138 (entered into 
force 12 April 2002) [Statute o f the SCSL].
2 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (AFRC Trial Judgment), SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (20 June 2007) 
(SCSL, Trial Chamber II); Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima (AFRC Appeals Judgment), SCSL-04-16-A, 
Judgment (22 February 2008) (SCSL, Appeals Chamber); Prosecutor v Moinina Fofona (CDF Trial 
Judgment), SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment (2 August 2007) (SCSL, Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Moinina 
Fofona (CDF Appeals Judgment)> SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment (28 May 2008) (SCSL, Appeals Chamber); 
Prosecutor v Sesay {RUF Trial Judgment), SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (2 March 2009) (SCSL, Trial 
Chamber I); Prosecutor v Sesay {RUF Appeals Judgment), SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (26 October 2009) 
(SCSL, Appeals Chamber).
3 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Confirmation o f  the Charges (29 
January 2007) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I) [Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges].
It is important to examine adult liability for the crime of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers because crimes committed by child soldiers stem from this war crime. Indeed, if 
child soldiers were not recruited and being used by adults on the first place, they would 
not commit crimes. Analysing liability of those who recruit and use child soldiers allows 
for understanding how this practice can be punished. One can expect that, since one of 
the goals of international criminal law is to deter future criminal behaviours, convicting 
individuals for recruiting and using child soldiers would deter future offenders. Existence 
of fewer offenders would imply that fewer crimes will be committed by child soldiers. 
Unfortunately, because prosecution of adults who recruit and use child soldiers is recent, 
the effect on the decrease of the practice and of the subsequent crimes committed by child 
soldiers cannot be measured yet. Lastly, it is important to see whether adults could be 
held liable for the crimes committed by child soldiers but this issue has not yet been 
addressed by international criminal tribunals.
I- Overview of the Cases Dealing with the Crime of Recruitment and Use of 
Child Soldiers
The war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers did not exist in the Statutes of 
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE) established after the Second World War. Nor did it exist in the 
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established respectively in 1993 and 
1994. The crime was first introduced in the draft version of the Rome Statute in 1998 
(entered into force in 2002) and then within the Statute of the SCSL in 2000. As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, this crime had previously been recognized in
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Conventions dealing with international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law. Most of the cases heard by the ICC and SCSL contain charges on this ground.
A- Cases Before the ICC
The ICC’s first case was that of Thomas Lubanga, former rebel and Commander-in-
Chief of the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) which is the
military wing of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) in the DRC. He was charged 
solely with the war crime of recruiting and using child soldiers. The ICC’s Prosecutor has 
also charged other individuals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on this 
same ground. Since 1998, the DRC has been involved in a multilayered, overlapping 
conflict caused by a number of complex reasons, including conflict over basic resources 
such as water and access to, and control over, valuable minerals such as coltan and gold.4 
Since the outbreak of fighting, it is estimated that 5.4 million people have died from 
conflict-related injuries or disease and some 45,000 continue to die each month.5 Ituri, a 
region located in the north-east of the vast country, is one of the areas worst-affected by 
the devastating wars.6 The conflict is characterized by the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers and, indeed, the DRC is thought to have the largest number of child soldiers in 
the world.7 In March 2004, the President of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, referred the 
situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo.8 According to the referral
4 Anup Shah, ‘The Democratic Republic o f  Congo” (last updated 21 August 2010), online: Global Issues < 
http://www.globalissues.Org/art./87/the-democratic-republic-of-congo>.
5 Ibid.
6 Human Rights Watch “DRC: ICC’s First Trial Focuses on Child Soldiers” (23 January 2009), online: 
HRW < http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/22/drc-icc-s-first-trial-focuses-child-soldiers>.
7 Martin Bell, “Child Alert: Democratic Republic o f  Congo” (2006), online: UNICEF < 
http://www.unicef.org/childalert/drc/content/Child_Alert_DRC_en.pdf>.
8 Office o f  the Prosecutor, “Prosecutor receives referral o f  the situation in the Democratic Republic o f
Congo” (2004), online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/prosecutor%20receives%20referral%20o 
f%20the%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%20congo?lan=en-GB>.
letter, there were reasons to believe that international crimes within the jurisdiction of the
i
ICC were being committed within the territory of the DRC.9 In June 2004, with the
authorization of Pre-Trial Chamber I, the Office of the Prosecutor started to investigate
the situation.10 Subsequently, arrest warrants were issued against five individuals from the
DRC, namely: Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Bosco
Ntaganda and Callixte Mbarushimana.11 12Four of them -  Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo and
10Ntaganda - have been charged with the crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
Lubanga, Katanga and Ngudjolo are in the custody of the Court, while Ntaganda is still at 
large.13
The Lubanga case demonstrates the severity of the war crime of recruitment and use 
of child soldiers because Thomas Lubanga, as the first individual to be charged by and 
transferred to the ICC was indicted on this sole ground.14 The positive aspect of this trial 
is the strong message it sends to the world, confirming that impunity no longer exists for 
those accused of such a war crime. However, it is very unfortunate that other crimes, and
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9 Ibid.
10 Office o f  the Prosecutor, “The Office o f  the Prosecutor o f  the International Criminal Court opens its first
investigation” (2004), online: ICC < http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/the%20office%20of%20the%20prosecut 
or%20of%20the%20intemational%20criminal%20court%20opens%20its%20first%20investigation?lan=en
-GB>. : ’ '
11 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant o f  Arrest (10 February 2006, unsealed 
on 17 March 2006) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant 
o f  Arrest (2 July 2007, unsealed on 18 October 2007) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant o f  Arrest (6 July 2007, unsealed on 7 February 2008) (ICC, Pre- 
Trial Chamber I); Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant o f  Arrest (7 August 2006) 
(ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I) [Ntaganda, Warrant o f  Arrest]', Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC- 
01/04-01/10, Warrant o f  Arrest (28 September 2010) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I).
12 Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation o f  the Charges (30 September 2008) (ICC, 
Pre-Trial Chamber I) [Katanga & Chui, Confirmation o f Charges]; Ntaganda, Warrant o f  Arrest, supra 
note 11.
13 “ICC Situation and Cases, Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda”, online: ICC <http://www.icc- 
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0206/ 
ICC+0104+0206.htm>.
14 Lubanga, Confirmation of Charges, supra note 3.
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particularly crimes of sexual violence were not included within the charges.15 Lubanga 
made his first appearance before the Court on 20 March 2006 but proceedings were 
stayed twice due to concerns from Trial Chamber I that the accused was not receiving fair 
proceedings.16 These resumed on 8 October 2010, following a decision from the Appeals 
Chamber.17 Throughout the proceedings, many witnesses, including former child soldiers, 
parents of former child soldiers and experts, testified before the Court. It is expected that 
the closing oral statements will take place in public hearings on 25 and 26 August 2011, 
with a decision to be pronounced by Trial Chamber I within a reasonable period of 
time.18 •
Germain Katanga (former commander of the rebel group Force de Résistance 
Patriotique en Ituri (FPRI)), and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (former leader of the rebel 
group Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (FNI)) have been charged with three 
counts of crimes against humanity19 and seven counts of war crimes, including 
recruitment and use of child soldiers.20 21The FPRI and FNI are ethnic Lendu armed groups 
operating closely together against the UPC, ethnic Hema armed group. The Pre-Trial
15 During the investigation stage, evidence that gender-based violence occurred in the DRC for the period 
o f  time covering the indictment was found. The Prosecutor himself publically stated “I fully agree that this 
is one o f  the gravest crimes, raping women was a tool to destroy communities. Rape as it was perpetrated in 
Congo does not constitute only sexual abuse but it is used as a weapon o f  war”: Interactive Radio for 
Justice, "Special Thomas Lubanga Program” (Transcript, 5 April 2006), online: IRFJ
< http://www.irQ.org/Programs/Programl l/IRFJ_prgl l_english.doc >. And yet, it was decided to focus 
solely on one type o f  crime due to strategic and security reasons: Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-91/04-01/06- 
170, Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation (June 28, 2006) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I).
16 ICC “Case Information Fact Sheet: Situation in Democratic Republic o f  the Congo”, (last updated 15 
October 2010), online: ICC < http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/LubangaENG.pdf>.
11 Ibid. , ;;
18 ICC Press Release, “Trial o f  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The presentation o f  evidence stage is closed” (20 
May 2011), online: ICC < http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/pr671>.
^  Katanga & Chui, Confirmation o f  Charges, supra note 12 at 140-149.
20 Ib idzt 75-118. :.
21 Jennifer Easterday, “The Trial o f  Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui” (2011), online: Open 
Society Justice Initiative <http://www.katangatrial.org/>.
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Chamber decided to hear both cases jointly because both individuals have been charged 
with violations relating to the same attack in Bogoro on 23 February 2003. The attack 
was directed against a military camp that existed in that village but also against the 
civilian population. The attack was intended to “wipe out” Bogoro village by killing the 
predominantly Hema civilian population. Lastly, Bosco Ntaganda (former Deputy Chief 
of General Staff for Military Operations within the FPLC) has also been charged with 
implementing a policy adopted at a higher level to recruit and use child soldiers.2 3 
Ntaganda was ranked third in the hierarchy of the UPC and was subordinated to Thomas 
Lubanga. He is not yet in custody of the ICC. He is currently still operating in the DRC 
nd while nominally in the Congolese army, he also maintains a parallel chain of 
command operating outside the army's military hierarchy and suspected of recruiting and 
using child soldiers.24
In addition to the situation in the DRC, the ICC is also addressing the situation in 
Uganda, another conflict in which serious allegations of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers are present. Uganda was referred to the ICC by President Yoweri Musevini in 
2003.25 Since its independence in 1962, the country has been economically and politically 
unstable.26 More specifically, a conflict has arisen in the Northern district of Acholi 
where the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group notorious for its brutality, is
22 Office o f  the Prosecutor, “Case Information Sheet: Case in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo- 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui”, (last updated 15 October 2010), online: ICC 
< http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/KatangaChuiEng.pdf>.
23 Office o f  the Prosecutor, “Warrant o f  Arrest against Bosco Ntaganda”, (7 August 2006), online: ICC 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.PDF>.
24 Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Rogue Leaders, Rebels Forcibly Recruit Youth” (2010), online: 
HRW <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/20/dr-congo-rogue-leaders-rebels-forcibly-recruit-youth>.
25 Office o f  the Prosecutor, “Case Information Sheet: Situation in Uganda”(last updated 16 June 2010),
online: ICC <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E7F674DF-C2D8-4A86-98Cl-
4C9621050D4B/282225/KonyEt AllENG.pdf>.




operating.27 The LRA is known for abducting children in order to swell its ranks. It is 
estimated that the LRA has abducted 25,000 children since the beginning of the conflict 
in the early 1980s.28 On 8 July 2005, the ICC issued arrest warrants against Joseph Kony 
(leader of the LRA), Vincent Otti (Second-in-Command of the LRA), and Okot 
Odhiambo (Deputy Army Commander of the LRA). They are accused of having 
committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, including the war crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers.29 Otti is suspected of having been killed by Kony in 
2007.30 31An arrest warrant was also issued against Dominic Ongwen who, as Brigade 
Commander of the LRA was directly involved with crimes committed by the LRA,
31including abduction of civilians for the purpose of recruitment to the ranks of the LRA. 
Another individual, Raska Lukwiya (former Deputy Army Commander of the LRA) was 
also charged by the ICC but the proceedings against him were terminated due to his 
death.32 In order to make a decision on the guilt or innocence of all these individuals 
charged with recruiting and using child soldiers, the ICC will be able to rely upon the 
jurisprudence from the SCSL.
11 Ibid.
28 Coalition to S top ; the .Use o f  Child Soldiers, “Child Soldiers Global Report” (2008), online: 
<http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/files/country_pdfs/FINAL_2008_Global_Report.pdf> • [Global 
Report 2008] at 348.
29 Office o f  the Prosecutor, “Warrant o f  Arrest for Joseph Koni”, “Warrant o f  Arrest for Vincent Otti”, 
“Warrant o f  Arrest for Okot Odhiambo”(8 July 2005), online: from ICC < http://www.icc- 
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%20 
0204%200105/uganda >.
30 BBC News, “Otti Executed by Uganda Rebels” (2007), online: BBC < 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/7156284.stm>.
31 Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant o f  Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (8 July 2005) 
(ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II).
32 Prosecutor v Raska Lukwiya,ICC-02/04-01/05-248, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings Against 
Raska Lukwiya (11 July 2007) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II).
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B- Cases Before the SCSL
The SCSL is currently hearing the case of former President of Liberia Charles Taylor. 
Before this, it heard three cases where eight individuals were convicted of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The SCSL was created by an agreement between the UN and 
the Sierra Leonean government in 2002 with the mandate of trying those bearing the 
greatest responsibility for international crimes committed during the conflict.33 The 
country was ravaged by a civil war that lasted from 1991 to 2002 and that involved three 
main parties. On one side was the elected government of President Kabbah which was 
supported by the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), mainly composed of Kamajors (traditional 
hunters who were in charge of defending villages).34 On the other side, were the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), created as a result of a 1997 coup by seventeen 
junior-ranking soldiers of the Sierra Leonean army,35 as well as the rebel Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF). Following the 1997 AFRC coup that overthrew the elected 
government, the AFRC joined with the RUF in order to take control over Sierra Leone 
and especially over its diamonds.36 The Sierra Leonean civil war was characterized by the 
use of child soldiers: it is estimated that between 5,000 and 10,000 child soldiers were 
involved in the conflict, 30% of them being girls mainly used as “bush wives”.37 Child 
soldiers were used by all parties to conflict, but the RUF seems to have been the first to 
enlist children and is responsible for the highest number of child recruitments recorded.38
33 Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 1.
34 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 164; CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 2 and 62.
35 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 164.
36 Ibid  paras 164, 166,170 and 172.
37 Global Report 2008, supra note 28 at 298.
38 Ibid  at 299.
In this context, trials of the leaders of the three main fighting forces took place. In the 
AFRC case, three defendants - Alex Tamba Brima (senior member of the AFRC), 
Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (both deputy commanders of the 
AFRC) were charged with fourteen counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes.39 
This case is groundbreaking in that it is the first time in international criminal law that 
individuals were prosecuted for recruiting and using child soldiers, among many other 
international crimes. The three accused were all convicted by the Trial Chamber for the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, and were sentenced to global sentences of 50 years 
(for Brima and Kanu) and 45 years (for Kamara) of imprisonment.40 The trial judgment 
was appealed by both the prosecutor and the accused.41 On appeal, the convictions for the 
war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers were upheld.42
In the CDF case, Samuel Hinga Norman (national coordinator of the CDF), Moinina 
Fofana (director of war within the CDF), and Allieu Kondewa (high priest of the CDF 
and chief initiator of new recruits into the Kamajor Society) were prosecuted for eight
counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes including the war crime of recruitment
. . \
and use of child soldiers.43 Norman died in the course of the trial and the Trial Chamber 
subsequently terminated the trial proceedings against him.44 As will be detailed later in 
this chapter, Fofana was acquitted of the charge of enlisting child soldiers. Kondewa was
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39 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated Indictment (18 
February 2005) (SCSL, Trial Chamber II).
40 Prosecutor v Alex Tamba Brima, SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judgment (19 July 2007) (SCSL, Trial 
Chamber II).
41 AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 2.
42 Ibid, disposition.
43 Prosecutor v Norman, SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment (4 February 2004) (SCSL, Trial Chamber I).
44 Valerie Oosterveld, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced Marriage: Providing 
Clarity or Confusion?” (2007) The Canadian Yearbook o f  International Law [Oosterveld] at 852.
found guilty of recruiting child soldiers.45 However, Kondewa’s conviction was reversed 
by the Appeals Chamber as detailed below.46
In the RUF case, Issa Hassan Sesay (leader of the RUF), Morris Kallon 
(battlefield commander and Sesay’s deputy within the RUF) and Augustine Gbao (RUF’s 
overall security commander and colonel), were prosecuted, among other things, for other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law including recruitment and use of 
child soldiers.47 The three accused were sentenced to lengthy imprisonment and the 
Appeals Chamber confirmed the sentences.48
The civil war in Sierra Leone was closely related to conflicts occurring in Liberia, 
Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea as each country’s armed groups and governments provided 
support to factions in neighbouring countries.49 For instance, it was reported that child 
soldiers have been recruited in Sierra Leone by Liberian forces in order to fight in 
Liberia.50 It is as a result of these interrelationships that Charles Taylor, former President 
of Liberia, has been charged by the SCSL with 11 counts of crimes against humanity and
war crimes including the crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers.51 Taylor was
' . \
arrested by the Nigerian authorities in March 2006 and appeared for the first time before
the SCSL on April 2006.52 In June 2006, it was decided that Charles Taylor’s trial would
(
take place in The Hague, Netherlands, because his presence in Freetown would be an
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45 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2, disposition.
46 CDF Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, disposition.
47 Prosecutor v Sesay, SCSL-04-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment (2006) (SCSL).
48 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2, disposition; RUF Appeals Judgment, supra note 2, disposition.
49 Global Report 2008, supra note 28 at 297.
50 Ibid  at 300. - A
51 Prosecutor v Charles Taylor, Second Amended Indictment against Charles Taylor, SCSL 2003-01-PT 
(29 May 2007) (SCSL, Office o f  the Prosecutor).
2 “Timeline”, online: SCSL < http://www.sc- 
sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx>.
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“impediment to stability and a threat to the peace” of the region.53 The evidence presented 
before the court relies upon the fact that Charles Taylor himself was using child soldiers 
in Liberia and therefore it was no surprise to him to know that child soldiers were used in 
Sierra Leone.54
Because the war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers by adults is relatively 
new, its constitutive elements have only been interpreted by the SCSL to date. The 
AFRC, CDF and RUF trials provided many clarifications and details about the crime, but 
the ICC will still have to address some remaining uncertainties.
II- Elements of the Crime of Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
The Rome Statute criminalizes the recruitment and use of child soldiers by national 
armed forces in case of an international armed conflict and by armed forces or groups in 
case of an internal armed conflict.55 The Statute of the SCSL contains a very similar 
provision by prohibiting the conscription or enlistment of “children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”56 
This section aims to describe, in conformity with the guidance given by the SCSL, the 
constitutive elements of this war crime. ■
A- Customary Nature of the Crime of Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
The war crime of recruitment of child soldiers existed within customary international 
law before its codification within the Rome Statute and the Statute of the SCSL. The 
customary nature of this crime was first affirmed when the Appeals Chamber in the CDF
53 Situation in Sierra Leone, SC Res 1688, UNSCOR, UN Doc S/Res/1688 (2006).
54 Alpha Sesay, “Prosecutors Accuse Charles Taylor o f  Using Child Soldiers in Liberia” (2010), online: 
Open Society Justice Initiative < http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2010/01/26/prosecutors-accuse-charles- 
taylor-of-using-child-soldiers-in-liberia/>.
55 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii).
56 Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 1, art. 4(c).
case addressed a motion filed by the accused Norman. Norman argued that he could not 
be charged with this crime because it did not exist under customary international law at 
the time of the alleged crimes and therefore violated the principle of legality, nullum 
crimen sine lege. He further argued that while Additional Protocol II and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child may have created an obligation to refrain from recruiting child 
soldiers, these instruments did not criminalize such practice. Therefore, the Rome Statute 
criminalized child recruitment but did not codify customary international law. In its 
decision, the Appeals Chamber held that “child recruitment was criminalized before it 
was explicitly set out as a criminal prohibition in treaty law and certainly by November 
1996.”57 8 : .
In the AFRC case, a similar issue arose. The accused Kanu invoked the defence of 
mistake of law, arguing that he was not aware of the unlawfulness of recruiting or using 
child soldiers under 15 years because such practices commonly occurred in Sierra Leone 
prior to the time-period covered by the indictment.59 He also argued that the age of 15
years, below which it is illegal to recruit and use child soldiers under international
\
criminal law, was arbitrary and therefore inapplicable because the ending of childhood in 
African societies has to do with physical capacity to perform acts reserved for adults.60 
The Trial Chamber first recalled the finding of the Appeals Chamber in the Norman 
decision on the customary nature of the crime.61 Second, it held that the rules of 
customary international law are not contingent on domestic practice in one given
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57 Prosecutor v Norman (Child Recruitment), SCSL-2004-14-AR72, Decision on Preliminary Motion 
Based on Lack o f  Jurisdiction (31 May 2004) (SCSL, Trial Chamber I).
58 Ibid, para 53.
59 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 730.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid, para 731.
country.62 63Kanu attempted to appeal on this ground of mistake of law and arguing lack of 
mens rea on his part, but the Appeals Chamber dismissed the argument as frivolous and 
vexatious. Since then, the SCSL has consistently relied on the customary nature of the 
crime.64 Nevertheless, this customary nature can be discussed on two grounds. First, the 
Appeals Chamber, in its Norman decision, held that recruitment of child soldiers was a 
crime under customary international law, leaving open the question of use of child 
soldiers. The Trial Chamber in the CDF case clarified this point when it explained that 
“using children to participate actively in hostilities was also proscribed under customary 
international humanitarian law prior to the events charged in the indictment.”65 Second, 
the formation of custom requires both state practice and opinio juris. Tim Kelsall argues 
that the Appeals Chamber’s finding that the crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers 
was a crime under customary international law at the time alleged in the indictment does 
not reflect the complex reality on the ground during the Sierra Leone civil war. In his 
view, the conception of childhood in rural Sierra Leone differs widely from the 
conception of the international community, in that rural Sierra Leonean children are 
perceived as “dangerous, half-wild beings, who do not enjoy the rights of adulthood.”66 67
In order to become adults, children must endure suffering and hard work. For instance, 
they can be sent to a foster family where they do the domestic labour as well as other 
forms of labour. The practice of child soldiering is a “logical extension of these types of
71
62 Ibid, para 732.
63 AFRC Appeals Judgment, supra note 2 paras 293,296-297.
64 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 728 ; CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 197; AFRC 
Appeals Judgment, supra note 2 para 295; CDF Appeals Judgment, supra note 2 para 139.
65 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 197. The Trial Chamber relied upon art. 4(3)(c) o f  APII which 
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initiation.”68 For these reasons, he argues that it is possible that the accused in the CDF 
case did not know about the illegal nature of recruiting child soldiers and therefore did 
not have the requisite mens rea.69 70And, in fact, such elements of a cultural defence were 
included in the expert testimony of anthropologist Daniel Hoffman. Kelsall focuses on 
the CDF because its methods of child recruitment had some cultural resonance, insofar as 
the CDF relied upon traditional methods of initiating children into adulthood in order to 
enlarge the number of individuals involved in the defence of their home villages and 
towns. He further argues that even if it is possible that leaders from the AFRC and the 
RUF did not know about the illegality of the crime because childhood is a flexible notion 
in Sierra Leone, they must have known that “abducting a young person from their family 
and community, often after having killed their parents, and then forcing them to fight, 
was wrong.”71 In other words, Kelsall seems to argue that the methods of recruitment and 
use of the CDF were not as reprehensible as the ones used by the AFRC and RUF 
because in the former case, the cultural resonance was very strong. Nevertheless, he also 
points out that he is not endorsing Kondewa’s actions and that “only the most fanatical of 
cultural relativists would argue that equipping very youiig persons to fight in wars is a 
good thing.”72 This could indicate that, even though Kondewa was part of a culture where 
child soldiering could be seen as legitimate for the reasons mentioned above, any 
individual having some common sense would know that this practice is wrong. In 
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soldiers. Yet, another practice -  which is also part of customary international law - is 
criminalized: the use of child soldiers.
B- Distinction Between Recruitment and Use
The war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers must be understood as 
distinguishing two crimes: on the one hand, there is the crime of recruiting children under 
15 years into armed forces or groups. On the other hand, there is the crime of using 
children under 15 years to participate actively in hostilities. This distinction is important 
to mention because, in order to be convicted under article 4(c) of the Statute of the SCSL 
or under the equivalent provisions of the Rome Statute, it is enough for an individual to 
commit either of these crimes as opposed to both of them. However, this distinction is not 
obvious at first glance, since both Statutes include these two offenses within a single 
provision. In addition to this, the elements of the crime from the Rome Statute as well as 
the Trial Chamber in the AFRC case do not distinguish between both crimes. They 
explain that the criminal conduct is to conscript or enlist one or more persons into the 
national armed forces or use one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities. 
However, both the CDF and RUF Trial Judgments clarified the difference between 
recruitment and use of child soldiers by adopting two sets of elements.73 4 On the one hand, 
the crime of recruitment of child soldiers implies that one or more persons were recruited 
into an armed force or group by the accused. On the other hand, the crime of use of child 
soldiers implies that one or more persons were used by the accused to actively participate 
in hostilities. In fact, the wording of the Statutes themselves suggests the existence of two 
crimes. The prohibited behaviours are to conscript or enlist children under 15 years into
73 ICC, “Elements o f  the Crime o f  the Rome Statute”, online: ICC <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/> 
[Elements o f  the Crime]; AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 729.
74 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 195-196; RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 190-193.
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armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities. While 
recruitment refers to the manner in which the child became associated with the armed 
forces or the armed group, use relates to the way in which the child was utilized.
1- Recruitment
The question arises as to whether the formulation “conscript or enlist” suggests that 
these two behaviours are also separate crimes. Analysis of the elements of the crime of 
the Rome Statute as well as the decisions from the SCSL leads one to understand that 
conscripting and enlisting can be gathered under the umbrella of the term “recruitment”. 
The distinction between the two relates to the method of recruitment. Conscription has 
been defined by the AFRC Trial Chamber as “compulsion, in some instances through the 
force of law”.75 6 A similar approach was adopted by the RUF Trial Chamber.77 Enlistment 
entails “accepting and enrolling individuals when they volunteer to join an armed force or 
group.”78 However, this distinction is not very useful because, in both situations, the act 
is criminal and the consent of the child to join an armed group does not have any effect 
on the liability of individuals who accept the child. This is so because it is considered that 
when a child “voluntarily” joins an armed group, his or her choice is biased by other 
factors such as economic need or indoctrination. As noted by the UN Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Children in Armed Conflict, Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, “in most conditions of child recruitment even the most "voluntary" of 
acts are taken in a desperate attempt to survive by children with a limited number of
75 Sandesh Sivakumaran, “War Crimes Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2010) 8 JICJ 1009 at 
1012. '
16 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 134.
71RUF Trial Chamber, supra note 2 para 186.
78 Ibid para 735.
options (...) The line between voluntary and forced recruitment is therefore not only 
legally irrelevant but practically superficial in the context of children in armed conflict.” 
The Trial Chamber in the CDF case took a particular approach to recruitment. It held 
that it is important to interpret the term “recruitment” in light of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross commentary to article 4(3)(c) of Additional Protocol II 
which provides: “The principle of non-recruitment also prohibits accepting voluntary 
enlistment. Not only can a child not be recruited, or enlist himself, but furthermore he 
will not be "allowed to take part in hostilities", i.e., to participate in military operations 
such as gathering information, transmitting orders, transporting ammunition and 
foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage.” Based on this comment, the Trial Chamber held that 
“the term “enlistment” could encompass both voluntary enlistment and forced 
enlistment.” This approach is problematic since it . blurs the distinction between 
conscription and enlistment made by the Statute of the SCSL. On the other hand, since 
the distinction is in fact irrelevant, this approach could be understood as pointing out the 
inconsistency. The main contribution made by the Trial Chamber relates to its analysis of 
“initiation” and whether or not this could constitute-enlistment. The issue was to 
determine whether initiation into the Kamajor society through rituals constituted
enlistment. It found that initiation into the Kamajor society did not necessarily amount to
/-
enlistment into an armed force or group, but that such initiation could amount to 798012
75
79 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Situation in the Democratic Republic o f Congo in the Case o f the Prosecutor 
vs Thomas Lubanga Dyilo- Written Submission o f the United Nations Special Representative o f  the 
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80 ICRC, “Commentary to APII”, online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf7COM/475- 
760008?OpenDocument>, para 4557.
81 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 192.
82 Oosterveld, supra note 44. . M
enlistment in specific cases.83 The.Appeals Chamber used a broader definition of 
enlistment, saying that enlistment includes “any conduct accepting the child as a part of 
the militia.”84 This approach, which is similar to the one taken in the AFRC trial 
judgment, rectifies the problematic definition given by the Trial Chamber when it 
distinguished between voluntary and forced enlistment. However, this definition is 
broader than the one provided by the AFRC Trial Chamber. Because of this, the Appeals 
Chamber determined that witness TF2-021 was not enlisted during initiation rituals, but 
rather before that, when he was captured by the CDF and forced to carry looted 
property.85 8679Since Kondewa’s guilt for recmiting child soldiers was based on his role in 
initiating TF2-021 and the Appeals Chambers found that TF2-021 was in fact enlisted 
before that time, Kondewa was acquitted on this count. The RUF cáse does not shed 
light on this because the Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor did not bring evidence of
0 7
voluntary enlistment and restricted its findings to conscription.
Lastly, it is important to note that recruitment of children is prohibited for “armed 
forces or groups.” The jurisprudence of the SCSL makes it clear that these armed forces
00
or groups can be governmental or non-governmental. These findings were based upon
o n
the interpretation given in the Tadic Judgment of the ICTY. The Rome Statute 
emphasizes this distinction and the fact that both governmental and non-governmental 
forces are prohibited from recruiting children under 15 years. Indeed, while article
83 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 969: However, Justice Itoe had a separate opinion arguing that 
initiation should not be considered to be part o f  enlisting and therefore a criminal offense, separate opinion, 
para 30.
4 CDF Appeals Judgment, supra note 2 para 192.
85 Ibid, para 144.
86 Ibid, para 146.
87 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 1694.
88 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 734; CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 194; RUF Trial 
Judgment, supra note 2 para 189.
89 Prosecutor v Tadic, IT-94-1 A, Appeal Judgement (15 July 1999) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), para 120.
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8(2)(b)(xxvi), which refers to international armed conflicts, refers to “national armed 
forces”, article 8(2)(d), which covers internal armed conflicts, refers to “armed forces or
groups”.
2- Use
It is also clear from the jurisprudence of the SCSL that active participation in 
hostilities includes direct participation in combat as well as active participation in 
military activities linked to combat.90 This reasoning stems from the report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which 
states that the notion covers:
direct participation in combat and also active participation in military 
activities linked to combat such as sabotage and use of children as 
decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints. It would not cover activities 
clearly unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase 
or the use of domestic staff in an officer’s accommodation. However, 
use of children in a direct support function such as acting as bearers to 
take supplies to the front line, or activities at the front line itself, would 
be included within the terminology.91
The AFRC Trial Chamber gave a somewhat ambiguous definition because it adopted a 
wider view than the drafters of the Rome Statute, mentioning that “any labour or support 
that gives effect to, or helps maintain, operations in a conflict constitutes active 
participation.”92 For instance, finding and/or acquiring food and making trails or finding 
routes constitute active participation in hostilities.93 This is problematic because it
90 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 736; CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 193; RUF Trial 
Judgment, supra note 2 para 188.
91 Report o f  the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f an International Criminal Court, 
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 (14 April 1998) at 21, footnote 12; AFRC Trial Judgment supra note 2 para 736.
92 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 737.
93 Ibid, para 737.
a
78
encompasses a wide variety of auxiliary activities,94 thereby blurring the distinction 
between active and non-active participation. While the CDF case does not provide any 
guidance on this demarcation,95 the RUF trial judgment does by giving extensive
examples of what constitutes active participation. It found that committing violence
■\
against civilians, abducting peacekeepers, serving as bodyguards to commanders, 
undertaking armed patrols, manning military checkpoints, guarding military objectives 
(such as diamond mines), and acting as spies constitute active participation.96 97However, 
performing domestic chores for RUF and AFRC commanders or using children on food- 
finding missions does not amount to active participation in hostilities. An unanswered 
question stayed is therefore whether an armed group that uses children for domestic 
chores or on food-finding missions could be responsible for illegal recruitment of child 
soldiers? These children are performing tasks within the armed groups and therefore they 
have been recruited either in a compulsory manner or because the child volunteered. 
Even when these activities are not considered as active participation, one cannot, negate 
the fact that these children are part of the armed group. Refusing to admit that children 
who perform tasks that do not amount to active participation may still be part of the 
armed group is problematic because it blurs the distinction between recruitment and use, 
because recruitment would be understood through what constitutes use. The RUF Trial 
Chamber should have clarified that children who were used for domestic chores and on 
food-finding missions were in fact illegally recruited by the RUF and that, if the RUF
94 Guibert and Blumenstock, “The First Judgment o f  the Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Missed 
Opportunity?” (2007) 6 Law and Practice o f  International Courts and Tribunals at 381; Oosterveld, supra 
note 44 at 148.
95 The CDF case did not address the issue o f  “use” as it focused on the notion o f  recruitment. However, 
Justice Itoe gave a detailed analysis on where to draw the line between active and non-active participation. 
For a commentary on this see Oosterveld, supra note 44 at 149-151.
96 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 1718, 1720, 1724-1725, 1729, 1731.
97 Ibid, paras 1730 and 1743.
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was not liable for using these children, it was still liable for recruiting them. This leads to 
the next point, which relates to the use of girls by armed groups.
The notion of “active participation” was adopted by both Statutes in order to cover 
activities broader than mere direct participation in combat. However, the current 
understanding of active participation is not satisfactory in the sense that it privileges boy 
soldiers. The SRSG on Children in Armed Conflicts, Radhika Coomaraswamy submitted 
an amicus curiae brief to the International Criminal Court in the Lubanga case. In the 
brief, she recommended that the Court interpret the term “participate actively” broadly in 
order_to„coyer thestatus.of both combatant and non-combatant children serving with 
fightingJforces.L9- She warned that a narrow interpretation would have the effect of 
excluding girls from the definition of child soldiers when they do not carry out activities 
linked to combat.98 100 This exclusion would result in a profound injustice because harm 
that is specific.to, girls .would.not.bexovered.101 102*This is because girls do not usually have 
a role linked to combat, even though many do receive some combat training. Rather, 
most girls recruited into fighting forces have roles at the military base, serving as 
domestic slaves, forced “wives” and/or sex, slaves.10- Thus, even though the term 
“participate actively” is meant to be read broadly, in the absence of a judgment in the 
Lubanga case clarifying otherwise, the term is too narrow to capture the experiences of 
many girls associated with fighting forces. However, given the analysis of the previous
98 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Situation in the Democratic Republic o f Congo in the Case o f the Prosecutor 
vs1 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo- Written Submission o f  the United Nations Special Representative o f the 
Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict, ICC-01/04-01/06-1229 (18 March 2008).
99 Ibid  at 8.
100 Ibid  at 9.
101 Ibid.
102 Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana, Where Are the Girls (Canada: International Center for Human
Rights and Democratic Development, 2004) at 74.
m Ibid.-
80
paragraph, it would be necessary to see whether liability of individuals who use girls 
could be grasped by the crime of recruitment if it cannot be part of the crime of use. In 
this event, even if girls who are used as sex slaves are not recognized as actively
participating in hostilities, the accused would still be liable for recruitment and use of
child soldiers because these girls were recruited by the armed group. There is, however, a 
significant drawback in including girls within the category of “child soldiers”. Child 
soldiers are considered to be combatants under international law and therefore are lawful 
targets of attack and may be killed.104 Civilians, on the other hand, are subjected under 
international criminal law to legal protections against certain forms of attack. The 
question that arises is whether girls providing support roles would really be better 
protected when considered as child soldiers, or whether they are better off considered 
civilians.
Turning to the mens rea requirement for both recruitment and use of child soldiers, the 
elements of the crime of the Rome Statute as well as the Trial Chamber in the AFRC case 
indicate that the perpetrator must have known or must have turned a blind eye to the fact 
that the child was under 15 years.105 The Trial Chamber in the CDF case added an
element, which is the intent of the perpetrator to enlist the child or use the child to 
participate actively in hostilities.106 107This higher subjective requirement was also adopted 
by the Trial Chamber in the RUF case. When rendering its decision in the Lubanga 
case, the ICC will need to clarify which approach is the right one. In spite of some 
unresolved questions - for instance, the mens rea requirement for being guilty of
104 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2005).
105 Elements o f  the Crime, supra note 73; AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2. ;
106 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 195-196.
107 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 191 and 193.
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recruitment and use of child soldiers - the SCSL brought clarity as to the elements of this 
crime. Based on the interpretation it gave to the crime, the SCSL convicted individuals 
using various modes of liability.
Ill- Legal Findings on the Responsibility of the Accused for Recruiting and 
Using Child Soldiers
Indictments in the AFRC, CDF and RUE cases covered a broad scope of possible 
modes of liability for the Trial Chamber to consider when determining liability for the 
crimes charged including recruitment and use of child soldiers. The three indictments 
provided that the accused were individually criminally responsible for the crimes, which 
crimes each of them “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or in whose planning, 
preparation or execution each accused otherwise aided and abetted, or in which crimes 
were within a joint criminal enterprise in which each Accused participated or were a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise in which each 
Accused participated.” In addition or in the alternative, the indictment provided that
the accused were responsible of the crimes committed under article 6(3).108 09 This
\
provision is the one on command responsibility. In analyzing the liability or not of the 
accused for recruiting and using child soldiers, each judgment considered various 
testimonies, reports and other available documents. This examination led to a 
determination of whether or not child soldiers were recruited or used within a specific 
area or armed group. Once recruitment and use of child soldiers was established, the 
judgments analyzed whether this practice could be imputed to the accused. In order to do
108 Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, SCSL-04-16-T, Indictment (5 February 2004) (SCSL, Trial Chamber 
II), para 35; Prosecutor v Moinina Fofona , SCSL-04-14-T, Indictment (5 February 2004) (SCSL, Trial 
Chamber I), para 20; Prosecutor v Sesay, SCSL-04-15-T, Indictment (2 August 2006) (SCSL, Trial 
Chamber I), para 38.
109 Ibid paras 36, 21 and 39.
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so, it relied on specific facts to find the mode of liability under which they would be 
found guilty.
A- Personal Commission
Out of three cases and eight individuals being brought before the SCSL to face 
charges of recruitment and use of child soldiers, only one individual -Kondewa - was 
found guilty for personally^ committing this crime. This illustrates one of the difficulties 
confronting international criminal law. Because international criminal tribunals have a 
mandate to prosecute only those who are the most responsible, it is often hard to find a 
link between the accused -  who are often very high in the chain of command - and the 
crimes being committed on the ground. Oftentimes, as demonstrated by the cases before 
the SCSL, those who are the most responsible do not physically perpetrate the crimes but 
are liable under other modes of liability. Even so, on some occasions, individuals like 
Kondewa in the CDF case are held responsible (in this case, at trial) for the commission 
of a crime. Kondewa was found liable under article 6(1) of the. Statute of the crime of 
enlisting a child under the age of 15 into an armed group. Among other elements, the 
Trial Chamber relied upon the testimony of witness TF2-021 who was first captured by 
Kamajors and forced to carry looted property. He was then initiated by Kondewa at Base 
Zero.110 The Trial Chamber found that “initiation into the Kamajor society does not 
necessarily amount to enlistment into an armed force or group”,111 12however, in the 
circumstances in which Kondewa initiated the boys, the act was “analogous to enlisting 
them for military service.” Since TF2-021 was 11 years old when Kondewa enlisted 
him, the Trial Chamber concluded that Kondewa was individually criminally responsible
110 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 968.
111 Ibid, para 969.
112 Ibid, paras 969-971.
for enlisting child soldiers.113 This conviction was overturned by the Appeals Chamber on 
the basis that enlistment did not occur when he was initiated, but before that: he was 
enlisted the day he was captured and forced to carry looted property.114 This means that, 
in the end, no accused was found liable for committing the crime of recruitment and use 
of child soldiers under personal commission. However, several accused were found liable 
for committing this crime by planning it.
B- Planning
Planning implies that “one or several persons contemplate designing the commission 
of a crime at both the preparatory and execution phases.”115 Planning as a mode of 
liability was not discussed in Chapter 2 of the present thesis dealing with the general 
principles of liability because planning is not considered as a mode of liability under the 
Rome Statute.116 Even though it was contained within the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR 
and SCSL, and is considered to be part of customary international law, drafters of the 
Rome Statute did not include such a provision because they did riot want to shift criminal 
liability to the preparatory phase.117 Planning is discussed here because individuals from
83
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the AFRC and RUF cases were found liable for planning the crime of recruitment and use 
of child soldiers. In the AFRC case, in addition to ordering the conscription of children 
under the age of 15 into the armed group or using them to participate actively in 
hostilities, Brima was found liable for planning this crime in Bombali District and the 
Western Area of Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber found that the large scale, 
continuous and organised nature of enslavement crimes required a substantial degree of- y .
planning and preparation.18 19 1203The accused Brima was the overall commander of the AFRC 
troops in Bombali district and in Freetown and, as such, he was substantially involved in 
planning the various operations in these districts as well as in the planning and execution 
of the crimes that took place in these areas. For instance, on a number, of occasions, he 
publicly addressed the troops and advocated criminal conduct. Kanu was also found 
liable for planning the commission of conscription of children under the age of 15 into an 
armed group or using them to participate in hostilities in Bombali District and in the 
Western Area. The Trial Chamber relied upon the facts that he was in charge of the 
forced military training of civilians at Camp Rosos and was a Chief of Staff and
19^Commander in charge of civilians in Freetown and the Western Area. The fact that 
recruitment and use of child soldiers was treated in the AFRC case as part of other 
enslavement crimes is discussed later in this section when dealing with the liability of 
Kamara.
University Press, 2005) at 311; Gerhard Werle, Principles o f International Criminal Law, 1st Ed. (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press2005) para 492.
118 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 1836.
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In the RUF case, Sesay and Kallon were found liable under article 6(1) for planning 
the use of child soldiers to participate actively in hostilities in Kailahun, Kono and 
Bombali districts between 1997 and September 2000.124 The Trial Chamber found that 
“the execution of this system of conscription required a substantial degree of planning 
and that this planning was conducted at the highest levels of the RUF organization.”125 
Both Sesay and Kallon were senior RUF commanders who were actively involved in the 
system of conscription.126 For instance, in June 1998, Kallon and Sesay gave orders for 
children to be trained at RUF camps.127 The ICTY clarified what planning entails and it 
noted that, if planning is followed up by execution of the crime by the same person, 
planning is no longer punishable as a distinct crime: a perpetrator cannot be convicted of 
both planning and committing because the latter “absorbs” the former.128 129In the RUF 
case, planning was relied upon as a mode of liability because it was impossible for the 
Trial. Chamber to convict the accused under personal commission. There was evidence 
for such a mode of liability, but due to the fact that the prosecution failed to provide 
adequate and sufficient notice of the material facts pertaining to alleged personal 
commission of this crime to the defence, the accused was acquitted for personal 
commission. In other words, there were elements favouring liability for personal 
commission of the crime and because the Trial Chamber was unable to convict the 
accused on this ground for procedural reasons, it convicted them for planning. This is 
positive, in the sense that responsibility of the accused for the war crime of recruitment
124 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 2230 and 2234.
125 Ibid, para 2225 .................
126 Ibid, paras 2226,2232.
127 Ibid, para 2232.
128 Prosecutor v. Kordic, IT-95-14/2, Judgment (26 February 2001) (ICTY, Trial Chamber) para 386; 
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129 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 2221-2222.
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and use of child soldiers could be recognized in spite of absence of condemnation for 
personal commission. Unlike the Rome Statute, the Statute of the SCSL does not divide 
modes of liability into various categories suggesting different degrees of liability. 
Therefore, one can deduce that sentences for planning a crime should be as severe as if 
the crime was personally committed. The same conclusion can be made with respect to 
ordering the commission of a crime. However, it is difficult to establish whether in 
practice committing a crime and planning or ordering its commission are treated on the 
same way when it comes to sentencing. The AFRC Trial Chamber gave global sentences 
so it is not possible to know how many years of imprisonment are the result of recruiting 
and using child soldiers. In the CDF case, Kondewa was sentenced to 7 years of 
imprisonment on this count by the Trial Chamber whereas Kallon and Sesay were 
respectively sentenced to 35 years and 50 years. In light of these elements, one can say 
that planning is at least as grave as committing, if not more.
C- Ordering
Brima, of the AFRC, was found liable for ordering the abduction of children under the
\
age of 15 years for military purposes in Bombali district as well as in Freetown and the 
Western area. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Trial Chamber relied upon 
testimonies of witnesses. Concerning Bombali district, TF1-334 testified that children 
under 15 years were trained at Camp Rosos. Following the completion of the training 
period, Brima “ordered that the male children be distributed to the various company 1302
130 I f this is true for the SCSL, this is not true for the ICC because the Rome Statute suggests that ordering 
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commanders.”134 Witness TF1-158 testified that, upon arrival at Rosos, a commander 
gave the civilians guns and ordered them to search the town for food. The commander 
indicated that this order came from Brima. Concerning Freetown and the Western Area 
district, TF1 -334 indicated that Brima ordered the abduction of civilians “in order to 
attract the attention of the international community (...) On Brima’s orders, the young 
boys under the age of fifteen years were later trained and forced into Small Boys 
Units.” The Trial Chamber also noted “the evidence of Prosecution witness TF1-024 
that the accused Brima ordered the abduction of civilians because he had lost so many 
troops.” While ordering, as well as personally committing and planning, a crime is a 
liability for commission, one accused was convicted for a crime of omission under the 
doctrine of command responsibility.
D- Command Responsibility
Liability as a commander for crimes committed by the subordinates means that a 
commander is responsible for these crimes when knowing that they were occurring, he or 
she failed to prevent or punish them. Kamara was found liable under this doctrine for the
13Q ^crime of enslavement in Kono district. The Trial Chamber explained that, in spite of 
his role as overall commander in Kono district, the prosecution had not established that 
he was involved in or substantially contributed to the enslavement crimes. However, he 
was aware of these crimes because, according to witness, testimonies, the perpetrators of 
these crimes were led by two individuals who were under the effective control of 135*79
135 Ibid  para 1718.
u6Ibid.
137 Ibid para 1783.
m Ibid.
139’ Ibid paras 1928 and 1950.
Kamara.140 The Trial Chamber analyzed the war crime of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers as part of the crime of enslavement. It found that “an unknown number of 
civilians were abducted and used as forced labour; civilians were subjected to sexual 
slavery; and children under the age of 15 were conscripted into armed groups or used to 
participate in active hostilities.”141 Then it found Kamara responsible for recruiting and 
using child soldiers. However, this conclusion is not satisfying because the war crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers is subsumed within the broader category of 
enslavement. Even though child soldiering is considered as a form of slavery, this 
conclusion does not allow for capturing the specificity of the crime. It is interesting to 
note here that Kamara was found liable for the crime committed, by his or her 
subordinates themselves as opposed to a sui generis liability for a crime of omission for 
failure to prevent or punish the commission of the crime. Therefore, all individuals 
convicted by the SCSL were convicted for the crime of commission of recruitment and 
use of child soldiers. However, it also acquitted two individuals of this charge.
E- Absence of Liability for Recruiting and Using Child Soldiers 
In the CDF and the RUF cases, Fofana and Gbao-were acquitted of the crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers on the basis that the elements given by the 
prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.142 With 
respect to Fofana, the Trial Chamber indicated that his mere presence at the commanders’ 
meeting did not “demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that he encouraged anyone to 
make use of child soldiers. Neither [did] it demonstrate that he aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of either the enlistment of child soldiers into the armed
140 Ibid  paras 1972 and 1975.
141 Ibid  para 1973.
142 CDF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 967; RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 paras 2236-2237.
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forces or the use of child soldiers to participate actively in hostilities.”143 Also, Fofana’s 
presence at Base Zero where child soldiers were also seen was not sufficient to establish 
that he had any involvement in the commission of these criminal acts.144 In determining 
whether Fofana was guilty under the doctrine of command responsibility, the Trial 
Chamber took into account the fact that a witness saw a Kamajor commander under 
Fofana’s command being guarded by a boy.145 The Chamber established that this 
evidence does not establish Fofana’s awareness of the situation.146 Lastly, Fofana’s 
presence at the commanders’ meeting was not sufficient to establish his liability under 
article (3).147 *Turning to Gbao, the Trial Chamber determined that the fact that he loaded 
former child fighters onto a truck was considered as “insufficient to constitute a 
substantial contribution to the widespread system of child conscription or the consistent 
pattern of using children to actively participate in hostilities.” Second, in pleading 
command responsibility, the prosecution failed to establish the superior-subordinate 
relationship between Gbao and the perpetrators.149 These failures by the prosecution to
prove adult liability for recruiting and using child soldiers show the difficulty to which
\ ' .
international criminal law is confronted. It is difficult to'prove a link between the crimes 
being committed on the ground and those who are at the highest levels within the 
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While this section focused on liability of adults who recruited and used child soldiers, 
another and related issue is the one of liability of adults for the crimes committed by child 
soldiers.
IV- Liability for the crimes committed by child soldiers?
Child soldiers may play different roles and one of these is to commit crimes against 
civilians. Because they may be too young to understand their acts and to intentionally 
commit crimes, their criminal liability is uncertain. However, it is certain that victims 
should be able to find justice. Because of this, logical reasoning demands that, if child 
soldiers cannot be punished for their own crimes, those who recruit and use them should 
be the ones held liable for the same crimes.
A- Liability for Using Child Soldiers Does not and Cannot Encompass Liability for 
the Crimes Committed by Child Soldiers
Adults can be criminally liable for recruiting and using child soldiers to participate 
actively in hostilities. At first glance, it appears that the only direct victims of this war 
crime are child soldiers, for that they are the only ones suffering direct personal harm as a 
result of the crime.150 However, child soldiers are, in essence, tools used to commit 
crimes against civilians. This has been recognized by the RUF Trial Chamber, which 
found that “in the context of an armed conflict where violence against civilians was an 
integral and defining feature of the conduct of hostilities, the concept of active 
participation in hostilities encompasses crimes committed against civilians.”151 Therefore, 
if children are but a means to an end for adults in the commission of crimes against
150 Rule 85(a) o f  the ICG Procedure and Evidence provides “For the purposes o f  the Statute and the Rules 
o f Procedure and Evidence: (a) ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result o f  the 
commission o f  any crime within the jurisdiction o f  the Court.” Complete the citation.
151 RUF Trial Judgment, supra note 2 para 1724.
civilians, it makes intuitive legal sense that adult liability for use of child soldiers 
includes liability for the actual crimes committed by child soldiers. Thus we can 
legitimately ask, when convicting an adult individual for using child soldiers, are we also 
convicting him or her for the subsequent crimes committed by the child soldiers he or she 
used? An affirmative answer to this question is to be welcomed in the sense that victims 
of child soldiers would find some sort of justice through the conviction'of the one 
responsible for using child soldiers and therefore responsible for the crimes committed 
against them as a result of this first crime. The reasoning here is that, if child soldiers had 
not been used at the first place, they would not have committed crimes. Child soldiers 
under 15 years cannot be prosecuted by the SCSL and child soldiers under 18 years 
cannot be prosecuted by the ICC. Therefore, if prosecution is not permitted of those 
adults who used child soldiers for the specific crimes committed by these children, then 
there is a serious legal gap where victims cannot find justice. Including liability for 
crimes committed by child soldiers within the phrase “use of child soldiers” would 
remedy this unfortunate situation.
However, this approach is not supported by current jurisprudence. Recent decisions
interpreting the definition of “victim” contained in rule 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence of the ICC explain that the harm suffered by the victims does not
1necessarily have to be direct but must necessarily be personal. Moreover, participation 
of victims is restricted to the crimes contained in the charges. Victims of child soldiers 1523
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152 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Victims’ Participation (18 January 2008) 
(ICC, Trial Chamber), confirmed by Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on 
Victims’ Participation (11 July 2008) (ICC, Appeals Chamber), para 107.
153 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Victims’ Participation (11 July 2008)
(ICC, Appeals Chamber), para 108. On this issue, the Appeals Chamber reversed the findings o f  the Trial 
Chamber. <
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did not qualify as indirect victims of the crimes confirmed against Thomas Lubanga 
because they did not suffer personal harm for the fact that child soldiers were recruited 
and used.154 If use of child soldiers was made to encompass liability for the crimes 
committed by child soldiers, victims of child soldiers would have been recognized as 
victims of the individual who used these children. In addition to this, they would be direct 
victims. The fact that victims of child soldiers were not even recognized as indirect 
victims shows that the notion “use of child soldiers” does not encompass liability for the 
subsequent crimes. This approach which is meant to limit the number of victims who 
qualify for participation in the ICC’s proceedings is not satisfactory. The main 
consequence is to put emphasis on the egregiousness of the war crime of recruitment and 
use of child soldiers but to totally ignore the fact that child soldiers are also perpetrators 
of international crimes. In other words, child soldiers continue to be seen as passive 
innocent victims and their own victims are forgotten. The ICC should acknowledge that 
child soldiers do commit unspeakable crimes against civilians. This would not 
necessarily imply that child soldiers should be held criminally liable because other 
solutions would be more appropriate to deal with them, as will be discussed later in this 
thesis. But publicly recognizing that child soldiers did commit crimes is a necessary step 
for the reconstruction of the victims. This could be done through condemning adults who 
recruited and used child soldiers for the crimes committed by these children. However, 
including the crimes committed by child soldiers within the crime of recruitment and use 
is not recommended for two reasons. First, it would not respect the international criminal 
legal principle of specificity under which it is important to distinguish each crime. In the
154 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, Redacted Version o f  Decision on Indirect Victims (8 
April 2009) (ICC, Trial Chamber I) para 54.
present situation, two crimes are to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the war 
crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers and this crime may be evidenced through 
the use of children to commit crimes against civilians. On the other hand, there are the 
international crimes committed by child soldiers against civilians. Second, victims of 
child soldiers may be able to find justice through other modes of liability such as ordering 
or through the doctrine of command responsibility.
B- Liability for Crimes Committed by Child Soldiers through Ordering and 
Command Responsibility
The Rome Statute and the Statute of the SCSL allow for an individual to be held liable 
if he or she orders the commission of a crime or under the mode of command 
responsibility.155 Both of these modes of liability allow for accountability of adults for the 
crimes committed by child soldiers. Concerning ordering, two possible situations arise. 
First, the impugned order can be given to a specific individual. If this individual is a child 
and the adult who made the order is found guilty for ordering the crime, he or she is 
therefore liable for ordering the crime carried out by the child. Second, the order can be
v
given to “the troops” in general. For instance, in convicting the accused Brima in the 
AFRC case for ordering, in Bombali District, the commission of crimes against the 
civilian population with intent to instil terror, the SCSL relied upon the fact that Brima 
“gave orders to the AFRC troops to attack [the village of] Karina.”156 In this situation, it 
is difficult to know who exactly carried out the order and whether child soldiers were 
among those who did. These elements show that in theory, adults who order to commit 
crimes against civilians could be held liable for crimes committed by child soldiers.
155 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 25(3)(b) and 28; Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 1, art. 6(1) and 6(3).
156 AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2, para 1710.
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However, this liability depends upon finding evidence that children were involved in the 
commission of the crimes ordered. As mentioned earlier, child soldiers can be used to 
serve as porters or spies and therefore an indication that child soldiers were part of the 
troops that were ordered to commit crimes does not necessarily imply that these children 
were involved in committing crimes. Another example illustrating this situation where 
children involved with the armed group do not commit crimes is the one of girl soldiers 
who are often used as sex slaves or bush wives.
Turning to command responsibility, a commander can be condemned for the crimes 
committed by his or her subordinates. In the event child soldiers are among the 
subordinates who commit crimes, then, when the commander is found guilty under the 
doctrine of command responsibility, he or she is also found guilty for crimes committed 
by subordinates including child soldiers. As mentioned in chapter 2, there is a debate 
under international criminal law to determine whether liability under command 
responsibility is a liability for the crimes committed by the subordinates or whether it
constitutes a separate offense where the superior is liable for the failure to prevent or
\
punish a crime. In order to solve this conflict, Chantal Meloni suggested distinguishing 
cases in which the superior “knew” about the crime and failed to prevent it, from cases
1 cn
where the superior “should have known” or “consciously disregarded information.” In 
the former situation, liability of the superior should be treated as accomplice liability and 
where the superior is liable for the crimes committed by the subordinates. In the latter 
situation, negligence of the superior should be treated as a separate offense. I would 
suggest a slightly different approach where consciously disregarding information should 157
157 Chantal Meloni, “Command Responsibility: Mode o f  Liability for the Crimes o f  Subordinates or 
Separate Offense o f  the Superior?” (2007) 5 JICJ 619 at 636.
be treated as knowing about the crime and therefore, should give rise to liability for the 
crimes committed. With regards to child soldiers, this means that where a superior knew 
about the crimes, or turned a blind eye on the crimes committed by child soldiers, he or 
she should be held liable for these. This is so because in this situation, the superior has 
the power to take the necessary measures to prevent or punish the crime. However, where 
the superior should have known about the crimes, but his or her failure to actively search 
for information prevented him or her to prevent the crimes or punish them, liability 
should be the one of omission. Therefore, the superior should not be held liable per se for 
the crimes committed by child soldiers.
It is difficult to say whether these two modes of liability, ordering and command 
responsibility, were used by the SCSL to convict the accused for the crimes committed by 
child soldiers. Indeed, the SCSL’s focus was not on the crimes committed by child 
soldiers but on the crimes committed by the accused. As such, when determining liability 
of an accused for ordering the commission of crimes, evidence as to whether these crimes 
were carried out by child soldiers was not present. Similarly, when determining liability 
of an accused under command responsibility, it is hard to know whether children were 
carrying out the crimes as subordinates. For instance, in the AFRC case, Brima, Kamara 
and Kanu were found liable under article 6(3) for crimes committed in Freetown and the 
Western Area.158 The Trial Chamber had recognized in the factual findings and based 
upon witness testimonies that child soldiers were being used by the AFRC within this 
district.159 In order to do so, it relied upon witness testimonies, including that of TF1-023,
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158 Ibid, paras 1810, 1950 and 2080.
159 Children under the age o f  15 were used for military purposes in Freetown and Western Area in 1999: 
AFRC Trial Judgment, supra note 2, para 1278.
who testified that she was captured by a young boy.160 Because one of the crimes imputed 
to the accused in Freetown and the Western Area was the abduction of civilians161 and the 
witness testified that she was abducted by a child soldier, one can logically conclude that 
the accused were responsible as commanders for this crime committed by this child.
To conclude this part, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the SCSL did not focus 
per se on liability of the accused for the crimes committed by child soldiers. Such 
liability is discovered “accidentally” through careful analysis of the judgments. Because 
child soldiers are responsible for many crimes, it is recommended that future judgments 
rendered by the SCSL or the ICC contain an independent paragraph dealing with liability 
of the accused for the specific crimes committed by child soldiers, in addition to 
highlighting the crimes committed by adults. For instance, when finding an individual 
liable under the mode of command responsibility, the decision should emphasize any 
evidence of crimes that were committed by adult subordinates on the one side and by 
child subordinates on the other. While adults who recruit and use child soldiers should be 
prosecuted by international criminal tribunals for the crimes committed by child soldiers, 
this option is not to be recommended for child soldiers themselves. This will be explained 
in the concluding chapter which put emphasis on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration programs and transitional justice mechanisms.
V- Conclusion
This chapter was meant to highlight the current state of law with respect to the war 
crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers provided by the Rome Statute and the 
Statute of the SCSL. While it is clear that this crime is also a crime under customary
160 Ibid, footnote 2355 and TF1-023, Transcript 9 March 2005 at 30.
161 Ibid para 1745.
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international law, its constitutive elements remain somehow uncertain. The notion of use 
to participate actively in hostilities is especially problematic with regard to girls who are 
used by armed groups to perform domestic chores and provide sexual services. 
Concerning the legal findings on the guilt of the accused for the crime of recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, decisions from the SCSL reflect the complexity of international 
crimes. Indeed, while one individual was convicted for personal commission, one other 
was convicted for ordering and planning, three others were convicted for planning and a 
last one was convicted under the doctrine of command responsibility. This emphasizes 
the idea that international crimes are rarely physically perpetrated by those who are the 
most responsible for them. Instead, international crimes require a substantial degree of 
organization which is emphasized by a variety of modes of liability. Turning to the 
crimes committed by child soldiers, future decisions of international tribunals, and 
especially from the ICC, will need to clarify whether adults are in practice being held 
liable for these under the mode of liability of ordering or under the command 
responsibility doctrine. Another uncertainty in the field of international criminal law with 
respect to the crimes committed by child soldiers is- the liability of child soldiers 
themselves. An examination of this issue is the purpose of the next chapter of this thesis.
97
98
Chapter 4: Liability of Child Soldiers
Child soldiers are victims of the war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
However, they are also perpetrators of other international crimes. They may torture, 
maim, rape or kill civilians.1 Therefore, the question arises as to whether they should be 
held liable for these crimes. And, indeed, one may wonder why children would be 
shielded from prosecution when they commit such horrible crimes. The aim of this 
chapter is to explore the arguments given in favour of and opposed to child criminal 
liability in order to establish conclusions on liability of child soldiers under international 
criminal law. On the one hand, one may feel that children should be held accountable for 
their crimes because it would serve justice for the victims. On the other hand, it appears 
to be difficult to defend accountability for children who may be too young to be 
considered capable of committing crimes, or, in many situations, who acted under duress 
when committing crimes. The legal discussion on the issue of criminal liability of child 
soldiers is primarily based on the concept of mens rea: In other words, the main issue 
international criminal law is dealing with is to determine whether child soldiers can 
actually intend to commit international crimes. This chapter starts by examining the 
difficulties raised by the prosecution of children at the international level. Then, it 
presents arguments in favour of child criminal liability, thereby arguing that child soldiers 
should be prosecuted. In the last part emphasis is put on obstacles to the prosecution of 
child soldiers. This thesis concludes by arguing that, if child soldiers are to be prosecuted,
1 Matthew Happold, “Child Soldiers, Victims or Perpetrators?” (2008) 29 U  La Verne L Rev 56 [Happold] 
at 79.
the minimum age for criminal liability should be fixed at 15 years old and all the 
guarantees of a juvenile justice system should be offered.
I- Issues When Dealing With Criminal Liability of Children at the 
International Level
So far, child soldiers have never been prosecuted by international criminal tribunals. 
Nevertheless, it is important to think about the theoretical possibility of prosecution of 
children because more and more attention is given to the issue of child soldiering. Even 
so, child criminal liability is a difficult concept to think about at the international level for 
three reasons. First, different conceptions of childhood exist and therefore different views 
on the legality of prosecuting children may exist. Second, psychological development 
varies from one child to another, which leads to a difficulty in determining when the 
required element of mens rea is acquired. Third, no minimum age for criminal liability 
exists under international law because countries have not been able to agree on what this 
age should be.
A- Conceptions of Childhood
There are cultural differences among societies as to-what childhood consists of and 
when it ends. Depending on the society involved, across time or geographically, children 
are not perceived the same way. The main gap between societies is found in the notion of 
child’s autonomy and the idea that a child is an individual per se. This part gives details 
on the various conceptions of childhood, namely historical and sociological, as well as 
legal. These conceptions necessarily influence whether a specific society considers that a 
child can be criminally responsible.
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1- Historical and Sociological Conceptions
Concepts of childhood vary from time to time and from place to place. For instance, 
the French historian Aries considered that “in medieval society, the idea of childhood did 
not exist.”2 Even though this claim has been strongly contested,3 it surely indicates that 
in medieval society, the conception of childhood differed from our present conception. 
Archard argues that there is a distinction between having a “concept” of childhood which 
is to recognize that there is a distinction between adults and children and having a 
“conception” of childhood.4 The latter refers to what are the distinguishing attributes 
between adults and children.5 He introduces three elements to the notion of childhood. Its 
“boundaries” define the point at which it ends.6 Its “dimensions” refers to the idea that 
each society has its own particular value system which may favour different perspectives 
in order to distinguish between adults and children.7 These perspectives may be moral, 
juridical or philosophical. Lastly, conceptions of childhood may depend upon its 
“divisions.” While some societies may give particular importance to the point at which a
child acquires speech, others may emphasize the period of adolescence.8 The central idea
\
that one must remember about the historical conception of childhood is that “[t]he notion 
of childhood is a culturally transmitted,ideaJhat friay haye changed significantly over past 
centuries, though there is little consensus about the detail of how and why these changes 
in perception have occurred.”9
2 Ariès, L'Enfant et la vie familiale sous l'Ancien Régime (Paris : Librairie Plon, 1960) at 125.
3 Linda Pollock, Forgotten Children (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983); David Archard, 
Children: Rights and Childhood (New York: Routledge, 2004) at 22 [Archard].
4 Archard, supra note 3 at 27.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid  at 31.
1 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Trevor Buck, ed, International Child Law, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2011 ) at 5 [Buck].
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Turning to the sociological conceptions of childhood, it is essential to note that, as the
notion of childhood changes throughout the time, it also changes depending on the
society which is perceiving childhood. According to Corsaro, there are two models of the
socialisation process: the deterministic and the constructivist models.10 The former is
“based on the idea that the child is appropriated by society, that is, trained into becoming
a useful member of society.”11 *The latter is based on the idea that the child appropriates
the society, thereby avoiding “any marginalisation of children by viewing them only as
10emerging members of the wider community.”
Historical and sociological conceptions of childhood reflect that this notion varies 
from one state to another and across time. International law is created by states and 
evolves across time. Since each society has its own conception of childhood, it is difficult 
to find consensus on the notion of childhood at the international level.
2- Legal Conception at the International Level
International child law is framed by social policies existing at the national, regional 
and international levels.13 It is also identified through international treaties such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).14 The GRC is the most widely ratified 
international treaty and therefore, is a good indicator of the state of customary 
international law. It has been ratified by every country except the United States and 
Somalia.15 Conflicting theories on children’s rights exist under international law. The 
“will theory” of rights assumes that the person asserting the rights has a choice as to
10 William Corsaro, The Sociology o f Childhood (London: Sage Publications, 2005).
11 Buck, supra note 9 at 9.
n Ibid  at 10.
13 Ibid  at 14.
14 Convention on the Rights o f the Child, GA Res 44/25, UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49, (1989) 
\CRC\.
15 United N ations. Treaty Collections, “Status o f  States’ Ratifications”, online: UN  
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-ll&chapter=4&lang=en>.
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when and whether to exercise them.16 *As children are not capable of doing so, they 
cannot be right-holders. In contrast to this, .the interest theory assumes that rights are 
based upon whether a child has an interest, meaning whether he or she is in need of 
protection. Because children need to be protected due to their vulnerability and 
immaturity, they should have rights. This observation leads to another controversial 
issue, which is the child’s right to autonomy that appears through article 5 of the CRC.19 20*
This article is the general provision on parental guidance and led to a strong disagreement 
between countries during the drafting of the Convention, as reflected in the travaux 
préparatoires. The central point of disagreement was the extent to which family should 
be involved in protecting child’s rights against the state. While delegations of the 
United States and Australia had submitted a proposal giving great importance to the role 
of the parents, the Canadian delegation opposed this view, mentioning that family should 
not be given arbitrary control over the child. This provision is actually one of the 
reasons for the United States’ opposition to ratifying the treaty. It is based on the concept 
of autonomy: the United States fears that “the CRC [would] undermine the family unit
16 Buck, supra note 9 at 25.
11 Ibid.
"Ibid.:-
19 Ibid at 28. Art. 5 o f  the CRC states: “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties o f  
parents or, where applicable, the members o f  the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent 
with the evolving capacities o f  the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child o f  
the rights recognized in the present Convention.”
20 Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights o f the Child (The Hague:
Kluwer Law, 1999) [Detrick] at 115.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid at 116-117; Commission on Human Rights, Report o f  the Working Group on a Draft Convention on 
the Rights o f  the Child, 43rd Session, 1987, UN Doc E/CN.4/1987/25 para 100; Commission on Human 
Rights, Report o f  the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights o f  the Child, 44th Session, 1948, 
UN doc E/CN.4/1988/28 para 27.
and the role of parents in raising their children.”23 Another provision strongly debated 
during the negotiations is the one on the boundaries of childhood. While some countries 
were in favour of ending childhood at 14 years, on the basis that this age represented in 
many countries the age at which compulsory education ended and the legal age to get 
married, others were in favour of the 18 years approach.24 In the end, it was decided that 
“for the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the 
age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier”.25 *
Having a discussion as to whether international criminal law should allow the 
prosecution of child soldiers is difficult because childhood is not a uniform conception. 
While some societies would conceive it in a way favouring prosecutions, others do not 
and it is hard to find a consensus. Another challenge which exists both at the domestic 
and international level is linked to the psychological development of the child. All 
children do not acquire the various levels of maturity at thè same time.
B- Psychological Development of the Child and Consequences on the Required Mens 
Rea Element •'
An accused can be found liable under international criminal law, only when the actus 
reus was committed with intent. This is referred to as the mens rea. A crucial aspect to 
take into consideration in any discussion on child criminal liability is the ability for one 
child to act with this required intent. Many authors have written on the psychological
23 Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik & Cris R. Revas, eds, The Convention on the Rights o f the Child - An 
Analysis o f  Treaty Provisions and Implications o f U.S. Ratification (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2006) (Todres] at 20.
24 Detrick, supra note 20 at 58; Commission on Human Rights, Report on the 36th Session, 1980, UN Doc 
E/CN4/L.1542.
25 CRC, supra note 14, art. 1.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 30.
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development of the child and the subsequent ability to intent to commit a criminal act.27 28930*
Their studies demonstrate that, up to a certain age, a child is not fully able to understand 
his or her acts as well as the consequences attached to it. However, the exact age at which 
an individual can commit a criminal act with the required mens rea element is not clearly 
determined. This is an issue in the sense that, from a psychological point of view, some 
children should be able to be found liable under international criminal law while others 
should not.
Jean Piaget was a very influential Swiss psychologist of the twentieth century whose 
research focused on psychology and genetic epistemology. In other words, he was 
interested in understanding how knowledge grows. His research on child development 
concluded that, during the development of the child, he or she builds cognitive structures 
which are divided into four main stages. First, between birth and 2 years old, a child
Q 1
builds a set of concepts about reality and how it works. Second, from 2 to 7 years, the
child perceives everything as part of concrete physical situations. Third, from 7 to 11
years, the child starts to conceptualize meaning. He or she creates logical structures that
11 '
explain his or her physical experiences. In the last step that can start between 11 and 15 
years, the child has developed cognitive structures similar to those of an adult.34 Based on
27 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement o f the Child (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932) [Piaget]; L. 
Kohlberg, Child Psychology and Childhood Education- A Cognitive Developmental View (New York: 
Longman, 1987) [Kohlberg].
28 “A Brief Biography o f  Jean Piaget”, online: Piaget < http://www.piaget.org/aboutPiaget.html>.
29 Ibid.
30 Nuno Ferreira, The UN Children's Rights Convention: Theory Meets Practice, by A. Alen et al (Oxford:
Intersentia, 2007) at 535 [Ferreira].
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this framework, Piaget established a theory on the development of moral judgement.35 He 
concluded that young children adhere to a notion of objective responsibility, based on 
fear of punishment and obedience to authority. After the age of 7, children increasingly 
acquire the capacity for making moral judgment and therefore enter the stage of 
subjective responsibility.
Lawrence Kohlberg was an American psychologist of the twentieth century.38 He 
modified and expanded upon Jean Piaget's theory on moral judgement and his views have
• • -IQsince become very influential. While Piaget described a two-stage process of moral 
development, Kohlberg outlined six stages within three different levels.40 The first level, 
or pre-conventional, applies to children until around 9 years. At this stage, the sense of 
morality is based upon fear for punishment and upon satisfaction of individualistic 
desires.41 The second level, or conventional, concerns adolescents between 10 and 20 
years. At this stage, adolescents have interiorised social norms and expectations. They 
fulfil their duties and claim their rights as established by the social order.42 The third 
level, or post-conventional, applies to some adults who base morality upon universal and 
ethical principles and determine their action in respect to these principles.43
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of these two well-recognized 
psychologists. First, a child’s moral development is very complex to study and there is no 
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trends, under which moral responsibility is assumed to be attained in the mid-teens,44 but 
there is also recognition 'that-.’each child develops differently and reaches the various 
stages mentioned at different ages. Therefore, analysis of whether a child had the intent to 
commit a specific crime should be made on a case-by-case basis. While some children 
may be able to fully understand their acts as well as the consequences attached to them 
prior to committing a crime, others may not be capable of having such intent. This means 
that, while some children would commit a crime with intent to do so, others would not 
and international criminal law is confronted with this issue of the differing presence of 
mens rea. These conclusions are supported by modem study of neuro-science. Naomi 
Cahn suggests that even though “the law has not historically depended on brain science, 
(...) the modem study of neuroscience offers the prospect of identifying more specific 
causes [related to adolescents’ criminal behaviours].”45 In her paper dealing with the 
impact of neuroscience on understanding child soldiers’ actions, she mentions that early 
abuse and neglect can change the structure of children’s brain: “when children are abused 
or neglected, their brains may develop so that they overact to situations that are 
threatening so that delinquent behavior results from the brain using these early lessons of 
fear to defend itself.”46 All together, these elements show that child soldiers are different 
from adults because their psychological but also biological development is different. 
These observations must be taken into account when examining their criminal liability. 
Another huge difficulty in determining whether child soldiers could be held liable under
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44 Matthew Happold, “The Age o f  Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law” (2006), online: 
<papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstractJd=934567> [Age o f Criminal Responsibility in ICL] at 9.
45 Naomi Cahn, “Poor Children: Child “Witches” and Child Soldiers in Sub-Saharan Africa” (2006) 3 Ohio 
State Journal o f  Criminal Law 413 at 429.
46 Ibid  at 426.
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international criminal law is the fact that international law does not provide for a 
minimum age of criminal liability.
C- Absence of Minimum Age for Criminal Liability Under International Law 
The minimum age for criminal liability represents the age at which an individual can 
be legally prosecuted for crimes. Under international law, an adult is understood to be an 
individual who has attained the age of 18 years and above.47 It follows from this that if 
child criminal liability does not exist, then only adults can be prosecuted for international 
crimes. On the other hand, if child liability does exist, then the minimum age for criminal 
liability does not correspond with the age at which majority is attained. How is the age of 
criminal liability to be determined? This central question has unfortunately stayed 
unanswered under international law for decades. Domestically, there is no overarching 
agreement: the minimum age for criminal liability widely differs from one country to 
another, with the youngest age fixed at 7 years in India and the oldest age fixed at 20 
years in Japan.48
International law does, however, provide minimal guidance on how to determine 
what the minimum age should be. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (or “Beijing rules”) provide: “[i]n those legal systems 
recognising the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning 
of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age limit, bearing in mind the facts of
47 CRC, supra note 14. This treaty is the most widely ratified instrument. Therefore, its art. 1 stating that 
“For the purposes o f  the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age o f  eighteen 
years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” May be understood as an 
international consensus.
48 UNICEF, “Progress o f  Nations 1997: Special Protections, Progress & Disparity”, online: UNICEF 
<http://www.unicef.org/pon97/p56a.htm>.
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emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.”49 This non-binding notion was since 
codified and expanded in the CRC in its article 40(3): “State parties shall seek to promote 
the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically applicable 
to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law, and, in 
particular: (a) The establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.”50 The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, which is tasked with interpreting the CRC, recommends that this
minimum age not be too low: indeed, it has asked some countries to raise the minimum 
age provided in their domestic legislation.51 52However, the practice of the Committee is of 
little help in determining a standard minimum age for criminal, liability under 
international law. As noted by some, “it is not helpful in seeking to move towards 
consistency when it [the Committee on the Rights of the Child] criticizes the minimum 
age of 10 in England as being unlawful, while only recommending that Ireland, which 
had just raised the minimum age from 7 to 10, only consider reviewing the age with a
view to increasing it.” On the other hand, comments from the Committee on the Rights
\
of the Child are helpful to the extent that they provide guidance as to how criminal 
liability shall be determined. For instance, the Committee believes that criminal 
responsibility should be based on objective factors such as age instead of subjective
49 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration o f  Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/33 (29 November 1985) [Beijing Rules], rule 4.
50 CRC, supra note 14, art. 40(3).
51 Committee on the Rights o f  the Child, Concluding observations o f the Committee on the Rights o f the 
Child: Australia, 16th Session, 1997, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.79 ; Concluding observations o f the 
Committee on the Rights o f the Child: India, 23rd Session, 2000, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.l l5; 
Concluding observations o f the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Fiji, 18th Session, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.89 ; Concluding observations o f  the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: United Kingdom 
o f  Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 8th Session, 1995, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.34; Concluding 
observations o f  the Committee on the Rights o f the Child: Barbados, 21st Session, 1999 U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/add. 103.
52 Geraldine Van Bueren, Art. 40: Child Criminal Justice (Boston : Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) at 
27.
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factors such as “the attainment of puberty, the age of discernment or the personality of 
the child.”53
International criminal law similarly does not provide clarity in determining the 
minimum age of criminal liability. The Statutes of various international criminal tribunals 
are conflicting on this point. While the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Statutes 
are silent on the issue, the Serious Crimes Panels in East Timor have jurisdiction over 
minors over 12 years of age54 and the SCSL has jurisdiction to prosecute children over 15 
years of age.55 The Rome Statute gives jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to prosecute individuals over 18 years of age.56 578While some may interpret the 
Rome Statute’s provision as establishing a rule under international criminal law because 
of the permanency of the court and its potential universal jurisdiction, this argument
r« 7
neglects two things. First, the provision is more procedural than substantive. Exclusion 
from the jurisdiction of the Court simply leaves the task of prosecuting child soldiers to 
domestic jurisdictions. Second, it appears that the exclusion was to avoid arguments 
before that Court as to what the minimum age for criminal liability should be under 
international law.59
53 Committee on the Rights o f  the Child, Report on the 10th Session, 1995, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/46. :
54 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation 2000/30 on Transitional Rules of 
Criminal Procedures, 25 September 2000, UNTAET/Reg/2000/30, art. 45.
55 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government o f  Sierra Leone on the Establishment o f a 
Special Court fo r  Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.SS 138 (entered into force 12 April 2002) 
[Statute o f  the SCSL].
56 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 26.
57 Happold, supra note 1 at 79.
58 Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court (München, 
Germany: C.H. Beck, 2008) at 111.
59 Ibid  at 775.
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Prosecuting children at the international level would certainly not be without 
difficulties. The main issues would relate to determine who is a child; examine on a case 
by case basis whether a specific child’s psychological development allowed for an 
understanding of his/her criminal acts; reach a consensus on what the minimum age for 
criminal liability is. Thinking about whether child soldiers should be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals requires us to overcome these difficulties. It also requires 
justifications. In other words, if current practice of international criminal tribunals is to 
refuse to prosecute child soldiers, what would be the grounds under which one would say 
that, theoretically, they could be prosecuted?
II- Rationale for Prosecuting Child Soldiers
As mentioned in the previous section, international criminal law is not clear as to 
whether, under this area of the law, the minimum age for criminal liability is 15 years or 
18 years. This indeterminacy indicates that there is no categorical objection to the 
prosecution of children. Therefore, it is important to examine the rationales upon which 
international criminal law could rely on, if it was decided that child soldiers could be 
prosecuted. Several arguments can be developed. First, such prosecutions are in 
accordance with the aim of international criminal justice. Second, they seem to be 
authorized by international human rights law. Third, most domestic systems allow 
prosecutions of child soldiers and, in fact, some have done so. Last, we are currently 
witnessing one opening within international criminal law itself that indicates that the 
prosecution of individuals for crimes committed as children may be possible.
I l l
A- Aim of International Criminal Justice: Theories of Punishment
International criminal law pursues several goals which are quite similar to the ones 
found under domestic law. These include retribution and deterrence but also other goals 
such as bringing justice to the victims. Emphasis of these goals is important since they 
may give substantial grounds to the argument that child soldiers should be prosecuted.
1- Domestic Law vs. International Law
International criminal law deals with the most severe crimes of international law 
which violate jus cogens norms.60 International criminal tribunals have been established 
in order to make sure that those who violate these norms will respond to their acts. The 
idea behind it is that some crimes are so horrific that the international community must 
ensure that perpetrators of these crimes will not go unpunished. However, punishment 
may serve several goals and it is important to analyze whether theories of punishment 
found under international criminal law are the same as the ones found under domestic 
laws. One may think that the gravity of the international crimes, characterized by mass 
atrocity, would justify a different basis for punishment than domestic crimes. Moreover, 
the specificity of international criminality may justify additional aims for punishment 
such as telling the history of a conflict or achieving reconciliation of societies.61 
However, it seems that theories of punishment find the same grounds in international 
criminal law as in domestic criminal law. Drumbl expresses this view when talking about 
international criminal law that “despite the extraordinary nature of this criminality, its
60 Rome Statute, supra note 4.
61 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) [Cryer] at 31 and 33.
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modality of punishment, theory of sentencing, and process of determining guilt or
fs’yinnocence each remains disappointingly ordinary.”
2- Retribution and Deterrence
Theories of punishment have been developed to understand what is the rationale for 
prosecuting crimes that violate our most fundamental norms. First, there is the 
justification of retribution. This theory is often associated with Immanuel Kant, and it 
is based on the idea that those who have violated social norms should be punished 
without regard for the possible benefits (or drawbacks) of a prosecution. Indeed, a 
wrongdoer should be punished only on the grounds that he or she has committed a crime. 
Other justifications such as the well-being of the society are irrelevant because they 
equate to using a human being as a tool to accomplish a specific goal.62 34 This theory is to 
be distinguished from revenge. As explained by the ICTY: “[retribution] is not to be 
understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but as duly expressing the outrage of the 
international community at these crimes.”65 67 Looking at the jurisprudence of the 
international criminal tribunals, retribution is, alongside deterrence, the most prominent 
punishment rationale. Moreover, it seems that, in practice, international criminal law 
evidences a preference for retributive motivations.
Based on this retributive theory, child soldiers should be prosecuted because they 
committed crimes. The outcome here is seen as consequential: someone who does wrong
62 Mark Drumbl, “Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality o f  Mass Atrocity” 
(2005) 99 Northwestern Law Review 539 [Drumbl] at 541.
63 Cryer, supra note 61 at 24.
64 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements o f Justice, Translated by John Ladd (London: The 
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1965) at 100.
65 Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, Judgment (24 March 2000) (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) para 
185. .
66 Drumbl, supra note 62 at 559.
67 Ibid  at 561.
must be punished. However, there is an issue with this outcome because it seems to 
neglect the mens rea element. If committing a criminal act is sufficient to allow 
prosecution, it implies that only the actus reus is taken into account. Moreover, one could 
go even further in the argumentation. Marx wrote on punishment that the only valid 
theory would be the Hegelian one because it is the only one which “recognizes human 
dignity.”68 According to Hegel, “[p]unishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of 
his own will. The violation of right has been proclaimed by the criminal as his own right. 
His crime is the negation of right. Punishment is the negation of this negation, and 
consequently an affirmation of right, solicited and forced upon the criminal by himself.”69 
Nevertheless, Marx also points out that individuals are acting under conditions of 
“capitalist unfreedom”70 and therefore cannot be held responsible for their acts.71 
According to him, a theory of punishment is valid only where it elevates the criminal to 
“the position of a free and self-determined being.”72 Without entering in the social classes 
analysis, Marx’ view on punishment could by extension be applied to child soldiers in 
that it is based on the concept of freedom. Are child soldiers really free when they 
commit a crime? And here is where the mens rea element appears, for that where 
someone is not free, how can he or she commit an intentional act?
As opposed to a Kantian view of punishment, some may argue that the purpose of 
punishment is to serve society by promoting deterrence. According to Bentham, “by the 
principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action 
whatsoever; according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the
68 Karl Marx, “Capital Punishment” New York Daily Tribune (18 February 1853) [Marx],
69 Ibid.
70 J. Angelo Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, 3rd ed. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006).




happiness of the party whose interest is in question.” Therefore, all actions must create 
the greatest amount of happiness to the greatest amount of people. It follows from this 
that a criminal should be punished proportionally to the amount of harm which is caused 
by the offense and should be sufficient to deter further offenses.73 4 75One may wonder 
whether prosecuting child soldiers could be justified by deterrence because child soldiers 
do not really have a choice as to the crimes they commit. Therefore, it is doubtful that the 
deterrence argument would be powerful in this case.
Most of the time, retribution and deterrence would not be convincing justifications for 
the prosecution of child soldiers because child soldiers do not act under free will. 
However, this global reasoning is problematic because it neglects situations where child 
soldiers actually make free choices. These choices start at the stage of recruitment. It has 
been noted that “despite the ambiguity of "voluntary" recruitment in contexts of severely 
constrained choices, there is a complex rationale in a child’s decision to join whether for 
ideological commitment, self-defense or economic survival.” Some children may be
more mature than others and some who join for ideological commitment may strongly
\
believe in their causes. Most of the children do not freely and voluntarily join an armed 
group. However, some children may actually do so. It would be wrong to automatically 
decide that children do not have free will simply because they are children. Especially, 
and as mentioned above, teenagers around 15 years may already be able to have a strong 
moral understanding. Therefore, in these cases, it would be right to prosecute children for 
the purposes of retribution and deterrence. It has been argued that “it is reasonable to ask
73 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation (Amherst: Prometheus 
Books, 1988), chapter I.
74 Ibid, chapter XIV.
75 Dana Landau, “Child Soldiers- The Use o f  Child Soldiers”, online: international relations and security 
network <www. isn.ethz.ch/isn/content/.../01%20Use%20of%20Children.pdf>.
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whether absolving children of responsibility for crimes they have committed is 
necessarily in the best interests of the child. In at least some cases, where the individual 
was clearly in control of their actions, and not coerced, drugged, or forced into 
committing atrocities, acknowledgement and atonement, including in some instances 
prosecution, might be an important part of personal recovery. It may also contribute to 
their acceptance by families, communities and society at large.”
In the large majority of cases, retribution and deterrence could not justify prosecution 
of child soldiers for their crimes because their acts are not free. However, there may be 
some cases in which free will and intent to commit crimes could be demonstrated. In 
these cases, prosecution could be justified under the grounds of. retribution and 
deterrence. Prosecution of child soldiers could also be justified by the other goals 
international criminal law intends to achieve.
3- Other Goals
Apart from retribution and deterrence, international criminal justice has other goals 
that may be stronger grounds to justify the prosecution of child soldiers. First, 
international criminal prosecutions may be pursued for the purpose of rehabilitation. 
According to this theory, the point of criminal sanction is the reformation of the 
wrongdoer. International criminal law applied this theory in the ICTY’s Erdomevic case 
by condemning the accused to only five years of imprisonment, despite his conviction for 
taking part in an execution squad which murdered hundreds of Bosnian Muslim civilian 
men between the age of 17 and 60, as a crime against humanity. He himself killed 
approximately 100 persons. The tribunal stated that he “should be given a second chance 76
76 “Child Soldiers, Progress but too little” online: Coalition to Stop the Use o f  Child Soldiers 
<http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/introduction>.
77 Cryer, supra note 61 at 28.
to start his life afresh upon release, whilst still young enough to do so.” Therefore, 
condemning child soldiers to low sentences may help them to reintegrate within the 
society while they are still young, and therefore society would likely feel that the wrongs 
committed by child soldiers have been dealt with. Also, it may be more inclined to 
reaccept them and move forward.
The aim of rehabilitation goes along with another one: bringing justice to the victims. 
Traditionally, international criminal law focused on the accused in the sense that it is 
necessary for the accused to benefit from a fair trial. However, international criminal 
law has been influenced by civil law systems such as France and in which victims play a 
large part in the proceedings. Therefore, the ICC has developed an original way of 
dealing with victims by allowing them to participate in the proceedings when their 
interests are affected. This is so because it was recognized that one of the aims of 
international criminal justice is to bring justice to the victims. As a result, “it would be 
paradoxical to keep saying victims should only have an auxiliary role when one of the 
reasons why proceedings take place is the victim itself.” Justice for the victims may be 
the most relevant justification when dealing with prosecution of child soldiers. Indeed, 
one can hardly imagine how victims of child soldiers would reaccept these children as 
part of their community without having the feeling that justice had been done. Therefore, 
this idea of bringing justice to the victims is crucial. Recent history demonstrates that 
international law recognizes that victims should be heard. Following the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, calls from victims of genocide to see the children who participated in it being 789012
78 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-Tbis, Judgement (5 March 1998) (ICTY, Trials Chamber) para 16.
79 Cryer, supra note 61 at 478.
80 Ibid.
81 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 68.
82 Cryer, supra note 61 at 479.
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prosecuted, led to the arrest and detention of many children within Rwanda. This 
situation represented the first time in history where children accused of committing 
genocide were imprisoned and waiting for trials. Another example relates to Sierra 
Leone. At the time of discussions in 2000-2001 surrounding the creation of the SCSL to 
address crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the previous decade’s 
armed conflict, it was said that “the people of Sierra Leone would not look kindly upon a 
court which failed to bring to justice children who committed crimes of that nature and 
spared them the judicial process of accountability.” On the other hand, many children 
rights’ advocates argued that child soldiers should not be prosecuted within the Special 
Court. Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General stated that “Within the meaning 
attributed to it in the present Statute, the term “most responsible” would not necessarily
exclude children between 15 and 18 years of age. [...] the gravity and seriousness of the 
crimes they have allegedly committed would allow for their inclusion within the
jurisdiction of the Court.” Thus, the Statute for the SCSL permits the Prosecutor to
88prosecute individuals who were aged between 15 and 18 years at the time of the crime.
Prosecuting child soldiers at the international level could be supported in some cases 
by motives of deterrence and retribution. However, the most convincing argument would 
be that such prosecutions would form part of the process of bringing justice to the 
victims. The idea that children could be prosecuted was supported by some international 
organizations such as Amnesty International. It stated: “[i]n some cases, child soldiers *8457
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must be held accountable for their actions, but any criminal action against them must 
respect international fair trial standards.”89 Nevertheless, it is.important to acknowledge 
tensions between the various existing motives for punishment. Retribution and deterrence 
being the primary goals of international criminal justice, it is not sure whether 
prosecution of child soldiers -  when justified solely by the necessity to bring justice to 
the victims - would be appropriate. Moreover, victims may not see criminal prosecutions 
as the best way to obtain justice such as in societies where focus is made on 
reconciliation and forgiveness. However, prosecution of child soldiers can be justified on 
another ground which is the fact that such prosecutions are allowed by international 
human rights law. .
B- Allowed by International Human Rights Law
Because of the newness of international criminal law, many issues yet unresolved - 
such as the question of whether or not child soldiers can be prosecuted - may find some 
guiding answers in the more established but related field of international human rights 
law. Therefore, it is important to see what that area of the law recommends. Interestingly, 
international human rights law does not argue against child prosecution. Analysis of the 
CRC is a very strong indicator of the views of the international community on issues 
related to children due to the fact that it is the most widely ratified international 
instrument.90 The CRC does not explicitly say that prosecution of children is authorized. 
Instead, it contains provisions on child criminal liability, stating that if a child is to be 
prosecuted, certain conditions must be respected. This is a strong indicator that the
89 Amnesty International, “Child Soldiers: Criminals or Victims?” (22 December 2000) part 2, online: AI 
<http:// www.amnesty.Org/en/library/asset/IOR50/002/2000/en/dom-IOR500022000en.html>.
90 “By July 1, 1997, virtually every nation had ratified or acceded to the CRC, with the exception o f  the 
United States and Somalia”: Todres, supra note 23 at 14.
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international community, through states’ ratifications of the CRC, agrees that child 
prosecution could occur and a fortiori is authorized. Indirectly, it also means that the 
international community thinks that children can have the necessary mens rea element 
when committing a crime. This conclusion is in conformity with the laws applicable at 
domestic levels. Indeed, “under many national legal systems children as young as ten 
years (or even less in some jurisdictions) are deemed capable of forming the requisite 
intent to commit a crime.”91 923
The fact that an international treaty as widely ratified as the CRC recognizes that 
prosecution of children can occur at a domestic level impacts on understanding 
international law. Indeed, provisions of the CRC have crystallized under customary 
international law. Indirectly, this indicates that the international community is not 
substantially opposed to prosecution of children at the international level. However, 
should children be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals such as the SCSL, these 
tribunals would have to respect standards provided by the CRC. Nevertheless, one can 
argue that international crimes are different from domestic crimes. Therefore, the analysis 
at the international level should be different from the one that occurs at the domestic 
level. The main issue here occurs in terms of mens rea. As noted above, for many 
countries, children are capable of having the intent to commit a crime. However, 
according to Happold, “it has been argued that international crimes require such onerous 
mens rea requirements that children will always lack capacity to commit them.” In other 
words, international crimes cannot be intentionally committed by children. On this,
91 Steven Freeland "Mere Children or Weapons o f  War- Child Soldiers and International Law" (2008) 29 U  
La Verne L Rev 19 at 49.
92 Customary international law reflects a general practice perceived as having force o f  the law. Since the 
CRC has been ratified by almost every nation it can be considered as customary international law.
93 Happold, supra note 1 at 72.
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Happold argues that while genocide requires a specific intent, most international crimes 
do not require such a . proof and therefore this argument cannot be used to distinguish 
between crimes committed under domestic laws from crimes committed under 
international law.94 This argument is powerful especially when dealing with war crimes. 
However, not only genocide but also crimes against humanity require a special intent. As 
à result, the intentional element is the same for international crimes as for domestic 
crimes only when dealing with war crimes. This means that the CRC is to be understood 
as applying in the same way to domestic crimes and war crimes. It could apply differently 
to genocide and crimes against humanity.
The idea that children can be prosecuted when they commit crimes is.supported by the 
international community through wide ratification of the CRC but also through 
ratification of regional treaties. For instance, the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child (African Charter) contains a provision on the administration of 
juvenile justice.95 This instrument has been ratified by 37 African states out of 53.96 *This 
means that, in addition to agreeing, through ratification of the CRC, that children can be 
prosecuted, a large majority of African states reiterated their commitment to this idea. In 
addition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is also governed by a 
regional treaty, ruled in the same way. In the case of two ten years old boys who abducted 
and killed a 2 year-old and were condemned for abduction and murder, the ECHR ruled 
that “even if England and Wales is among the few European jurisdictions to retain a low
94 Ibid.
95 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare o f the Child, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered 
into force 29 November 1999), arts. 17 and 30.
96 Africa Union “Status o f  Ratification o f  the Charter as at February 2004”, online: <http://www.africa- 
union.org/child/home.htm>.
91 T v  United Kingdom and V v United Kingdom (2000) 30 European Human Rights Law Reports at 121.
age of criminal responsibility, the age of ten cannot be said to be so young as to differ 
disproportionately from the age limit followed by other European States. The Court 
concludes that the attribution of criminal responsibility does not in itself give rise to a 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention.”98 However, this conclusion drawn from this 
decision can be contested in the sense that the two boys were tried in an adult court, 
before a judge and a jury and during public hearings.99 Therefore, no specific procedure 
as guaranteed by the CRC was used.100
International human rights law contain provisions on child criminal liability. These 
provisions indicate that state practice is to prosecute children who commit crimes. 
International human rights law acknowledges this fact and gives conditions under which 
such prosecutions can occur. Interestingly, child soldiers could be and have been 
prosecuted by some domestic jurisdictions.
C- Domestic Prosecutions of Child Soldiers
The Rome Statute of the ICC is being implemented at the domestic level by its States 
Parties. Most of these domestic jurisdictions have a juvenile justice system in place, 
thereby allowing prosecution of children. This indicates that, theoretically, child soldiers 
could be prosecuted by many domestic systems. And, in fact, prosecutions of child 
soldiers have happened at the domestic level.
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1- Implementation o f the Rome Statute by Domestic Systems
States party to the Rome Statute have a legal obligation to include the international 
crimes contained in the Rome Statute within their own domestic systems.101 1023For 
instance, in Canada, the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act was 
introduced in order to “implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.” Since the minimum age for criminal liability in Canada is 12 years, it
i
means that, in theory, a child could be prosecuted in Canada for international crimes. 
Another example is the case of France. France is a monist system meaning that the 
Rome Statute has a direct effect in domestic law. However, in order to be able to 
implement its obligation of complementarity, the French domestic system had to 
modify the criminal code.104 Indeed, it was necessary to introduce the exact same 
crimes as the ones provided in the Rome Statute. Under French law, children are not 
criminally responsible unless they are capable of understanding their acts.105 This 
means that a child could be prosecuted under French law for international crimes. It is 
important to mention that 114 countries have ratified the Rome Statute and 65 of 
them have already implemented it within domestic law.106 10735 countries also have 
some form of advanced draft implementing legislation. These data suggest that, in
101 Art. 1 o f  the Rome Statute provides that the ICC is complementary to national criminaljurisdiction. In 
his inaugural speech, the ICC prosecutor introduced the idea o f  positive complementarity. Under this 
principle, the ICC shall encourage national systems to prosecute crimes that fall under the ICC jurisdiction. 
It is to be contrasted with negative complementarity under which the ICC prosecute crimes within its 
jurisdiction when states are unwilling or unable to do so: Benjamin N Schiff, Building the International 
Criminal Court (New York: Canbridge University Press, 2008) at 117.
102 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24.
103 Constitution de la République Française, JO, 4 October 1958, art.55.
104 Art. 212-2 o f  the criminal code was modified by law 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adaptation du 
droit pénal à l'institution de la Cour Pénale Internationale.
105 art. 122-8 Cpén.
106 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Ratification and Implementation”, online: Coalition for 




65 countries, individuals can be prosecuted for international crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and another 35 countries will soon be able to do so. As 
mentioned earlier in this paper, most countries allow for the prosecution of children in 
their domestic system. This leads to the conclusion that, potentially, a majority of the 
countries in the world could prosecute children for international crimes within their 
domestic system. If most of the domestic laws allow for the prosecution of children, 
including domestic laws that have been imported from the international level, then, 
why should international criminal law rule in a different way?
2- Domestic Prosecutions o f Child Soldiers
Theoretical considerations stating that child soldiers could be prosecuted by most 
domestic systems are supported to some extent by states’ practices. Child soldiers have 
been prosecuted in Africa and more recently by the United States. 
a- In Africa
In Africa, child soldiers have been charged under domestic laws for international 
crimes such as war crimes. For instance, in 2000, the DRC executed a 14 year old child 
soldier and, in 2001, another four aged between fourteen and sixteen were condemned to 
death.108 In the end, these children were not executed due to pressures from non­
governmental organizations (NGOs).109 In Uganda, two former child soldiers were 
accused of treason.110 However, these charges were later withdrawn, following lobbying
108 Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Foreign Minister o f  Democratic Republic o f  Congo” (2 May 2001), 
online: HRW <http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/index.html>; Human Rights Watch, Press Release “Congo: 
Don't Execute Child Soldiers: Four Children to be Put to Death” (2 May 2001), online: HRW <http:// 
www.hrw.org/press/2001/05/congo0502.html>; Human Rights Watch, “Congo Spares Child Soldiers” 
(June 2001), online: HRW <http://hrw.org/updatew/2001/06.html>.
109 Ibid
110 Human Rights Watch, “Uganda: Letter to Minister o f  Justice” (19 February 2003), online: HRW 
<http://hrw.org/pres/2003/02/uganda021903-ltr.html>; Human Rights Watch, Press Release “Uganda: Drop
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by Human Rights Watch, on the basis that Uganda was under the international obligation 
to rehabilitate child soldiers. Another interesting case is the situation in Rwanda 
mentioned earlier, under which children were charged at the domestic level with 
committing genocide, an international crime implemented domestically. It was reported 
that almost 4000 children were detained in Rwanda following the genocide, only 1500 of 
whom had been released from detention by 2001.111 123Two institutions allowed prosecution 
of child soldiers: the domestic courts and the gacaca. Rwandan legislation provides that 
offenders under the age of 14 cannot incur penal responsibility. Offenders between the 
age of 14 and 18 are entitled to raise their status as minors as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing. In prosecuting those responsible for genocide, the Rwandan courts applied 
these mitigating factors. For instance, a minor under 18 years found guilty before 
domestic courts of killing five Tutsi children was sentenced to only five years’ 
imprisonment.114 Gacaca proceedings are a traditional method of dispute resolution 
adapted to promote accountability for offenses related to genocide.115 Gacaca proceedings 
are different from the Rwandan conventional courts because their focus is on both 
retribution and reconciliation.116 Because of this, gacaca proceedings offer a more 
diversified array of punishment ranging from imprisonment to community service.117 
Gacaca proceedings also recognize that minors should be treated differently from adults.
Treason Charges Against Child Abductees” (March 4, 2003), online: HRW
<http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/03/uganda030403.html>.
111 Nienke Grossman, “Rehabilitation or revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human Rights’ 
Violations” (2007) 38 Geo. J. oflnt'l L. 323 at 351.
112 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) [Drumbl] at 79.
113 Ibid.
114 Ministère Public v. Nzabonimpa, RMP 69.430/S4/KD, RP/R1/98 (28 December 1998) (Gisenyi 1ère 
Instance).
115 Drumbl, supra note 112 at 85.
116 Ibid at 86.
m  Ibid at 88.
Minors under 14 years cannot face prosecution but can be placed in special solidarity 
camps, whereas minors between 14 and 18 years must benefit from reduced 
punishment. A last example is the one of DRC where, very recently, a 15 year-old 
accused of rape was found to be outside the jurisdiction of a military court trying 
individuals for crimes against humanity and was sent to be tried in a domestic juvenile 
court.18 19 120Read together, these elements may be interpreted as indicating that child soldiers 
may be prosecuted under domestic jurisdictions, under the condition that their status of 
juveniles is respected. Therefore, if they are to be prosecuted, juvenile justice systems 
should be used.
b- The Case o f Omar Khadr
Omar Khadr is a Canadian citizen who was bom in 1986. It is alleged that his father 
“was a high-ranking member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a senior Al-Qaeda operative and 
a close associate of Osama bin Laden.” It is also alleged that from 1996 until 2001, 
Khadr “travelled throughout Afghanistan with his father meeting senior Al-Qaeda 
members and visiting Al-Qaeda training camps and guest houses. In the summer of 2002, 
he received personal training in the use of arms and explosives and, on completion of his 
training, joined a team of Al-Qaeda operatives constructing and planting landmines 
targeted against U.S. and coalition forces.” Khadr is accused by US officials to have 
murdered the US sergeant Christopher Speer by throwing a grenade at him during a 
firefight between US Special Forces and a group of Al-Qaeda operatives. Following 
his arrest and transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Khadr was charged under the newly created
118 Ibid.
119 Kelly Askin, “Guilty”, online: blog open society < http://blog.soros.org/201 l/02/fizi-diary-guiIty/>.
120 Happold, supra note 1 at 59. <
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid  at 57.
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system of Guantanamo Military Commissions with “conspiracy, murder by an 
unprivileged belligerent, attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent.” However, 
these commissions were later struck down as being unconstitutional.123 24 1256789Instead, new
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charges were brought against Khadr after the Military Commission Act was signed. 
These include “Murder in Violation of the Law of War, Attempted Murder in Violation 
of the Law of War, Conspiracy, Providing Material Support for Terrorism and 
Spying.” In October 2011, he entered a guilty plea. According to the plea agreement, 
Khadr pleaded guilty “in exchange for an eight-year sentence, with a likely transfer to a
19RCanadian prison after one year.”
Khadr’s case is controversial in many aspects and his prosecution has been widely 
criticized. First, commentators such as David Crane (the first Prosecutor at the SCSL) 
have argued that child soldiers, including Omar Khadr, should not be prosecuted. They 
are primarily seen as victims who do not have the choice but to kill and therefore they 
lack the mens rea to commit war crimes. Second, other commentators such as Matthew 
Happold do not exclude the idea that child soldiers could be prosecuted under certain 
circumstances. However, they have criticized the process under which Omar Khadr was
123 U.S. v. Omar Khadr United States, Case No. 05-0008, Military Commission.
124 Hamdam v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006) : Held that the military commissions lack “the power to 
proceed because its structures and procedures violate both the Uniform Code o f  Military Justice and the 
four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949.”)
125 Military Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (Oct. 17,2006).
126 United States v. Omar Khadr, online: <http://www.defense.gov/news/Apr2007/Khadrreferral.pdf>.
127 Jeanne Meserve, CNN Wire Staff "Youngest Guantanamo detainee pleads guilty" (25 October, 2010), 
online: CNN < http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/10/25/khadr.plea/>.
128Andrea Prasow, “Khadr’s Plea Agreement and Sentencing” (5 November 2010), online: Amnesty 
International < http://www.hrw.Org/en/news/2010/l l/05/khadrs-plea-agreement-and-sentencing>.
129 David Crane, “Children as Terrorists, Wrong to Train, Wrong to Charge” (2008), online: Jurist 
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i inprosecuted. Indeed, in prosecuting Omar Khadr, the United States did not respect its
1 ^ 1
international obligations in terms of respecting juvenile justice standards.
Countries that have ratified the Rome Statute are under the obligation to prosecute 
individuals accused of international crimes. This obligation implies that when these 
countries have a functioning juvenile justice system, they are under the obligation to 
prosecute child soldiers when appropriate. However, due to states’ overlapping 
obligations between the Rome Statute and other international treaties, states are also 
under the legal obligation to respect standards imposed by other international 
instruments. If domestic systems must prosecute child soldiers, respecting international 
standards, why would international criminal justice be different? . . ^
D- Openings under International Criminal Law: Prosecution of Children for 
International Crimes
The argument that children could be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals is 
strengthened by the current legal framework. Indeed, the ICC gives some openings 
towards prosecuting child soldiers. Dominic Ongwen was abducted by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army when he was 10 and has since fought with that group. The ICC has 
issued an arrest warrant against him for three counts of crimes against humanity and four 
counts of war crimes. However, the question of whether he can be held liable is 
controversial because he is a complex political victim.130 234 His early victimization created 
the conditions under which he committed serious crimes and also the conditions under
130 Happold, supra note 1 at 72.
131 Human Rights Watch, “The Omar Khadr Case: A  Teenager Imprisoned at Guantanamo” (June 2007), 
online: HRW <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/06/01/omar-khadr-case>.
132 Justice and Reconciliation Project, Complicating Victims and Perpetrators in Uganda:
On Dominic Ongwen (Field Note 7: July 2008) [Ongwen, Field Note].
133 Ongwen, Warrant o f Arrest, supra note 103.
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which he became one of the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Dominic Ongwen 
has not yet been arrested and the mandate of the IGC only allows the prosecution of 
crimes that happened after 2002.135 136At that time, Dominic Ongwen was already an adult. 
Therefore, the case does not directly illustrate a situation where an individual is being 
prosecuted for crimes committed when he was a child. However, it does show a 
willingness o f the ICC to consider that victimization while a young child does not 
necessarily imply lack of the mens rea requirement once an adult.
Child soldiers are not mere innocent victims. They are also perpetrators of 
international crimes. For this reason, arguments that they should be prosecuted can be 
made. However, prosecuting child soldiers may not be in accordance with, the mandate of 
international criminal tribunals which is to prosecute those who are the most 
responsible. How can one seriously consider that a child who is victim of the crime of 
recruitment and use to participate actively in hostilities would be the most responsible for 
the subsequent crimes that occur? In addition to this, if international criminal tribunals 
were to prosecute children, major difficulties would occur, v
III- Rationale for Excluding the Prosecution of Child Soldiers 
The previous section emphasized the arguments one can make in favour of 
prosecuting child soldiers by international criminal tribunals. However, there are also 
strong reasons to advocate in favour of excluding such prosecutions. The prosecution of 
child soldiers should not be allowed by international criminal law for three reasons. First, 
even though the CRC contains provisions that can be understood as favouring 
prosecution of child soldiers, it also contains a provision on the best interests of the child.
135 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 11(1).
136 Statute o f  the SCSL, supra note 55, art. 1(1).
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It is doubtful that prosecuting child soldiers would be in their best interests. Second, 
prosecuting child soldiers would raise serious practical issues. International criminal 
tribunals, with the exception of the SCSL, do not allow for such prosecutions. However, 
in the hypothesis one argues that theoretically, they could do so, one would also have to 
think about the difficulties this would raise. Third, in the event one argues that, 
theoretically, child soldiers could be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals and 
finds a way to overcome challenges linked to such prosecutions, it is unlikely that such 
prosecutions would be a success. Indeed, child soldiers would be entitled to raise 
defences provided by international criminal law and that would rule out their liability.
A- Special Guarantees and the “Best Interests” of the Child
The CRC contains provisions on child criminal liability which allows one to think that 
the CRG supports prosecution of children. However, these specific provisions have to be 
read in accordance with article 3 of the CRC which refers to the “best interests” of the 
child as a primary consideration. The Beijing rules also establish that the aims of 
juvenile justice should include; an emphasis on the “well-being of the juvenile.” It is 
difficult to see how international prosecution of children who are victims of the crime of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers would serve the best interests of these children. 
Instead, the purpose of juvenile justice is rehabilitation and therefore, criminal 
prosecutions should be at last resort. Moreover, in the context of the debates on 
whether or not the SCSL should prosecute child soldiers, some argued that the 
prosecution of child soldiers would not serve their best interests and that other solutions 137*9
137 CRC, supra note 14, art. 3.
Beijing Rules, supra note 49, rule 5.
139 Daniel Ryan, “International Laws and Laws o f  War and International Criminal Law- Prosecution o f  
Child Soldiers- United States vs Omar Khadr” (2010) 33 Suffolk Transnat’l L Rev 175 at 184.
such as truth and reconciliation commissions might be more appropriate.140 The Report 
from the UN Secretary-General mentions that “the international non-governmental 
organizations responsible for child-care and rehabilitation programmes, together with 
some of their national counterparts, however, were unanimous in their objections to any 
kind of judicial accountability for children below 18 years of age for fear that such a 
process would place at risk the entire rehabilitation programme so painstakingly 
achieved.”141 The Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed 
Conflict argued that “based on the current practice of ad hoc tribunals, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court, there is an emerging consensus 
that children below the age of 18 should not be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity by international courts.”142 Moreover, some argue that children “have 
no place at a war crimes tribunal, no matter how benevolent such a tribunal may be 
towards them.”143
Prosecuting child soldiers may not be the best way to ensure their reintegration and 
therefore, it may be against their best interests. Even if prosecutions were not a barrier to 
their best interests, other issues would have to be considered.
130
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B- Practical issues
Currently only the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) allows for prosecutions of 
child soldiers but has never used its power to do so. This section aims at giving an idea of 
practical concerns international criminal tribunals, including the ICC would have to face 
if child soldiers were prosecuted before them. First, international criminal tribunals 
simply do not have the resources in place to ensure solid application of the rights that 
should be guaranteed to juvenile offenders. In the CRC, children are guaranteed 
procedural rights that are common to adults such as the presumption of innocence but 
also specific rights such as the right to privacy at all stages of the proceedings.144 
International criminal proceedings are structured around the principle of public hearings 
and this principle is included in the Statutes of international criminal tribunals.145 
Exceptions to the principle of public hearings are provided by the Rome Statute in order, 
for instance, to protect victims and witnesses or accused.146 However, the Statute of the 
SCSL, which allows for the prosecution of child soldiers, does not contain any provision 
on the practical application of the right to privacy of children. It only mentions that “the 
accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the 
Special Court for the protection of victims and witnesses.”147 The issue here is to 
determine what the “measures” are. One can imagine that protective measures would be 
the same accorded to victims and witnesses of the ICC such as protection of the identity 
or distortion of voices and faces.148 However, there is currently one very controversial
144 CRC, supra note 14, art. 40(2)(b)(i) and (vii).
■45 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 67(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 16 art. 21(2); Statute o f the International 
Criminal Tribunal fo r  Rwanda, 8 November 1994, 33 ILM 1598, art. 20(2).
146 Ibid, arts. 68(2); 22; 21.
147 Statute o f the SCSL, supra note 55, art. 17(2).
148 Markus Funk, Victim’s Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) at 123.
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protective measure, which is the use of anonymous witnesses.149 It has been argued that it 
goes against the principle of transparency and fair trial for the accused.150 Does the right 
to privacy include the right to be prosecuted anonymously in the case of child soldiers?
Another practical problem with prosecuting child soldiers is the double role they may 
play: in the ICC, victims’ participation is a novelty and has appeared to be necessary.151 152
The Rome Statute provides that “where the personal interests of the victims are affected, 
the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages 
of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is 
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial 
trial.” But what about case situations where victims are the same as .the perpetrators? 
Would it be fair to prosecute a child as a perpetrator while knowing that he or she could 
also be considered as a victim? Wording of the Rome Statute indicates that as long as 
personal interests of the victims are affected, these victims shall be able to present then- 
views and concerns at all stages of the proceedings. Child soldiers cannot be prosecuted 
by the ICC. However, if this was an option, it means that child soldiers accused of 
international crimes and prosecuted by the ICC could legitimately request the status of 
victim. This duality victim-perpetrator would pose a major challenge.
Apart from practical issues, prosecution of child soldiers may not be an option for the 
reason that most of the time, they could be unsuccessful. Therefore, instead of spending
149 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-108, Decision Establishing General Principles 
Governing Application to restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) o f  the Statute (19 May 2006) 
(ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I); Salvatore Zappala, “The Rights o f  the Victims vs the Rights o f  the 
Accused”(2010) 8 JICJ 137 at 150.
150 Ibid.
151 Mariana Pena, “Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: Achievements made and 
Challenges Lying Ahead” (2010) 16 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 497 at 502.
152 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 68(3).
money in prosecutions, funding would be better spent in programs aiming at reintegrating 
child soldiers.
G- Defences Under International Criminal Law
International criminal law is governed by general principles of liability. In order to be 
found criminally liable, the elements of actus reus (criminal act), mens rea (intent to 
commit a criminal act) and grounds for excluding liability have to be examined. 
Concerning crimes committed by child soldiers, the actus reus may be quite easy to 
prove, assuming a prosecutor can locate witnesses or other evidence. The next step is to 
examine whether the child had the intention to commit such an act. As mentioned above, 
domestic systems are entitled to determine a minimum age for criminal liability under 
which an individual is deemed to be criminally irresponsible. Such provisions are used to 
reflect the idea that, up to a certain age, an individual does not have the capacity to fully 
understand his or her acts and the consequences of these acts. Therefore, lack of mens rea 
is presumed. As noted earlier, international criminal law does not determine a minimum
age for criminal liability so that one cannot say exactly where the line is to be drawn.
\
However, one might suggest that, since the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute 
minors, minority status is a valid excuse to go unpunished. Another defence child 
soldiers could raise is the one of intoxication. Many studies have shown that child 
soldiers are compelled to take alcohol or drugs in order to make them become fearless.153 54 
Since the use of both impairs discernment, international criminal law recognizes that 
involuntary intoxication is an excuse.155 Last but not least is the defence of duress. Child
153 Ibid, art. 26.
154 UNICEF “Weah Speaks out About Child Soldiers”, online: UNICEF
<http://www.unicef.org/infobycoimtry/liberia_19220.html>.
155 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 31(l)(b).
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soldiers are subjected to brutal indoctrination methods used by the armed groups to which 
they are part. It has been reported that children who disobey their commanders are 
savagely killed in front of other children in order to set an example.156 1578In these 
circumstances, child soldiers are constantly under threat of being tortured or killed. 
Executing orders is the only way of survival for those children. The Rome Statute clearly 
indicates that a person is not criminally responsible when the, crime was committed under 
duress. However, in the Erdemovic case, the ICTY said that duress was only a 
mitigating factor. Since duress is approached differently by the various international 
criminal tribunals, it is not clear whether child soldiers could use this defence as an 
excuse that would rule out their liability. What is clear is that they could at least invoke 
duress as a mitigating factor.
IV- Conclusion
Child soldiers are complex political individuals who can be considered both, victims 
and perpetrators. If - contrary to calls from most children’s rights organizations, child
soldiers who committed crimes are to be treated primarily as perpetrators - one should
\
make sure that a child is indeed legally capable of committing crimes: The main issue 
when trying to answer the difficult question of child criminal liability is the mens rea 
requirement. Can a child have the intention to commit an international crime? No 
minimum age for criminal liability is determined by international law for the reason that 
no consensus can be reached. This age depends on the conception each state has of 
childhood and therefore, it widely differs from one country to another. Arguments given 
in favour of the prosecution of child soldiers find support in the theories of punishment,
156 Ongwen, Field Note, supra note 132.
157 Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 31(l)(d).
158 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Judgment (7 October 1997) ( ICTY, Appeals Chamber) para 19.
in international human rights law and in domestic practices. Moreover, international 
criminal law provides some openings towards this option. Arguments given against the 
prosecution of child soldiers are grounded on the idea that the best interests of the child 
should be respected. In addition to this, in the event prosecutions would occur, children 
would benefit of defences provided by international criminal law.
Based on the above considerations, child soldiers should never be prosecuted under 
the age of fifteen years. Most domestic systems recognize criminal liability around the 
mid-teens.159 Therefore, this option would go along with current state practice. Moreover, 
it would be supported by psychological analyses that tend to demonstrate that from the 
age of 15 years, children may be capable of moral responsibility. After turning fifteen, 
child soldiers should be able to be prosecuted. This argument is strongly reinforced by the 
fact that, if it is legal for armed forces to recruit children from that age,160 it means that 
children of that age are capable of making independent choices. However, prosecution of 
children between 15 years and 18 years is not necessarily the best way to implement the 
right to reintegration promoted by the CRC. This is the reason why children between 15 
years and 18 years could be held accountable in other ways than criminal prosecutions.
135
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Concluding Chapter
This thesis has highlighted the debates and complications with determining liability at 
the international level for international crimes committed by child soldiers. Specifically, 
emphasis was put on liability of adults for the war crime of recruitment and use of child 
soldiers as well as on liability of child soldiers themselves for the international crimes 
they commit. Chapter 1 was an introduction to international law on child soldiers. It is 
clear that the practice of child soldiering is unanimously condemned by the international 
community. However, the theme of child soldering faces tensions that still have to be 
solved. This is so because international law is developed by states but states’ practices on 
childhood are not uniform. For instance, states cannot agree on the borders of childhood 
and this is problematic because the very notion of childhood impacts on the definition of 
child soldiers. While a 14 year-old involved in an armed conflict may be considered as an 
adult - and therefore not as a child soldier - in some countries, this same individual may 
be considered as a child - and therefore, as a child soldier - in another country. 
International law itself is ambiguous when it comes to defining who is a child soldier. 
International human rights law defines child soldier as any individual under 18 years 
involved in an armed group whereas international criminal law criminalizes the 
recruitment and use of children under 15 years to participate actively in hostilities.
Chapter 2 presented an overview of the general principles of liability applicable under 
international criminal law. These principles were applied in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis 
in order to analyse criminal liability of adults who recruit and use child soldiers and 
criminal liability of child soldiers for their own crimes. Basically, the principles provide 
that an individual accused of having committed an international crime can be convicted
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only to the extent that a Prosecutor proves that the crime was committed with intent. In 
addition to this, a Prosecutor must indicate the mode of liability under which the accused 
is being charged. Modes of liability range from personal commission of a crime through 
command responsibility, which represents liability of superiors for the crimes committed 
by subordinates. Lastly, the general principles of liability contain justifications and 
excuses that must be taken into account in order to either release an individual from any 
guilt, or in order to mitigate the sentence of an individual.
Chapter 3 analyzed the war crime of recruitment and use of child soldiers. It 
introduced individuals accused of such a war crime by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and for whom proceedings are 
pending. It also introduced three cases from the SCSL where individuals were convicted 
of this war crime. These three cases provide guidance for interpreting the constitutive 
elements of the crime. Lastly, chapter 3 analyzed liability of adults who recruit and use 
child soldiers for the crimes committed by these children.
Chapter 4 shed light on the controversial issue of liability of child soldiers for their 
international crimes. The most problematic theme when discussing liability of child 
soldiers is the one of legality. Because child soldiers are children, it is difficult to 
establish whether the required mens rea element to commit a crime is present. However, 
based on scientific studies, it appears that children over 15 years are capable of acting 
with intent and therefore could be legitimately prosecuted. These findings are 
corroborated by the current state of law since most domestic systems, as well as 
international human rights law, allow for such prosecutions to take place. Nevertheless,
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treatment of children accused of criminal acts must be different than the treatment 
reserved for adults.
As a result of the foregoing analysis, this thesis advocates the following 
recommendations: liability of adults who recruit and use child soldiers should be 
strengthened by elevating the legal age to recruit and use child soldiers to 18 years and by 
rendering liability for the crimes committed by child soldiers more explicit; and child 
soldiers between 15 and 18 years should account for their crimes but the proceedings and 
the sanctions used should differ from the ones imposed upon adults. In this sense, 
participation by child soldiers in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
programs as well as mechanisms of transitional justice other than criminal proceedings 
would be the most appropriate ways to impose a dimension of accountability.1
I- Strengthening Liability of Adults who Recruit and Use Child Soldiers
International criminal law has adopted significant steps towards punishment of those 
who recruit and use child soldiers. Nevertheless, more needs to be done. Drafters of the 
Rome Statute decided to criminalize the recruitment and use of children under 15 years in 
spite of support from several states and NGOs of an 18 year age limit. This higher age 
limit is reflected in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts (Optional Protocol) which was adopted
4 *5
m response to criticisms directed towards the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The *2
It is to be noted that transitional justice initiatives have another impact which is to complement efforts to 
protect the social and economic rights o f  children in post-conflict societies: Sharanjeet Parmar, “Realizing 
Economic Justice for Children: The Role o f  Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies” (2010), online: 
UNICEF <http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdftj_publication_eng.pdf>.
2 Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court (München, 
Germany: C.H. Beck, 2008) at 468.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f the Child on the involvement o f children in armed 
conflict, GA Res 54/263, UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/54/49, (2000) [OPT]; Convention on the 
Rights o f the Child, GA Res 44/25, UNGAOR, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/44/49, (1989) [CRC].
139
latter was seen as providing a weak framework to protect children from being recruited 
and used in armed conflicts.4 The Optional Protocol elevated the minimum age for 
compulsory recruitment by states’ armed forces to 18 years.5 Also, state parties are 
obligated to “take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who 
have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”6 78To date, 140 
countries have signed and ratified the Optional Protocol and 24 more have signed but not
n
yet ratified. Universal ratification of the Optional Protocol in the future might reflect a 
new customary norm which forbids recruitment and use of child soldiers under 18 years. 
International criminal law should recognize the push made towards a higher standard and 
criminalize recruitment and use of child soldiers under 18 years. In addition to this, 
international criminal law should make it clear that adults who recruit and use child 
soldiers may also be held liable for the crimes committed by these children under the 
doctrines of ordering or command responsibility. This clarification needs to be made in 
future decisions rendered by international criminal tribunals by including an independent 
paragraph dealing with liability of the accused for the specific crimes committed by child 
soldiers. The current approach taken by international criminal law is to exclude 
prosecution of child soldiers. This means that, if those responsible for their recruitment 
and use are not considered guilty of the crimes committed by these children, no one is
4 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) 
at 72.
5 OPI, supra note 3, art. 1.
6 Ibid, art. 2.
7 “Status o f  Ratification”(2011) online: UN
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-l 1-b&chapter=4&lang=en>. 
The United States is not party to the CRC, however, it has ratified OPI, “Optional Protocols to the 
Convention on the Rights o f  the Child”, online: UNICEF <
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_protocols.html>.
8 R. Coomaraswamy, “The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f the Child on the 
Involvement o f  Children in Armed Conflict- Towards Universal Ratification” (2010) 18 International 
Journal o f  Children’s Rights at 539.
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assuming liability for the children’s crimes. Therefore, liability of adults for the crimes 
committed by child soldiers is important because, otherwise, victims of these crimes will 
not be able to find justice. However, even if child soldiers are not held liable before 
international criminal tribunals, they should account for their crimes in other ways.
II- Accountability for Children between 15 and 18 Years
This thesis concluded that children under 15 years should never be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals, nor be held accountable in any other way. While the age 
limit of 15 years might appear arbitrary, it is to be recommended for one principal reason. 
Psychological studies, as well as recent findings on neuroscience, demonstrate that most 
children under 15 years are not emotionally and physically as developed as adults.9 
Because of this, they do not have the capacity to fully understand their acts and, 
therefore, to commit a crime with intent. It would go against the general principles of 
liability to condemn an individual who did not possess the mens rea at the time of the 
crime.
From the age of 15 years, children can be considered as young adults in the sense that, 
from this age, most of the children have attained an emotional and physical maturity 
similar to that of adults. Because of this, children between 15 and 18 years should be held 
accountable for their acts. Because early abuse and victimization has an impact on one’s 
understanding of right and wrong, it could be argued that child soldiers should not be 
held liable for their crimes. However, this solution is not satisfactory because at some 
point there must be a limit at which individuals can be held accountable for their acts, 
independent from their past experiences. For instance, individuals who had been child 
soldiers and who are now adults, such as Dominic Ongwen, can be prosecuted by
9 For deeper analysis on this, see chapter 4, para I-B o f  this thesis.
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international criminal tribunals. Their past as child soldiers and the fact that their early 
victimization created the conditions under which they committed crimes does not relieve 
them of liability and therefore of the potential to be criminally prosecuted. This author 
acknowledges, however, that this position is controversial, particularly in the case of 
Dominic Ongwen. This thesis recommends that such individuals be prosecuted, in spite 
of the fact that their past may explain their acts. After all, domestic jurisdictions do 
prosecute rapists even though they may have been raped themselves when younger. Their 
past is considered as a mitigating circumstance.
At the international level, the reasoning should be the same: even though an individual 
may have acted as he or she did because his or her behaviour was conditioned by earlier 
experiences, these experiences must not be an excuse to shield these persons from 
accountability. Doing otherwise would lead to absence of criminal prosecutions because 
most individuals would have an excuse to act as they did. And yet, criminal prosecutions 
are necessary because they aim at providing retribution and deterring future criminal 
behaviour. The question still to be answered is the one of the age at which one decides 
that lack of accountability should end. 15 years is a legitimate age because, as noted 
above, at that age, children have acquired the capacity to intentionally commit crimes. 
However, international criminal prosecutions of child soldiers are not to be recommended 
for two reasons. First, it is difficult to imagine that a child would be the most responsible 
for the commission of an international crime. Since international criminal tribunals have 
mandate to prosecute only those most responsible, prosecutions of children are not 
realistic. Second, children under 18 years are not considered as adults under international 
law because of the necessity to be protected. In other words, even though children over
142
15 years are as developed and mature as adults, they are still vulnerable. This 
vulnerability can be explained by the fact that they do not enjoy as many rights as adults 
and are therefore dependent upon adults to have these rights respected. As a corollary, 
children are given rights by international law in order to be protected from vulnerability. 
For instance, when a child is accused of having committed a criminal act, his or her 
reintegration into society should be a primary concern.10 This is why accountability 
through other mechanisms than international criminal tribunals is particularly suited to 
child soldiers who have committed serious crimes.
Ill- Accountability of Child Soldiers Outside the Framework of Criminal 
Proceedings
Child soldiers over 15 years could be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals in 
the event these had jurisdiction over minors because children over 15 years are capable of 
committing crimes with the required mens rea element. However, child soldiers between 
15 and 18 years are still children and their vulnerability should be taken into account 
when holding them liable. Participating in DDR programs as well as in Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are two mechanisms that would allow 
accountability of child soldiers and, at the same time, respect their right to reintegrate into 
society.
A- Participation in DDR programs
In order for child soldiers to account for their acts without being involved in criminal 
proceedings, participation in programs monitored by international organizations and 
having accountability and rehabilitative dimensions could be used. Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs are monitored by the United Nations
10 CRC, supra note 3 art. 40(1).
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and aim at contributing to security and stability in post-conflict environments by 
removing weapons from the hands of ex-combatants and helping them to integrate 
socially and economically into society.11 123Disarmament is the collection, documentation, 
control and disposal of any arms and weapons of combatants and of the civilian 
population. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants 
from armed forces or other armed groups. Reintegration is the process by which ex­
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.14 DDR 
programs are being implemented mostly in Africa. Because recruitment of children by 
armed forces is illegal under international law, children’s DDR programs are not the 
same as that of adults.15 Rather, children’s DDR programs are used as an attempt to 
prevent or redress a violation of children’s human rights. For instance, in Sierra Leone, 
while demobilized adults received cash stipends and skills training, children had the 
choice between access to education or skills training.16 However, this child/adult 
differentiation was an issue because some children claimed that they were adults in order 
to receive cash.17 18
So far, success of children’s DDR programs has been relative. The DDR program in 
Sierra Leone is considered as one of the most successful. In total, 72,440 individuals
11 United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Center, “What is a DDR”, 





16 John Williamson, “The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration o f  child soldiers: social and 
psychological transformation in Sierra Leone” (2006) 4 Intervention: The International Journal o f  Mental 
Health,
Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas o f  Armed Conflict 185 [Williamson] at 189.
17 Ibid.
18 Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, “Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration,
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have been demobilized, 6,845 of whom were children.19 201The example of Sierra Leone 
shows that, while the objectives of disarmament and demobilization have been achieved, 
a different conclusion can be made with respect to reintegration. As noted by the 
Women’s Refugee Commission, “many children, adolescents and women left behind by 
the DDR face a range of new, serious problems, including: an inability to provide for the 
children they bore while in captivity with armed groups; the experience of strong 
negative stigmatization within their communities and families; migrations to urban areas 
in search of work; becoming homeless “street kids;” using drugs and committing crimes; 
and becoming involved in commercial sex work.” Several factors can explain these 
failures. First, DDR programs are often conditioned to the presentation of a weapon in 
order to be eligible to participate. This leads to the exclusion of girls who are often used 
by armed groups as sex slaves and/or to perform domestic chores and are therefore not 
given a weapon. Second, DDR programs are under-funded. Because of this, there is a 
lack of financial support in order to provide education and skills training. For instance, a 
young boy reported that DDR was not “effective because they don’t buy us material for 
our school.” Third, children who were formerly abducted by armed groups and who 
have now become adults are excluded from children DDR programs and because of this, 
they do not get sufficient support in order to reintegrate within society.23 Specifically, it 
was easier for children associated with the Civil Defence Forces to reintegrate than for
and Gender-based Violence in Sierra Leone” (2002), online: Women’s Refugee Commission < 
http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/docs/sl_ddr03.pdf> at 1.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid at 1.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid at 6.
22 Ibid at 7.
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children associated with the Revolutionary United Front.24 25678This was because, in the 
former case, children were able to keep close links with their families because their 
fighting took place close to home (to defend their villages) and often with the support of 
their families, in the latter case, the child soldiers were often forced to commit atrocities 
against family members as a tactic of the Revolutionary United Front to completely 
alienate and separate the children from any support network they may have had in the 
past. Lastly, successful reunification with family does not necessarily equate with true 
reintegration. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, family or community reunification was mostly 
successful. Even so, experts have noted that there is a difference between accepting a 
child within the community and accepting his or her past as a child soldier because 
“acceptance and physical reintegration are not necessarily synonymous with 
reconciliation.” Experience shows that communities care deeply about the past of their
children, and that children who committed atrocities will have greater difficulties with
• 28 reintegration.
Children’s DDR programs as an alternative to prosecution of former child soldiers 
would need to be extended in order to contain a dimension of accountability. As 
described above, aiming at reuniting children with their families is not enough because 
families do not necessarily accept the past of the child. This can lead to stigmatization
24 Williamson, supra note 16 at 192.
25 Ibid at 190-191.
26 In Siena Leone, 98% o f the children demobilized were re-united with parents or relatives: Williamson, 
supra note 16 at 192. In Liberia, 94 % o f  former fighters (adults and children) who went through DDR 
process, said they had no problem being re-accepted to their communities: Republic o f  Liberia, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Report, Volume III, Appendices, Title II, Children, The Conflict and the TRC 
Children Agenda (2009) at 72.
27 Veale & Starvou, “Former Lord's Resistance Army Child Soldier Abductees: Explorations o f  Identity in 
Reintegration and Reconciliation” (2007) 13 Peace and Conflict: Journal o f Peace Psychology 273 at 289.
28 Mark Drumbl, “Child Soldiers, Transitional Justice, and the Architecture o f  Post Bellum Settlements” 
(Paper delivered at the International Studies Association’s Conference, Montreal, Canada, March 2011), 
[unpublished] [Drumbl] at 27.
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and ultimately to rejection of the child. Effective children’s DDR programs should 
include as many children as possible so that no child is left behind and therefore left 
vulnerable to being re-recruited by armed groups or to becoming street children involved 
in new sorts of violence such as stealing and using drugs. Secondly, when children are 
being reunited with their families, an accountability dimension should be given for those 
who committed crimes. However, accountability should not be understood as criminal 
accountability. Instead, what matters in this case is acceptance of the child by the 
community through other forms of accountability such as purification rituals and 
cleansing ceremonies. The Paris Principles, as well as the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, recognize these cultural practices and 
recommend their use as long as they are not harmful to the child.29 30 312In addition or in the 
alternative of taking part in traditional methods of reintegration, child soldiers could 
participate in TRCs.
B- Participation in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
TRCs are a tool used by restorative justice. The perspective taken by restorative 
justice is to restore both the victim and perpetrator of crimes back into harmony with the 
community. TRCs are bodies established to look at human rights violations that took 
place during a specific period of time in a country. The inquiry leads to the drafting and
29 Ibid at 17.
30 Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces o f Armed Groups (February 2007), 
online: UN <http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf>, 
principle 7.53 provides: “In some communities, children are viewed and view themselves as carrying bad 
spirits from their experiences with armed forces or armed groups. Appropriate cultural practices, as long as 
they are not harmful to children, can be essential to a child’s reintegration and should be supported.”; 
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, 6.20 Transitional Justice and DDR, 
online: UNDDR < http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/06/download/IDDRS_620.pdf> at 26.
31 Joanna R. Quinn, Transitional Justice, by M. Goodhart (London: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 368.
32 Ibid at 369.
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release of a report containing a detailed account of what has taken place.33 The role of a 
TRC is to record a full and impartial history of the war.34 While the South African TRC 
was criticized, among other things, for not leaving an opportunity for children to testify, 
the TRCs in Liberia and in Sierra Leone rectified this mistake.35 However, in Sierra 
Leone, it was decided that all children would be treated as witnesses in order to prevent 
them from being heard as victims or perpetrators.36 In Liberia, children could be heard as 
perpetrators but they were protected from criminal prosecutions and other sanctions.37 38
Moreover, in both countries, participation of children was voluntary, even though both 
TRCs had powers to compel witnesses to appear before them. The consequence of this 
is that children were protected from any form of accountability. And yet, it would be 
important to record human rights violations committed by children alongside with those 
suffered by them. Otherwise, account of the events cannot be full and the healing and 
reconciliation processes could be jeopardized. Therefore, future TRCs should ensure that 
children can be heard as perpetrators and be sanctioned in some way, even though 
children’s rights such as the rights to privacy and to reintegration should be respected.
Analysis of liability for international crimes committed by child soldiers is complex 
because the theme of child soldiering is full of tensions and involves many other 
disciplines than law. For the purpose of this thesis, legal reasoning was informed to some 
extent by psychological studies and transitional justice. It was found that adults who
33 Ibid.
34 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, (Sierra Leone), 2000, art, 6.1.
35 Drumbl, supra note 28 at 9-12.
™ Ibid at 12.
37 Ibid at 14.
38/Wrfat 12-13.
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recruit and use child soldiers should be held criminally liable before international 
criminal tribunals for the crimes committed by child soldiers. It was also found that child 
soldiers between 15 and 18 years should account for their crimes by mechanisms 
different from prosecution by international criminal tribunals. This is so because even 
though child soldiers over 15 years are perfectly able to understand their acts, their status 
as children must be taken into account. What matters in the end is not so much retribution 
for the child’s acts but his or her reintegration within a community he or she may have 
strongly offended. Making sure that child soldiers account for their acts in some ways 
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